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 Abstract 
Securing Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) that are a collection of mobile, decentralized, 
and self-organized nodes is a challenging task. The most fundamental aspect of a MANET is 
its lack of infrastructure, and most design issues and challenges stem from this characteristic. 
The lack of a centralized control mechanism brings added difficulty in fault detection and 
correction. The dynamically changing nature of mobile nodes causes the formation of an 
unpredictable topology. This varying topology causes frequent traffic routing changes, 
network partitioning and packet losses. The various attacks that can be carried out on 
MANETs challenge the security capabilities of the mobile wireless network in which nodes 
can join, leave and move dynamically. The Human Immune System (HIS) provides a 
foundation upon which Artificial Immune algorithms are based. The algorithms can be used 
to secure both host-based and network-based systems. However, it is not only important to 
utilize the HIS during the development of Artificial Immune System (AIS) based algorithms 
as much as it is important to introduce an algorithm with high performance. Therefore, 
creating a balance between utilizing HIS and AIS-based intrusion detection algorithms is a 
crucial issue that is important to investigate. 
The immune system is a key to the defence of a host against foreign objects or pathogens. 
Proper functioning of the immune system is necessary to maintain host homeostasis. The 
cells that play a fundamental role in this defence process are known as Dendritic Cells (DC). 
The AIS based Dendritic Cell Algorithm is widely known for its large number of applications 
and well established in the literature. 
The dynamic, distributed topology of a MANET provides many challenges, including 
 decentralized infrastructure wherein each node can act as a host, router and relay for traffic. 
MANETs are a suitable solution for distributed regional, military and emergency networks. 
MANETs do not utilize fixed infrastructure except where a connection to a carrier network is 
required, and MANET nodes provide the transmission capability to receive, transmit and 
route traffic from a sender node to the destination node. In the HIS, cells can distinguish 
between a range of issues including foreign body attacks as well as cellular senescence. 
The primary purpose of this research is to improve the security of MANET using the AIS 
framework. This research presents a new defence approach using AIS which mimics the 
strategy of the HIS combined with Danger Theory. The proposed framework is known as the 
Artificial Immune System based Security Algorithm (AISBA). 
This research also modelled participating nodes as a DC and proposed various signals to 
indicate the MANET communications state. Two trust models were introduced based on AIS 
signals and effective communication. The trust models proposed in this research helped to 
distinguish between a “good node” as well as a “selfish node”. 
A new MANET security attack was identified titled the Packet Storage Time attack wherein 
the attacker node modifies its queue time to make the packets stay longer than necessary and 
then circulates stale packets in the network. This attack is detected using the proposed 
AISBA. 
This research, performed extensive simulations with results to support the effectiveness of the 
proposed framework, and statistical analysis was done which showed the false positive and 
false negative probability falls below 5%. 
 Finally, two variations of the AISBA were proposed and investigated, including the Grudger 
based Artificial Immune System Algorithm - to stimulate selfish nodes to cooperate for the 
benefit of the MANET and Pain reduction based Artificial Immune System Algorithm - to 
model Pain analogous to HIS. 
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 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
  
 1.1 Introduction 
Wireless communications is a key technology that permits consumers to participate in the 
global digital economy as they go about their daily activities. Fixed and mobile wireless 
communications have evolved rapidly as demand for telecommunications has increased and 
today the rate of technological change is happening faster than ever before. Mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs) are a form of wireless communications that consist of an assemblage of 
wireless mobile nodes which dynamically interchange data amongst themselves without the 
dependence on a fixed base station or a wired backbone network. The goal of MANET is to 
sustain reliable mobile communications by amalgamating the network routing and relay 
functionality into the mobile nodes. The limited transmission range of the mobile nodes 
means that multiple hops could be required to exchange information with other nodes [2]. 
During the last decade, studies have been carried out on MANET routing that have resulted in 
numerous mature routing protocols. However, in most cases, the protocols require a trusted 
MANET environment, which is difficult to achieve. In many situations, the environment is 
susceptible to a range of security and other issues. For example, various behavioural patterns 
can be exhibited in nodes; some nodes can be selfish, malicious, or compromised by 
attackers. Various strategies have been advocated to secure the MANET routing protocols to 
identify and mitigate the various forms of attack, however, MANET security remains an 
active research topic [3]. In this thesis, a literature review is provided that identifies the 
MANET security challenges and an Artificial Immune System (AIS) approach is used to 
secure MANET from selected security related attacks. 
The MANET nodes that are in transmission range of each other are called neighbours. 
 Neighbours should be able to communicate with each other [2,3], however, when a node 
needs to forward data to other non-neighbouring nodes, the data might be routed through a 
sequence of multiple hops, with intermediate nodes acting as routers or relays. The success of 
MANET strongly depends on whether the nodes can be trusted. 
1.2 Research Problem 
MANETs are evolving and the threat landscape has increased, making the security of 
MANET a research focus. Mobility provides advantages and the ad hoc network nature of 
MANETs adds to the advantages, however an insecure MANET would negate many of the 
advantages. Ad hoc networks may be deployed in various terrain and hazardous conditions 
and even hostile environments where the device may be compromised, faulty or 
unserviceable. 
 Resource-constrained nodes. MANET nodes are typically battery powered and have 
limited storage and processing capability. Moreover, they may be situated in areas 
where it is not possible to re-charge and thus have limited lifetimes. Because of these 
limitations, they must be well designed to optimize energy-efficient operation within 
the limits of the storage available and processing capability.  
 Dynamic topology. The topology in an ad hoc network may change continuously due 
to the node mobility. As nodes move in and out of range of each other, some links 
break while new links between nodes are created. Because of these issues, MANETs 
are prone to various faults. 
 Node failures. Nodes may fail at any time due to different types of hazardous 
 environmental conditions. They may also drop out of the network either voluntarily or 
when their energy supply is depleted. 
 Link failures. Node faults and changing environmental conditions (e.g., increased 
EMI) may cause links between nodes to degrade or fail. 
 Route failures. When the network topology changes due to node mobility, nodes 
being added or removed from the network or faults and failures, traffic routes become 
out of date regularly and quickly. Depending upon the network transport protocol, 
packets forwarded through stale routes may eventually be dropped or delayed; packets 
may take a circuitous route before eventually arriving at the destination node. 
MANET routing protocols should deal with these issues to be effective.  
 Dynamic topology. Dynamic topology and changeable node membership may disturb 
the trust relationship between nodes. The trust may also be disturbed if some of the 
nodes are detected as compromised. This dynamic behaviour leads to the need for 
distributed and adaptive security mechanisms.  
 Adversary inside the network. The MANET nodes can freely join and leave the 
network and if they’ve joined the network there is an anticipation that the nodes will 
participate in the MANET, however, MANET nodes restrict power usage and this 
could lead to a selfish node behavior. Selfish behaviour by MANET nodes can lead to 
severely degraded performance making their behaviour mode detrimental in some 
respects than an external security attack. 
 The following research challenges were identified: 
 Applying the HIS concept to MANET to design a “bio immune MANET” 
 Implementing a DC in a MANET context 
 Utilising the HIS concept to address security concerns 
 Variations to typical security attacks 
 How to overcome selfish node behaviour 
 Modelling pain in a MANET 
1.3 Research Aims 
The research carried out encompassed several of the MANET challenges with a focus on the 
development of a robust and reliable security framework utilizing AIS concepts. The research 
aims include: 
1. In the current state of the art the nodes are in a protected state or human intervention 
is required when facing security threats. These situations are impractical in a MANET 
which is known for dynamic topology and node mobility. Therefore, a new and 
innovative approach is necessary which can overcome the challenges of the existing 
MANET design and rectify the drawbacks of the current state of the art. Integration of 
an AIS scheme in MANET packet transmission in order to create AIS based routing 
(Translate AIS signals to MANET signals) has the potential to be a valuable 
framework. 
 2. Model an AIS based security algorithm. Each node is modelled as a DC that initiate 
immune responses. Each DC node monitors the routing process and generates signals 
indicating the presence or absence of danger. 
3. Model the Packet Storage Time Attack. 
4. Model the Grudger based Artificial Immune System based Algorithm that helps to 
stimulate the cooperation of selfish nodes. 
5. Model Pain Reduction Algorithm utilizing AIS concepts to alleviate pain in MANET 
1.4 Objective 
The objective of this research was to: 
1. Analyse nodes based on their states and investigate the Probability of Communication 
as this is important when modelling MANET nodes as DCs.  
2. Implement an AIS based Security Algorithm (AISBA) and model the algorithm 
performance using trust metrics and AIS signals. 
3. Implement the Packet Storage Time (PST) attack and investigate its effect on 
MANET. 
4. Implement a Grudger based Artificial Immune System Algorithm (GrAIS) and model 
the algorithm to see the effects of selfish node stimulation to cooperate in packet 
transmission. 
5. Implement a Pain reduction based Artificial Immune System Algorithm (PrAIS) and 
 model the algorithm to identify MANET Pain analogous to that found in the HIS. 
1.5 Research Contribution 
The research carried out successfully met the research aims and objectives. An improved AIS 
based framework for MANET that incorporated solutions for several of the MANET 
challenges was developed. An AISBA model was proposed and simulated using NS-3. 
AISBA realizes a high detection rate and packet delivery ratio. The selfish nodes that usually 
behave in an adversarial manner were stimulated to cooperate based on the GrAIS model. 
Pain is a stimulus which indicates the cells in HIS are under stress or duress, this concept is 
the first of its kind, namely that PrAIS was modelled in a MANET. Finally, a new routing 
attack PST [59] was designed and simulations were carried out to validate the PST attacker 
utilizing AIS principles. 
The research contribution includes: 
 A review of the literature and a thematic classification of various AIS algorithms. A 
classification is proposed according to the challenges that AIS based MANET 
schemes might attempt to solve, thus providing a more efficient understanding of the 
proposed solution. In addition, the security attacks in MANET have also been detailed 
thereby providing an understanding of the reason behind the investigation of a new 
routing attack in MANET. 
 AISBA has been designed with AIS signals to provide a secure routing algorithm to 
detect selfish nodes. This is inspired from the HIS as the DCs in the Human body 
provide a robust defence. To guarantee reliability and minimizing end-to-end latency, 
 Trust metrics have been modelled and utilized to provide secure routing for MANET 
nodes. Extensive simulations demonstrate that AISBA yields a significant 
improvement in detection rate and packet delivery ratio. 
 A novel routing attack, PST, is implemented in MANET. In PST, the attacker 
modifies the storage time of the packet so that it does not reach the intended 
destination nodes. Utilizing AIS signals the source of the PST attack was identified. 
 A variant of the AISBA, GrAIS, takes advantage of the idea of a Dawkins model of 
birds and transforms the issue of selfish nodes non-cooperation by stimulating them to 
cooperate by utilizing the concept of increasing workload. Simulation results show 
that GrAIS yields significant improvements in the efficiency of packet delivery. 
 The PrAIS approach models pain in MANET. This novel approach is the first of its 
kind where pain that is analogous to what is found in the HIS is added to a MANET 
architecture. PrAIS applies a Pain before action (Pba) and Pain after action (Paa) based 
Pain Reduction approach, which uses the AIS signals, and trust among the nodes. 
Extensive simulations have demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
proposed approach. 
1.6 Publications 
Peer reviewed publications either published or submitted for publication during the research 
program. 
Journal 
 1. L. E. Jim and M. A. Gregory, "A review of artificial immune system based security 
frameworks for Manet," International Journal of Communications, Network and 
System Sciences, vol. 9, p. 1, 2016. (PUBLISHED) 
2. L. E. Jim and M. A. Gregory, "Utilisation of DANGER and PAMP signals to detect a 
MANET Packet Storage Time Attack," Australian Journal of Telecommunications 
and the Digital Economy, vol. 5, pp. 61-74, 2017. (PUBLISHED) 
3. L. E. Jim and M. A. Gregory “AIS Based Danger Theory Framework to Detect 
Selfish Nodes”. (SUBMITTED) 
4. L. E. Jim and M. A. Gregory “A Grudger Based AIS Approach to Coerce Selfish 
Node Cooperation in MANET”. (SUBMITTED) 
Conference 
5. L. E. Jim and M. A. Gregory, "State analysis of Mobile Ad Hoc Network nodes," in 
Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (ITNAC), 2015 
International, 2015, pp. 314-319. (PUBLISHED) 
6. L. E. Jim and M. A. Gregory, "Packet Storage Time attack-a novel routing attack in 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks," in Telecommunication Networks and Applications 
Conference (ITNAC), 2016 27th International, 2016. (PUBLISHED) 
7. L. E. Jim and M. A. Gregory, "Modelling of Pain in an Artificial Immune System 
based MANET," in Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference 
(ITNAC), 2017 27th International, 2017. (ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION) 
 1.7 Thesis Composition 
The research carried out included a literature review, identification of the research steps, 
algorithm development, simulations, analysis of the simulation results, comparison and 
discussion of the results with alternatives found in the literature and identification of future 
work. The thesis chapters presenting the work carried out are summarized to provide a guide 
to the thesis composition. 
Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the research and includes research aims, objectives and 
publications. The introduction presents the motivating factors behind the research, why it is 
important and adds to the body of knowledge and briefly outlines the approach taken. 
Chapter 2 includes a literature review that provides essential material about MANET and the 
current state-of-the-art challenges to assist with understanding the taxonomy of AIS schemes. 
The literature review is aided by the classification of the AIS algorithms and the work done in 
MANET. In addition, a few of the pioneering works related to the research into AIS and 
MANET are presented. Security attacks in MANET are briefly analysed. A brief overview 
highlighting the trade-off between selfishness and altruism is presented. The analogy between 
the MANET and HIS is also presented. 
Chapter 3 provides the design and development of the AISBA framework and key steps are 
identified in the chapter sections. Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 briefly describes the nodes in a 
four-quadrant model that was used for the research and presents the Hop count relation with 
the Probability of Communication. 
Chapter 4 includes the steps taken to detail the AISBA framework, using two types of Trust. 
 The signals are categorized namely the Safe Signal 1, Safe Signal 2, Danger Signal and 
Pathogen Associated Molecular Pattern (PAMP) signal. The PAMP signal is utilized to 
identify selfish nodes. These selfish nodes are identified by the high priority PAMP signal. 
The trust model is applied in terms of Trust based on interaction as well as Trust generated 
due to the signals for which nodes are modelled as DCs. Lastly, the statistical analysis in 
terms of the false positives and false negatives is given in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 presents PST, a novel routing attack in MANET, where the attacker node modifies 
its storage time and thereby does not forward packets to the intended recipient nodes. This 
attack has been evaluated against various metrics. 
Chapter 6 presents the GrAIS Model as this research delves into the need for non-isolating 
selfish nodes, but instead utilize them for the benefit of the MANET. The GrAIS model takes 
its groundwork from the AISBA framework presented in Chapter 4 as well as the grudger 
model of birds. 
Chapter 7 deals with conceptualizing pain as a novel concept in MANET, where the nodes in 
MANET are analogous to the cells in the HIS and thereby prone to pain. A node is said to be 
in pain when the node’s trust and energy are compromised. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by providing a summary and a statement of potential future 
work. 
 Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 2.1 Overview 
The literature review provides background knowledge that underpins the research carried out, 
highlights the techniques, methods and approaches that are the state-of-the-art in the research 
topic area. A brief discussion of different AIS schemes from the current state-of-the-art is 
provided to highlight the directions being explored. To give the readers an overview of AIS 
algorithms, Negative Selection, Clonal Selection (CS), DC and Danger Theory are discussed. 
This chapter is organized into six sections. MANET and the analogy between the MANET 
and HIS is described in Section 2. An overview of MANET and AIS is provided in Section 3. 
The concept of AIS is detailed in Section 4, along with insight into MANET and Danger 
Theory. Section 5 provides details on selected AIS algorithms and their applications. The 
motivation to use AIS and HIS in MANET is detailed in Section 6. Section7 describes the 
research carried out into the use of AIS based techniques in MANET technologies. The 
conclusion and summary are provided in Section 8 and 9 respectively. 
Special attention was given to modelling the nodes for reasons made apparent in the state of 
the art analysis of node modelling provided in Chapter 3. Key concepts in AIS include how 
MANET protocols are utilized, especially utilizing AIS algorithms, are explained in detail 
along with their pros and cons. Finally, the different state of the art techniques are briefly 
described to illustrate how this technique is included in the AISBA framework. Through this 
translation of individual techniques an efficient and reliable the AISBA framework is 
achieved. 
2.2 MANET Background 
MANET is an aggregation of mobile, decentralized, and self-organized nodes. Securing 
 MANET is a challenge when every node forming the network is a potential menace that 
could compromise communications using a plurality of attacks. 
A MANET can become a self-organized mobile network without the need for fixed 
infrastructure other than when a connection is needed to a carrier network [13]. Each node in 
the network acts as both host and data transmitting router after a route discovery process 
between the source and destination. The routing protocols that have been proposed so far, 
including Ad Hoc on Demand Vector (AODV), Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), concentrate 
on the route discovery establishment. MANET security is a concern due to the nature of the 
distributed traffic management and the requirement that the trust be established with nodes 
joining the rapidly changing topology. 
There are potential weaknesses found in MANETs, and one potential weakness is the 
susceptibility to a wormhole attack [14, 15] where attackers bypass normal traffic routes and 
tunnel packets to another area of network. The wormhole route may suffer a lower hop count 
than normal traffic routes and the attackers manipulate the MANET route priority to perform 
eavesdropping, denial of service (DOS) and so on. Figure. 2-1 shows the traffic paths for 
normal traffic and wormhole traffic.  
  
Figure ‎2-1 Node hops for normal and wormhole traffic 
MANET routing protocols are classified as either reactive or proactive according to the route 
discovery technique used. On-demand protocols are reactive. The presence of a packet 
available for transmission and the need for a route leads to the commencement of a route 
discovery process. Table-driven protocols are proactive and routes are computed beforehand 
and stored in a table so that there will be a route available whenever a packet is to be 
transmitted. Routing protocols can be broadly classified into stability based, Quality of 
Service (QoS) based and hop-count based. Hop-count based protocols try to optimize the 
length of the route which is why a majority of the routing protocols proposed are based on the 
hop-count metric [16]. The importance of wireless communication systems for reliable 
mobile communications has increased significantly over the past decade. The dynamic 
topology offered by MANET provides flexibility and manoeuvrability. 
The DSR [2] protocol uses source routing rather than the hop-by-hop routing used by the 
majority of MANET routing protocols, which eliminates the need for frequent route 
 advertisement and neighbour detection packets. Applying the concepts and principles of HIS 
to the development of an AIS based algorithm provides an alternative approach to improve 
network security in MANET. 
2.3 MANET Security Attacks 
In this section, an analogy between HIS and MANET is provided and a brief description of 
the key MANET attacks [4] are given. MANET attacks can be classified into active and 
passive attacks as seen in Figure. 2-2. Passive attacks involve snooping on the data 
exchanged in the network without the intention to alter the traffic. This attack is difficult to 
detect because the network operation is not affected. Passive attacks, gather information 
about the network, traffic passing over the network or pry on the communication pattern 
between two or more nodes. A passive attack may lead to an active attack. In a passive attack, 
the confidentiality of the network could be compromised. 
In an active attack, the attacker alters some aspect of the network or the data being exchanged 
in the network thereby disrupting the normal functioning of the network. The malicious 
behaviour involves packet modification, injection or destruction. 
  
Figure ‎2-2 MANET security attacks 
A brief description of the different types of attacks that occur in MANET is provided in the 
following sections. 
2.3.1 Replay attack 
In a MANET, the topology changes permitting replay attacks where the attacker uses the 
strategy of storing control messages previously sent by a node [5, 6]. The attacker node 
resends the stored control messages which lead to genuine nodes updating their routing tables 
with stale information. This disturbs the normal operation of the MANET. 
2.3.2 Blackhole attack 
In a black hole attack the attacking node sends a false routing message claiming that it has the 
most conducive route to the destination whereby leading all the genuine nodes to forward 
their packets to the rogue [7,8]. 
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 2.3.3 Flooding attack 
In a flooding attack the attacking node sends multiple RREQ messages to a destination node 
that does not exist in the network [9, 10]. As the destination node does not exist, none of the 
nodes will be able to send a Route Reply, leading to congestion and a network DOS attack. 
2.3.4 Wormhole attack 
Wormhole is a type of MANET attack [11] where the attacking node creates a connection to 
remote nodes as if the two nodes are directly connected to each other. The two distant nodes 
send false advertising messages to indicate they have a one hop symmetric link between each 
other. This false information will propagate to other nodes across the network thus 
undermining the shortest path routing calculations. 
2.4 Analogy between MANET and HIS 
The analogy between MANET and the HIS is as follows [12]: 
 MANET can be considered a metaphor for the tissue of an organism; packets as 
signals; cells as nodes 
 Cells have limited processing, memory, and communication capacity – MANET 
nodes are similarly resource constrained 
 Biological Tissue comprises many cells – high-density MANET implies a substantial 
number of client devices 
 Each cellular phone is prone to failure - cells in biological tissue subject to pathogenic 
attacks - MANET nodes are prone to failure 
  Cells move and reorganize – MANET nodes move and rearrange 
 Communication between cells is through the diffusion of signalling proteins and 
matching of antigenic patterns which is analogous to MANET’s where 
communication is through packet dissemination and matching 
2.5 Related approaches in MANET utilizing Hop Count 
2.5.1 Multipath Hop-Count Analysis 
Multipath Hop-Count Analysis (MHA) is a multipath routing protocol proposed by Kuo et al. 
that avoids wormhole attacks by using a hop-count analysis scheme as pictured in Figure. 2-3 
[18]. MHA is designed to use split multipath routes, thereby causing the transmitted data to 
be split into separate routes. In MHA, a random variable X is set which represents hop-count 
values in the Route Reply (RREP) packets. A sample space U={x1,...xi,..xj..} is defined and 
has a cumulative distribution function FX(x) where α and β represent the lower and upper 
bound of the cumulative distribution function and s and t represent hop count boundaries. 
  
Figure ‎2-3 Colluding nodes in Wormhole Attack 
 
 xi, xj ϵ U;         i, j, s, t ϵ N (‎2-1) 
The route paths from RREP packets with hop-count xh satisfying xi ≤  xh  ≤ xj where h ϵ N, xh 
ϵ U are taken as legal paths in the MHA protocol. 
2.5.2 Past Interaction Social Analysis 
Hsu and Helmy [19, 20] observed that in a network, nodes do not encounter more than 50 per 
cent of the overall population of the total nodes in a network. As a result, there is less chance 
of a node encountering other nodes and nodes need to assess the probability that they will 
encounter the destination node. The authors did an analysis based on network traces of 
different university campus wireless networks. Their analysis showed that to build a 
connected relationship graph node encounters are essential. 
Haahr et al. [21] proposed social network metrics based on a social analysis of a node's past 
 interactions. Three components were locally evaluated: a node's "betweenness" centrality, a 
node's social "similarity” to the destination node and a node's tie strength relationship with 
the destination node. The centrality of a node in a network is a standard of how well 
connected it is to other nodes in the network. “Betweenness” centrality calculates the 
magnitude to which a node lies on the geodesic paths of other nodes. 
2.5.3 Probability to Deliver 
In the study carried out by Burgess et al. [22] messages are transmitted to nodes in the order 
of probability for delivery; this is based on contact information. All messages will be 
transmitted if the connection lasts long enough which in turn results in Epidemic Routing. 
Lindgren et al. [17] proposed PRoPHET Routing, which is also probability based, using past 
encounters to predict the probability of meeting a node again. Frequently encountered nodes 
have an increased probability and older contacts become obsolete over time. The transitive 
nature of encounters is utilized where nodes exchange, encounter probabilities and the 
probability of indirectly encountering the destination is also evaluated. 
The cost of the routing path is calculated by defining probability based on node encounters in 
the study carried out by Khelil et al. and Tan et al. [23, 24]. 
Grossglauser and Vetterli [25] use "time passed since last encounter” to route packages to 
destinations. The packet is forwarded to the node that encountered the destination more 
recently than the source and other neighbouring nodes. 
Ghosh et al. [26] propose a hub system, exploiting the fact that nodes tend to move between a 
 small set of locations identified as hubs. A set of hubs based on each node's movement profile 
is available to each node on the network in the form of a probabilistic orbit. This probabilistic 
orbit defines the probability with which a given node will visit a hub. Messages bound for a 
node are routed toward one of these hubs. 
2.5.4 Node location 
A location based routing scheme by Lebrun et al. [27] utilizes the trajectories of nodes to 
predict their future distance to the destination. This technique is also used to pass messages to 
nodes moving in the direction of the destination 
A virtual coordinate system by Leguay et al. [28] uses node coordinates which in turn contain 
a set of probabilities, each representing the probability of encountering a node in a specific 
position. The best available path is computed based on this data. 
2.5.5 Hop-count in Wormhole routes 
Sethi et al. [29] used a hop-count metric to analyse wormhole attacks. See Figure. 2-4 where 
the advertised path from node a to node d passes through the nodes a, b, c and d giving a hop 
count of three whereby the actual path from node a to node d passes through nodes a, b, e, f, 
g, h and d making the actual path of length six hops. This difference in hop-count between 
the advertised path and actual path can be useful for the detection of wormholes. 
Choi et al. [30] suggested a scenario where nodes will keep track of the conduct of its 
neighbours. RREQ is sent by a node to the destination using its neighbour list. However, if 
the RREP is not received back within a stipulated time, the presence of a wormhole is 
identified and the route is added to the source node's wormhole list. Each node maintains a 
 table which consists of a RREQ sequence number and neighbour node ID. After sending 
RREQ, the source node sets the Wormhole Prevention Timer (WPT) and waits until it 
overhears retransmission by the neighbour node. The maximum amount of time for a packet 
to travel one-hop distance is WPT/2. 
 
Figure ‎2-4 Hop-count metric for wormhole 
2.5.6 Routing protocols using hop mechanism 
Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) [34] is a proactive routing protocol where 
all routes to destination nodes, hop-count, and next-hop to the destination are maintained in a 
table. The table is updated by the periodic exchange of messages between neighbouring 
nodes. As paths are readily available to all destinations in network there is less delay 
associated with the path set-up process. Another disadvantage is due to the need to regularly 
update routing tables the node battery life is shortened. 
Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) [33] is a proactive routing protocol. The neighbors 
and link are detected by Hello messages that are broadcast to discover single-hop neighbors. 
Message flooding can be limited to nodes within a certain distance (in terms of number of 
hops). Nodes can also examine the header of a message to get information pertaining to 
distance (in terms of number of hops) of the message source. 
 DSR [31] is a reactive or on-demand routing protocol that discovers the routes only when it 
has packets to be forwarded to the destination. The RREQ packets contain data regarding the 
intermediate nodes and the hop-count. This protocol also optionally uses a flow ID option 
that allows packets to be forwarded on a hop-by-hop basis. 
AODV [32] is a reactive routing protocol where routes are established on demand. To send a 
message to a destination, RREQ messages are broadcast to intermediate nodes. The 
intermediate nodes in turn rebroadcast the messages to their neighbours. When a 
neighbouring node receives a request and it already has a route to the desired destination, it 
sends back a message to the source node through a temporary route thereby creating routes 
from various neighbouring nodes. The source node then selects the route that has the lowest 
hop-count. 
2.6 Tradeoff between Selfishness and Altruism in MANET 
Routing protocols developed for MANET can be classified as proactive, reactive and hybrid. 
The effect of node selfishness on routing and node resource utilization efficiency has not 
been studied adequately. In [35] misbehaviour in MANET was first identified and defined 
and the focus of this work was to alleviate node misbehaviour. The research found in the 
literature appears to focus on how to detect and isolate selfish nodes. These methods do not 
penalize the selfish nodes nor to coerce the selfish nodes to forward packets. The malicious 
nodes are rewarded if they’re identified and removed from routing paths. In [36] a review of 
node selfishness in MANET is provided. This research summarizes existing approaches to 
dealing with the selfishness problem and the authors provide a proposed solution to mitigate 
the selfishness problem. The operation of DSR [37] is explored and as energy depletes node 
 selfishness occurs. Various types of selfishness are defined and the problems arising because 
of selfish nodes co-existing in the network is investigated. 
In [38] the data flow between the MANET nodes is observed and when a selfish node does 
not forward a packet, the neighbour node waits for a pre-defined threshold number of packet 
transmission failures to be exceeded before triggering an alarm. 
In [39] the impact of selfish nodes on the MANET QoS is explored. This work analyses 
parameters including throughput, average hop count and packets dropped. The hop count 
increases as the selfish node concentration increases. The authors establish that there is an 
increment in the number of packets dropped along with a substantial reduction in throughput 
as the selfish node concentration increases. 
In [40] the MANET nodes are encouraged to be altruistic and the nodes are given positive or 
negative scores depending on their behaviour. The altruistic nodes utilize their energy to relay 
for other nodes, but they relay for selfish nodes only once. This approach does not call for the 
participation of selfish nodes for any communication. 
In [113] the author employs a theoretical account that considers how birds clean each other of 
parasites in hard to reach spots, thus helping with individual and group survival. The author 
defines three different model behaviours: 
1) Sucker - Birds that blindly help other birds without expecting anything in return. 
2) Cheat - Birds that take advantage of all the help they can get but do not offer anything 
in getting even. 
 3) Grudger - Birds that help others and recall who they have served. In case the same bird 
does not reciprocate, they will not help that bird again. 
2.7 Artificial Immune Systems 
“AIS are intelligent and adaptive systems inspired by the immune system toward real-
world problem solving. AIS are adaptive systems inspired by theoretical immunology 
and observed immune functions, principles and models, which are applied to complex 
problem domains [41].” 
 
Figure ‎2-5 Danger Theory model 
 
A recent immunological discovery called Danger Theory now paves the way for more 
efficient, second generation AIS. The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) [42] is a biologically 
 inspired technique, developed to detect intruders in computer networks. The DCA is based on 
a metaphor of naturally occurring DCs, a type of cell which is native to the innate arm of the 
immune system [41]. DCs are responsible for the initial detection of intruders, including 
bacteria and parasites by responding to the harm done by the invading entity. Natural DCs 
receive sensory input in the form of molecules, which can indicate if the tissue is healthy, or 
in distress. These cells have the ability to combine the various signals from the tissue and to 
produce their own output signals. The output of DCs instructs the immune system responder 
cells to deal with the source of the potential damage. DCs are excellent candidate cells for 
abstraction to network security as they are the body's own intrusion detection agents. 
To improve the performance of AIS algorithms a “danger project” has been commenced 
based mainly on the immunology Danger Theory, which states that the response type of the 
immune system to the incoming pathogens occurs due to the existence of danger or safe 
signals from the body tissues affected by the pathogen, as illustrated in Figure 2-5 [41]. 
DCA is a danger project contribution that utilizes the DC role in HIS as forensic navigators 
and important anomaly detectors. DCs are defined as antigens presenting lymphocytes in the 
innate immunity; these lymphocytes play a key role in either stimulating or suppressing the 
adaptive immunity T-cells and hence controlling the immune system’s response. 
The field of AIS has achieved importance as a branch of Computational Intelligence since its 
inception in the 1990s. The four major AIS algorithms on which research is centred are: (1) 
Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA); (2) Artificial Immune Networks (AIN); (3) CS 
Algorithm; and (4) Danger Theory and DCA. AI brings together the disciplines of 
 Immunology, Computer Science and Engineering. Over the past decade research into the 
Immune System has gained popularity as a vehicle for novel solutions to complex issues. The 
highly distributed, adaptive nature of the immune system includes capabilities such as 
learning, memory and pattern recognition, which are solid foundations for an artificial 
equivalent. AIS outcomes require both integration of immunology and engineering to 
transform the complex evolved mechanisms found in the HIS. 
Forrest et al. [43] proposed a negative selection method to distinguish self from non-self, 
based on the generation of T-cells. This approach was applied to the problem of virus 
detection in a computer and raised the profile of negative selection approaches. Following the 
work by Forrest et al. variations of the NSA have been developed with the essential 
properties of the original NSA remaining. 
AINs are another popular AIS approach that was based on the work by Farmer et al. into an 
immune network model [44] and an early immune network algorithm was designed by Ishida 
[45]. Timmis et al. [46] redefined the artificial immune network. Castro et al. [47] proposed 
the Clonal Selection Algorithm (CLONALG) which is based on a CS principle processes like 
those found in Genetic Algorithms including clone, mutation and reselection. 
The AIS community has produced a multifaceted set of immune inspired algorithms to solve 
computational as well as real world problems. Castro and Timmis [48] offered a detailed 
analysis of the Immune System and a presentation of current AIS algorithms. Tarakanov et al. 
[49] provided an insight into the mathematical basis of immunocomputing. Ishida [50] 
reviewed immune network models and highlighted the benefits of each approach. 
 2.8 AIS Algorithms 
Select AIS algorithms are described in this section. 
2.8.1 Negative Selection 
In the biotic or biological immune system T-cells are initially formed in the bone marrow and 
on maturation they move to the thymus. The phase of T-cell evolution is characterized by 
expressions provided by T-cell receptors. Whenever the Pre-T-cells and thymus cells interact 
this land thymus cells interact this leads to Pre-T-cell multiplication and divergence. Then 
these T-cells undergo negative selection to eliminate T-cells that are activated by self in the 
thymus. Although variations of negative selection have been proposed, the process described 
in [51, 52] remains in usage. 
Gao et al. [53] proposed enlarging non-overlapping detectors to obtain non-self coverage. Let 
the detector centre be Oj, then detector j will have a maximum radius of rj. The detectors with 
large radii have higher fitness. Ma et al. [54] describe a mechanism to produce useful 
detectors that are randomly produced and the unmatched antigen is placed into a detector 
space called the feedback detector. The feedback detector will be eliminated in case it 
matches self-strings. Once the feedback detector becomes mature it will be utilized to match 
antigens. When the feedback detector acquires a match on further antigens, it becomes a 
legitimate detector. Simple Evolutionary NSA (ENSA) and basic ENSA [54] are NSA 
variations and the functionality of Simple ENSA is to generate detectors capable of 
identifying corrupt data. When a detector seeks to match data it can lead to wayward or 
abnormal changes in the detector and this detector will be discarded. The evolution of the 
 next generation of detectors takes place through mutation, positive selection and negative 
selection. Such evolutionary inception loops to generate detectors until a wayward change is 
noticed. In Basic ENSA, in addition to the next generation detector set a randomly generated 
detector is also added. By including the additional detector searches can take place in the 
global space as well. ENSA finds its use in hardware/software segregation in embedded 
systems. 
Caldas et al. [55] proposed a variant of the NSA where a repository database is used to store 
perceptible performance indexes for an enterprise. There will be a set of cells known as 
decision cells, which will be responsible for extracting decisions from the repository database 
and provide feedback about the decision to the repository database. Each decision issue is 
represented by a decision cell which in turn is composed of x decision receptors. The 
approach proposed consists of two stages: learning and operation. In the learning stage, the 
decision maker selects the decision cells based on the information in the repository database. 
The cells form the initial reservoir of self-cells, that is a decision cache to be stored in the 
repository database for later usage. In the operation stage, the decision creator requests 
decision cells from the repository database and present decision related problems to the 
decision cells for resolution. 
Graaff et al. [56] proposed the Genetic Artificial Immune System (GAIS). Here the 
counterpart of lymphocyte is known as an artificial lymphocyte. The four states in which an 
artificial lymphocyte exists are: immature (no priority), mature (medium priority), memory 
(high priority) and annihilated (low priority). The bit string of an artificial lymphocyte is 
randomly generated and is made to undergo either positive selection or negative selection. 
 Based on the Hamming distance of the nearest self-pattern to the artificial lymphocyte, it will 
be assigned a distance threshold value. Whenever a match happens with a non-self-pattern the 
Hit counter of the artificial lymphocyte is incremented to find its matching ratio. 
GAIS also uses Genetic Algorithms (GA) to evolve artificial lymphocytes. Each artificial 
lymphocyte is related to a chromosome and the randomly generated artificial lymphocytes 
will constitute an existing GA population. 
Amaral et al. [57] uses GA to generate a detector in a real valued NSA. Every possible 
detector set is linked to a chromosome. Each gene is a pointer to a y dimensional detector set. 
The radius for each detector set is computed by using a decoding function and Monte Carlo 
integration [58, 59] is used to calculate the volume of the detector set. 
2.8.2 Artificial Immune Networks 
Jerne [60] suggested that the immune system can attain immunological memory due to the 
presence of B-cells. These B-cells prompt each other as well as restrain connected cells to 
control over production of B-cells. This is required to keep a stable memory. 
Hunt and Cooke [61] suggested a scheme comprising a bone marrow object, a network of B-
cell objects and antigen population. Bone marrow objects randomly initialize the B-cell 
population. The antigen population that is present in the system will be randomly picked and 
introduced to a spot in the B-cell network. Cloning of B-cell objects occur if they can bind to 
the antigen population. 
Pacheo et al. [62] designed an Abstract Immune System Algorithm. There are four strategies 
 necessary for the effectiveness of this model: (1) the affinity between the epitope of an 
antibody or prototype of an antibody; (2) the restraining of an antibody during epitope 
recognition; (3) the affinity between antigen and antibody; and (4) the nature of cells to die in 
the absence of communication. A given antibody type will be prompted or deleted by 
referring to the recruitment threshold or death threshold. 
Omni-aiNet [63] is applied to solve singular and multi-objective problems. The advantages 
identified were: (1) a new grid mechanism to control the spread of a solution in the objective 
space; (2) adjusting the size of the search space based on a predefined suppression threshold; 
and (3) axiomatically adapting the investigation of the search space. 
Taking advantage of the multi-population property of aiNet, the Multi-objective Multi 
population Artificial Immune Network (MOM-aiNet) for bi clustering was designed [64]. 
The advantage of MOM-aiNet is that several sets of non-subjugated solutions are returned in 
contradiction to a single set of non-subjugated solutions. The subjugation is used to compare 
the quality of solutions for a given issue, thereby enabling it to measure the solution set given 
by MOM-aiNet. Out of the data set one row and one column is randomly chosen so that 
MOM-aiNet produces y subpopulation of one bi cluster. In the algorithm for each 
subpopulation y clones subject to the mutation process will be developed. Three steps are 
involved in mutation which would be randomly chosen with equal probability: (1) delete a 
row of the column; (2) incorporate a row; and (3) incorporate a column. Whenever the 
number of non-subjugated elements becomes greater than y clones a distance based 
restraining process occurs so that a small and locally diverse sub-population is maintained. 
 Stibor et al. explored the compression quality of aiNet [65]. Using the Parzen window 
estimation and Kullback-Leibler divergence a similarity measure between the data set (input) 
and aiNet dataset (output) was introduced. A Parzen window estimator helps find the 
probability densities of the input and output datasets. 
2.8.3 Clonal Selection Algorithms 
According to the CS Theory when the original lymphocyte is activated by binding to the 
antigen, clonal expansion of the original lymphocyte occurs. During the development of the 
lymphocyte, if any clone with antigen receptors corresponds to the molecules of the 
organism's own body, it will be eliminated. With the clonal expansion of B-cells the average 
likeness increased for the antigen that sparked the clonal expansion through likeness 
maturation. Thus, the B-cells more effectively respond to antigens. Somatic hyper-mutation 
and the Selective mechanism lead to likeness maturation. Somatic hyper-mutation leads to a 
miscellany of antibodies by introducing random changes to the genes. Only those genes with 
a higher accord for the encountered antigen will survive. CLONALG was initially introduced 
in [66] and described in [47,67]. 
Ciccazzo et al. [68] suggested a variant of CLONALG termed Elitist Immune Programming 
(EIP). EIP is an extension of immune programming and the concept of elitism is borrowed 
from the immune inspired algorithm and is introduced to EIP. A new category of hyper-
mutation operators and network based coding is used in EIP. Any hyper-mutation operator 
can only act on one node or link at a time. This work leads to the proposition of ten ad hoc 
network based hyper-mutation operators: add-parallel, add-series, delete component, mutate-
 component-value, copy-component-value, add-random-component, mutate-component-kind, 
link-modify, shrink and expand-node. The EIP algorithm was applied to a synthesis of 
topology and size of analog electrical circuits. Based on the experiments the circuits designed 
by EIP were an improvement over that achieved using Genetic Algorithms. 
Halavati et al. [69] included symbiosis to CLONALG and uses specified antibodies, which 
are an approximate solution only, as they may not contain the data required. Each antibody 
will have just one property. Later the algorithm randomly selects an antibody to be included 
in an assembly. By using repetitive steps an assembly with the required properties is built, 
however, in instances where the algorithm is unable to build an assembly, antibodies with 
random values are created for the missing component parts and a new assembly is created. 
The technique of utilizing partially specified antibodies stems from the deduction that a 
problem can be broken into smaller problems and solutions to these smaller problems may 
provide an improved overall solution to the overarching problem. 
The approach in [70] proposed a variation of CLONALG for software mutation and testing 
that utilizes the notion of “memory individuals” that steer to the identification of an antigen 
rather than utilizing the notion of the CLONALG memory individuals per antigen. An 
antibody population is initialized with p tests either randomly generated or pre-specified. A 
periodic check is done by the algorithm searching for antibodies that will kill at least one 
mutant program. A Mutation Store is used to assess the freshness of an antibody and 
antibodies with a higher similarity score are added to the memory set to be returned to the 
tester. The productiveness of this method was compared against an elitist GA and the results 
showed that the proposed methodology produces a higher mutation score with lower 
 computational cost. 
The Trend Evaluation Algorithm (TEA) proposed by Wilson [71] is similar to CLONALG 
however; it incorporates a long-term memory pool as well as short term memory pool by 
multiplying all of the bound trackers. The processes of Apoptosis and Mutation in the TEA 
occur across all population members. Consider the case where an antigen Ag containing 40 
fictional price movements and ten Trends (T1-T10) is built to test the ability of the TEA to 
identify price trends. Antigen Ag is divided into four subsets Ag1, Ag2, Ag3, and Ag4. Ag1 
contains two simple trends T1 and T2 and the more complex trends are involved in Ag2, Ag3 
and Ag4. Experiments were done to test the algorithm's capability to discern price trends as 
well as to probe the algorithms influence over the long-term memory pool. 
2.8.4 Danger Theory based Algorithms 
Danger theory is another self/non-self theory that differs from other theories in how the 
system should respond. The salient characteristic of Danger Theory stems from the principle 
that the immune system does not respond to non-self but does respond to danger. This theory 
evolves out of the consideration that there is no need to assail everything foreign. In this 
theory,danger is measured by the distress signals sent by cells in the event of damage or 
unnatural death. 
Matzinger, proposed Danger Theory in 2002 [72] and highlighted that the "foreignness" of a 
microbe is not the main factor that ignites a response and "selfness" is no assurance of 
tolerance. The fundamental idea in Danger Theory states that antigen presenting cells are 
triggered by danger/alarm signals from sore cells. Danger signals will not be sent by healthy 
 cells or by cells experiencing normal cell death. 
The Two-Signal Model extended by Bretscher et al. [73] explains the Danger Theory in a 
different way where two signals are needed to activate the lymphocytes: (1) antigen 
recognition; and (2) co-stimulation. Signal 2 indicates that the antigen is threatening. 
The Danger Theory has its own disadvantages and Aickelin et al. [74] proposed applications 
of the Danger Theory that highlight: 
 The presence of an Antigen Presenting Cell (APC) is required to present a danger 
signal. 
 A danger signal does not have to be dangerous. 
 Danger signals can be positive or negative (presence or absence of signal). 
 An estimate of nearness may be used to imitate the danger zone. 
Conceptual ideas were also proposed on how the Danger Theory can be used for anomaly 
detection. Founded on the Danger Theory, an immune response is always triggered by danger 
signals. Low or high memory use, fraudulent disk activity and so forth could indicate danger 
signals. The Immune System can react to the antigens in the danger zone once a danger signal 
is produced. After the dangerous components are identified, they are then sent to a special 
part of the system for further verification. Another application of the Danger Theory used in 
intrusion detection can be found in [75]. 
Danger Theory has been applied to data mining problems [76]. Consider the case where a 
 user is browsing a set of documents where each document has a set of attributes. When AIS is 
implemented the antibodies in the system are used to detect the attributes. Each document 
browsed by the user will be dispensed to the antibodies. When the user expresses interest in 
the present document a danger signal is raised and antibodies matching the antigen (attribute 
in the present document) are triggered and become active. Wearisome document attributes 
will endure the auto reactive antibodies. Finally, AIS learns to become a good filter when 
searching for documents. 
Prieto et al. [77] used a goalkeeper strategy in the Danger Theory Algorithm (DTAL) that 
takes into account danger signals, lymphocytes and the danger zone. This technique was used 
in robot soccer, when the ball is on the source side (tissue) an alarm signal (Signal 1) will be 
triggered. When the ball (antigen) is taken by the opponent to the penalty side (danger zone) 
Signal 2 will be triggered. When both signals are received the lymphocyte is actuated to clear 
the ball. This strategy showed a performance above 90%. 
The work in [78] highlighted an application of the Danger Theory to accentuate the 
effectiveness of an e-mail classifier system. In web-mining the use of various types of media 
may cause various signals to be released, but in an e-mail system an abnormal email may 
release a "fascinating" signal of one category. The strong pertinence of these features 
constitutes a form of the Danger Theory. 
2.8.5 Dendritic Cell Algorithms 
The main role of DCs as antigen presenting cells were identified by Steinman and Cohn [79] 
where DCs are comprised of leukocytes which are present in all tissues. They are endowed 
 with a disparate hematopoietic lineage and function in various tissues. Inside various tissues, 
DCs segregate and mature when triggered appropriately; later they relocate to secondary 
lymphoid tissues where they present antigen to T-cells to induce an immune response. 
The immature DCs occupy body surfaces and are commonly present in an immature state and 
are unable to stimulate T-cells. Once the foreign pathogens are processed and obtained by the 
immature DCs as seen in Figure 2-6, they migrate to the thymus and the spleen where the 
immature DCs mature and stimulate an immune response. As explained in [80, 81] inflection 
between the various states of DCs is enabled by the recognition of signals, including PAMP, 
danger signals, apoptotic signals (safe signals) and inflammatory cytokines. These signals are 
explained as (1) PAMPs activate the immune response, thereby protecting the host from 
infection; (2) danger signals are released during tissue cell damage, their strength is lower 
than PAMPs; (3) safe signals are given out when programmed/normal cell death occurs; and 
(4) inflammatory cytokines are given out when general tissue distress occurs and amplify the 
effect of the other three signals. The immune response of the T-cell is determined by the 
corresponding weights of the four signal types. Semi-mature DCs have a suppressive effect 
while mature DCs have an accentuating effect. 
  
Figure ‎2-6 Dendritic Cell Algorithm Schematic 
The first DCA was presented by Greensmith et al. [82] and it involved combining various 
signals to investigate the current circumstance of the environment and non-parallel sampling 
of another data stream (antigen). A fuzzy margin occurs in accordance with the concentration 
of co-stimulatory molecules as an indicator for a DC to stop antigen collection and migrate to 
a virtual lymph node. The DCA works on the input signals with presumed weights to produce 
output signals. A value of 1 is assigned if the cumulative mature signal is greater than the 
cumulative semi-mature signal and vice versa. The mature context presentation of that 
antigen is calculated relative to the total number of antigens. 
The DC is designed as a Libitissue tissue server [83]. There are three stages in this algorithm: 
initialization, update and aggregation. Initialization deals with setting initial values and the 
update stage is sub-divided into tissue update and the cell cycle. The Libtissue tissue server 
comprises the tissue update and cell cycle. Data from the source is given to the tissue server 
 through the tissue client. The appearance of new data in the system leads to the provision of 
input signals for the population of DCs. The cell cycle is a distinct process that occurs at a 
user defined rate. When the antigen data is processed the cell cycle and tissue update process 
stops. In the final stage aggregation of the collected antigens occurs together with analysis 
and the Mature Context Antigen Value (MCAV) per antigen is derived. 
Gu et al. [84] used DCA on the KDD 99 [85] data set after two additional functions were 
added to the system for optimization: antigen multiplier and a moving time window. The 
antigen multiplier makes several copies of the antigen, to overcome the problem of "antigen 
deficiency” that can be given to DCs. On each iteration, new signals are calculated using the 
moving time window. Based on the results the antigen multiplier and moving time window 
have equal effect on the DCA using the KD 99 data set. 
Oates et al. [86] devised a DCA approach for a robot classification problem. Robotic DCA is 
designed as a stand-alone physiological module for compatibility with comprisal design. The 
Advanced Robot Interface for Applications (Aria) library's [87] "wander" design is extended 
with two extra modules: image processing and DCA execution. MCAV coefficients are 
output by the DCA module approximately once per second. PAMP, safe and danger signals 
are used as input to the DCA. PAMP originates from the image processing module and the 
safe signal originates from the Laser Range Finder (LRF). A sonar array having a 360 degree 
field of view (FOV) is the source of the danger signal and the antigen is an integer number 
which can be uniquely identified by the segment of the test pen. The DCA approach used 
helped the robot to steer away from obstacles in its path. 
 The authentic DCA is highly speculative and the Deterministic Dendritic Cell Algorithm 
(dDCA) [82] attempts to overcome this by using two sets of input signals as well as antigens. 
The DC is subjected to identical input signals. Here an array is used in order to store the 
antigen value and count of times the DCs have collected the antigen. There are three 
parameters in the dDCA-weight scheme for processing signals, outputting DC values and the 
number of DCs. 
The work in [88] depicts the affinity of DCA towards the architecture and operational 
requirements of sensor networks. Based on this variation, ubiquitous DCA (UDCA) was 
proposed to detect attacks on sensor networks and its features include: 
Signals from multiple data sources are collected by DC. New output cytokines are 
accumulated at the maturation stage of each DC. The linking of antigens with context 
information is done by UDCA. The extent of node misbehaviour is detected by UDCA via 
signals generated. 
2.9 MANET and HIS 
Fundamental aspects of an ad hoc wireless network include its lack of fixed infrastructure, 
design and challenges including security [89] and the lack of a centralized control mechanism 
adds to the complexity of fault and security intrusion detection and correction. The 
dynamically changing nature of mobile nodes causes an unpredictable topology that requires 
frequent route changes, network partitioning and protection from increased packet loss. The 
security attacks on MANET networks utilize opportunities provided by the wireless mobile 
infrastructure in which nodes can join and leave at will using dynamic requests [90]. Energy 
 efficient routing algorithms can be tricked into routing through compromised nodes if the 
node indicates high power when the other battery powered nodes are showing varying power 
levels [91]. The failure of one node may affect the entire MANET and this adds to the 
network design complexity, especially as the probability of network partitioning increases as 
node power levels fluctuate. Mobile node power supply limitations and energy depletion is a 
major factor affecting the lifetime of the ad hoc network [92]. 
HIS has been identified as a source of models, functions, and concepts that inspire AIS 
algorithms which can be used to secure both host-based and network-based systems [1]. 
However, it is not only important to utilize the HIS when creating AIS-based algorithms as 
much as it is important to produce high performance algorithms [41]. Therefore, creating a 
balance between utilizing HIS and introducing AIS-based intrusion detection algorithms are a 
crucial issue that would be valuable to investigate because MANET properties raise security 
issues to a level above those associated with fixed networks. The AIS properties such as 
being self-healing, self-defensive and self-organizing provide an opportunity to meet the 
challenges of securing MANET [93]. 
2.9.1 Introduction and Need for AIS Conceptualization in MANET 
An ad hoc network is formed by a group of nodes that do not require any predefined 
infrastructure to maintain network connectivity. One of the many advantages of MANET is 
the absence of dedicated fixed nodes to support packet forwarding and routing. MANET 
nodes act as both host and router. The application of MANETs span from military operations 
to the commercial sector such as rescue/emergency missions. Ad hoc networks can also link 
 with a temporary multimedia network to share information amongst users in a conference or 
classroom. Short-range MANET has simplified the connection between mobile devices, 
thereby replacing the need for cumbersome cables. 
This autonomous nature of MANET makes it vulnerable to malicious attacks, thereby making 
MANET susceptible to active as well as passive attacks. In a MANET, every node must be 
prepared for an encounter with an adversary either directly or indirectly. The mobility 
characteristics of the ad hoc network enable the nodes to roam independently, thereby making 
the task of identifying and tracking compromised nodes difficult. Security attacks on 
MANET nodes can result in compromised nodes that function incorrectly and potentially 
generate traffic with false routing information. 
The AIS is derived from the natural HIS and is a branch of Artificial Intelligence. The 
research carried out in the application of AIS helps to bridge the gap between engineering, 
science and immunology. Immune system characteristics provide an attractive research focus 
for applications in engineering and science. The evolution of AIS research has its roots in the 
study carried out by Farmer, Packard and Perelson [44]. 
2.9.2 Developments in AIS Based MANET 
The DCA ability to act as an anomaly detector algorithm inspires further investigation of the 
biological model to introduce improved DC inspired algorithms [1], which could detect other 
types of security attacks [6] in a MANET. In addition, many of the MANET characteristics 
and properties are similar to the innate immunity abstract features; such as the openness and 
susceptibility of each to different types of danger attacks [5]. 
  
Figure ‎2-7 MANET security goals 
MANETs share the same basic security goals that occur in other network types. The need for 
confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, availability, non-repudiation and access control as 
illustrated in Figure ‎2-7, which is the same as in other network types [94] and is generally 
determined by the importance and sensitivity of applications used or data transmitted. 
Network control, management, and security goals are harder to achieve in a MANET than in 
conventional networks [95] due to the mobile decentralized nature of the network. 
Sarafijanovic et al. [96] investigated the use of AIS to detect node misbehaviour in MANET 
using the DSR and the AIS algorithms with negative selection and CS. In this proposed 
system as illustrated in Figure  2-8, each DSR node implements an instance of the detection 
system, and runs it in two stages. In an initial stage, the detection system learns about the 
normal behaviour of the nodes with respect to the DSR protocol. During this stage, the node 
is supposed to be in a protected environment in which all nodes behave properly. From the 
packets received or overheard, the node observes the behaviour of its neighbours and creates 
 positive antigens. Towards the end of this learning stage, the node runs the negative selection 
process and creates its antibodies, known as Detectors. 
 
Figure ‎2-8 Detection system 
After the initial stage, the node may leave the protected environment and enter the second 
stage where detection and classification are carried out. In this stage, the node may be 
exposed to misbehaving nodes. The Detectors created in the learning stage are used to check 
if newly collected antigens represent the behaviour of good or bad nodes. In case an antigen, 
created for any neighbour during some time interval, is detected by any of the Detectors, the 
neighbour is identified as doubtful in that time interval. If there are too many doubtful 
intervals for a neighbour, that neighbour is classified as misbehaving. This triggers the CS 
process in the node that made the classification. In this process, the node adapts its detectors 
to improve misbehaviour detection. 
The work carried out by Hoffmeyer et al. [97] uses the self-non-self model negative selection 
process and some form of danger signal. In the system proposed, the Transmission Control 
 Protocol (TCP) connections play the role of self and non-self cells. TCP is a computer 
networking protocol that provides reliable data packet exchange between two networked 
devices that communicate over a multi-hop network. One connection is represented by a 
triplet encoding the sender’s destination address, the receiver’s destination address, and the 
receiver’s port number. A Detector is a bit sequence of the same length as the triplet and 
matches a triplet if both have contiguous equal bits. Candidate Detectors are generated 
randomly; in a learning phase, Detectors that match the correct (i.e., Self) triplets are 
eliminated and this is done offline, by presenting only valid TCP connections. The Detectors 
that are not eliminated have a finite lifetime and die unless they match a non self triplet, as in 
the IS. The danger signal is also used and it is sent by humans as confirmation in case of 
potential detection. This is a drawback, since human intervention is required to eliminate 
false positives, but it allows the system to learn about changes in the self. 
In the implementation of IDS [98] to secure MANETs the authors present an approach based 
on the paradigm of HIS. This is achieved by using a Mobile Agent which they identify as the 
Immune Agent (IA). The IA consists of four processes based on the scenarios encountered in 
the wireless ad hoc domain. 
 Detection process 
This is triggered when a connection between two nodes is established. 
 Classification process 
The next security process is the classification of self or non-self. 
  Blocking/Isolating Process 
The aim of this process is to block and isolate a node which is classified as malicious based 
on the standards stored in the IA. 
 Recovery Process 
The IA takes a snapshot of the data recovery file when it successfully attaches to the new 
node that intends to join the wireless domain. When a change in the node’s system is detected 
a classification for the pattern that caused the change is also determined. This approach uses 
memory, where data has been fed into a database and the same data is fetched and used in the 
recovery process. The following profiles are created for the purpose of a security approach 
based on immune inspired properties:  
 Gene Profile. This profile would contain the recurring events needed to establish a 
connection system. This is similar to self-cells in the Immune system. 
 Detector Profile. This profile is used to recognize non-self which is similar to HIS T-
cells. 
 Non-Self Profile. This profile would contain events that harm the system. 
The Immune agents capture the self and non-self patterns during the monitoring and 
capturing phase and we learn that U = Sf ∪ Nf represents the collection of patterns monitored 
while packets transfer, it contains both self and non-self patterns. Nf = {nf1, nf2… nfm}, Sf = 
{sf1, sf2… sfn} represents the set of all self and non-self patterns captured by the Immune 
Agent. To simulate the T-cells the Immune agent will be equipped with detectors that are 
 randomly generated. Ð = {d1, d2… dm} represents the set of the generated Detectors, Ð´= 
{d´1, d´2…d´m} the set of matured Detectors. 
The NSA is used to collect the matured Detectors to ensure that the generated Detectors do 
not match any self. The next step is CS where a Detector will be cloned if it attains a score 
after matching to non-self. The algorithm is as given below: 
 Let: d´i score = 0 
 For Nf = {nf1, nf2… nfm}; bind d´i to nfj, (for i, j=1, 2…, m); 
 If d´i detects nfj, then d´i score++; end if 
 While {d´i score≥ max score} do clone d´i // proliferation phase 
 d´i = d˝i; 
 If d˝i match sfi ;( 1≤ i ≥n); then delete d˝i ;// negative selection 
 Else Ð´ = Ð´ + d˝i // Update the Detectors Profile 
To utilize the Danger Theory concept, the immune agent keeps a replica of the data necessary 
to regain a node. Consider β, a system with components at time t: βt= {β 1, β 2.. βn }. A copy 
of βt is available in the Immune Agent Database. Therefore, any change in the system 
components can be identified. Let ε be a change that occurs in the system after time Δt. The 
Immune Agent checks the system and observes βt+Δt = β ± ε. As ε is not recognized, it is a 
suspect pattern and will be included in the non-self-set to be blocked in future. This approach 
is not implemented and simulated so the accuracy of this approach cannot be validated. 
 Nauman et al. [99] proposed using a DC approach in combination with a BEE algorithm. The 
scouts and foragers of the BEE algorithm are used in the DC formation. This algorithm uses a 
dynamic detector set and the DCs are modelled to sample the antigens (scouts) from the body 
tissues (node). During this phase, both self and non-self-antigens are sampled. At startup 
random Detectors are generated which are in turn subjected to negative selection with regard 
to self-antigens represented by the semi mature DCs. 
Using negative selection to generate Detectors involves computational overhead and 
generating Detectors in a dynamically changing environment like MANET is not viable. 
According to Ye et al. [100] two IAs, the detection agent and counterattack agent are 
entrusted with detection as well as reaction. The detecting agent may be viewed as a T-cell 
lymphocyte while the counterattack agent may be viewed as an antibody. Whenever the 
detection agent finds an invader, instructions are sent to the counterattack agents. The 
behavioural patterns of nodes identified are as follows: 
 Node Q received message P recorded as Recv (Q, P) 
 Node Q sends message P recorded as Send (Q, P) 
 Node Q keeps message P recorded as Keep (Q, P) 
 Node Q modified message P recorded as Modify (Q, P) 
 Node Q deletes message P recorded as Delete (Q, P) 
 Node Q generates new message P recorded as Make (Q, P) 
  Node Q verifies message P recorded as Verify (Q, P) 
 Node Q stores message P recorded as Store (Q, P) 
 Node Q broadcasts message P recorded as Broadcast (Q, P) 
Message R is the reply of the message P recorded as Reply (P, R). The behaviour patterns of 
attack nodes are kept in the Immune Memory Library to represent different attack methods: 
 Method 1: Recv (Q, P), Delete (Q, P). Node Q receives the message P and deletes it 
without transmitting it. This is an Interrupt Attack. 
 Method 2: Recv (Q, P), Modify (Q, P), Send (Q, P). Node Q upon receiving the 
message P modifies it and then transmits it. This is an Error Message Attack. 
 Method 3: Recv (Q, P), Reply (P, R), Send (Q, P). Node Q receives message P and 
sends the message via the wrong route. This is called a Black Hole Attack. 
 Method 4: Recv (Q, P), Keep (Q, P), Send (Q, P). Node Q receives message P and 
then transmits it after keeping the message for some time. This can ensue in a Hidden 
Attack. 
 Method 5: Make (Q, P), Broadcast (Q, P). Node Q makes and broadcasts a large 
number of messages in a short time, which leads to node overload. This is called a 
Denial of Service Attack. 
 Method 6: Store (Q, P), Modify (Q, P), Send (Q, P). Node Q modifies the details of 
the route and transmits again which will result in other nodes receiving error filled 
 routing messages. 
The detection agent records the behaviour of each of the neighbouring nodes. When the node 
behaviours do not match, they are analysed using the Immune Strategy Library. 
 
Figure ‎2-9 Immune libraries 
The creation of the Immune Memory Library and Immune Strategy Library as illustrated in 
Figure  2-9 is not mentioned in detail in [100] and the Detection Agent cannot record the 
behaviour of a particular node as there are other nodes in addition to the neighbouring nodes 
which could be compromised. If the Detection Agent was to record each node’s behaviour 
this would result in a considerable computational overhead. This has not been simulated so 
the accuracy and feasibility of the approach is left to future work. 
Fatemeh [101] suggested a combination of AIS and GAs that are used to adjust to alterations 
in network topology and Spherical Detectors are generated to handle non-self-space. The 
technique employed to generate Spherical Detectors is an area for future research that might 
be employed to identify the equivalent to protein compound antigens that exist in body cells 
alongside pathogens. 
The innate immune system uses built in knowledge to combat against infections and a danger 
 signal means damage caused by self-cells due to antigens coming from non-self. In Danger 
Theory, the recognition of pathogens is not enough to get a response from the adaptive 
immune system, but an additional sense of danger is needed before the body reacts to any 
infection caused by pathogens. 
Nauman [102] proposes two approaches based on AIS called BeeAIS and BeeAIS-DC. 
BeeAIS utilizes negative selection to detect anomalies in MANETs and with the use of 
negative selection, the profile of the system behaviour during normal routing is found. 
Antigens extracted from incoming traffic in the network are created from the packet header 
data. Here the antigens are modelled as one of three different types; scout antigen used to 
detect anomalies relating to scouts and forager antigens of two types used to detect changes 
to the source path. Antibodies and Detectors are created by combining four gene values as 
random numbers. Matching functions are when the interaction between antigen and antibody 
is measured in terms of distance in Hamming shape space. 
The two stages of BeeAIS operation are the Learning Phase and the Protection phase. In the 
Learning Phase the system behaviour is identified under normal routing conditions where 
each node monitors traffic in order to gather the information needed to make self-antigens. 
When a scout is received, a node may form a scout antigen and when a forager is received; 
forager antigens are made. A node could receive the same self-antigen many times. Hence it 
matches the newly formed antigen with the antigens that have been previously collected from 
the traffic flow. 
After the end of the Learning Phase a set of Detectors are generated using a negative 
 selection process with the self-antigen set collected during the Learning Phase. The Detectors 
will be generated randomly and only those that do not match with self-antigens are kept. 
In the Protection Phase the nodes collect antigens from the incoming traffic and carry out 
measurement of their affinity with the Detector sets. Whenever a match occurs, it indicates an 
anomaly is present. However, this approach fails as the algorithm learns the system behaviour 
only once and as a result, during the Protection Phase newly observed behaviour is declared 
as malicious by the system. 
Whenever a node receives a forward or backward scout it creates an antigen. After extracting 
the relevant fields from the scout header an antigen is created. The fields which are extracted 
include the scout source, destination, length of route and node ID of the previous hop. DCs 
are formed when a node sees a scout and the DCs are initialized with the following attributes: 
 DC Antigen: The sampled antigen from the scout is attached to the DC. 
 DC Life: The DCs are assigned a short lifetime and they die a natural death after that. 
 DC State: Upon instantiation, a DC is an immature DC and when antigens are 
sampled and when safe signals are present, the DC transitions to a semi-mature state. 
During the exposure to danger signals DCs transform to mature DCs. 
As the system starts, a set of random Detectors is generated by the node and the Detectors 
undergo a negative selection process during which antigens are identified. The Detectors that 
match with antigens are eliminated and the resulting Detectors match with non-self-antigens. 
Mature DCs are used to activate T-cells. During matching the T-cell detector is transformed 
 to become an activated Detector. 
The approach proposed in [102] doesn’t describe the role of an activated Detector sufficiently 
and the process carried out after the Detector becomes active is not adequately explained. 
Negative selection requires a Learning Phase which is not practical in a dynamic MANET. 
How the role of the Detector to curb malicious activities in the MANET is to occur is not 
adequately explained. 
Ansari et al. in [103] use the concepts of CS and danger signal for misbehaviour detection 
using DSR. The protocol events of a node are mapped to HIS elements. The genes of a node 
are designed based on the performance of the network, the node’s observations of 
neighbouring nodes. These genes form the ground to detect if a node is misbehaving. 
Antigens are represented by a pattern of observed events generated by the protocol. 
The events generated at the monitored node when it receives a packet originating at sender 
node are as given below 
 i=RREQ sent 
 j=RREP sent 
 k=RERR sent 
 l=DATA sent 
 m=RREQ received 
 n=RREP received 
  o=RERR received 
 p=DATA received 
The antigen set is represented as: 
 D={mmimmmimmjmimmplplp,plplplplplplplplplp} 
 G1=Num (m) 
 G2=Num (m*(i+j)) 
 G3=Num (p) 
 G4=Num (p*l) 
Where Gk denotes the kth gene, Num denotes the number of occurrences, * denotes “zero” or 
more occurrence. Each bit in the antigen set D is termed as a nucleotide. Antibodies are 
generated randomly after which they are passed for negative selection. 
Ab1= {1010100011, 0001101100, 1100100010, 0110001010} 
Ab2= {1010111000, 0101100100, 1010101010, 0110101110} 
SelfAg= ({0000100000, 0000000100, 0000000010}, {0000000000, 0000000000, 0000100000, 
0000010000}) 
SelfAg denotes self-antigen and the node saves this information when it is in the learning 
phase. Whenever a node experiences packet loss a danger signal is generated. The criteria to 
realize the self-antigen is not mentioned. The question arises if an antigen is generated by an 
 attacker node in the same time-frame. This would result in all nodes considering SelfAg to be 
a trustworthy pattern and generate antibodies that cannot accurately detect misbehaving 
nodes. Whenever a ‘1’ occurs in an antibody pattern which matches with the ‘1” in Self 
antigen, the antibody will be deleted. 
Sarafijanovic et al. [104] attempt to detect node misbehaviour by making the nodes learn 
what normal behaviour is in a protected environment. In this scenario, a self-antigen pattern 
would be generated and antibody patterns are deleted if there is ‘1’ in every position the 
antigen has a ‘1’. Here again the question arises if the same antigen pattern could be 
generated by an attacker node. 
In the approach proposed by Kim et al. [105] each node extracts a set of feature vectors y out 
of normal network traffic. Each feature vector is represented by a hyper sphere with a fixed 
radius in the feature space. At each time slot ti  t every node extracts a q dimensional 
feature vector yi. and (2-2) describes the network state. 
 yi = (yi
1
, yi
2,…, yi
q
) (‎2-2) 
Where yi
k
  [0, 1] is a measurable feature vector. The feature space is represented by Sp  
[0.0, 1.0]
p
 where yi ϵ Sp is associated with an antigen. 
A feature vector yi  Sp at time t is termed normal if it belongs to a normal network state. To 
generate a set of negative Detectors N(t) every negative Detector nj ϵ N(t) is defined as a 
hypersphere (aj, bj) where aj is the centre of the hypersphere and bj is the radius. 
Let P(t) be the set of positive antigens. The Niche NABC algorithm [106] takes P(t) as input 
 and generates a set N(t) of mature negative detectors. Immature food sources are created so 
that there will be a minimum overlap with positive antigens. When the quality of food 
sources cannot be improved further the food source will be abandoned. In this approach, there 
is an offline learning phase and an online learning phase. The offline learning phase is run in 
a protected environment and leads to the creation of negative Detectors. This approach does 
not map a food source to any of the routing or MANET parameters. 
Anass et al. [107] proposes a detection generation algorithm. In each generation, the DCs 
deliver a set of elements that are of fixed size randomly chosen from the antigens. Based on 
the context of the element which is presented a number of operations are established to allow 
memory Detectors to detect intrusive behaviour. When the context of the element is 
dangerous then the algorithm checks if the memory detectors can detect the antigen. If the 
danger element is not detected by the memory Detector the algorithm checks if the mature 
Detectors are able to detect this element. If there is a mature Detector which can detect the 
element then this mature element is added to the group of memory Detectors. In case the 
presented element is harmless the algorithm checks if this element is detectable by the 
memory Detectors to remove the corresponding detector. 
The context upon which the element is classified to be “dangerous” is not detailed. This 
experiment is not validated hence it is not possible to verify the approach. 
Visconti et al. [108] suggests a type 2 fuzzy set based algorithm for detecting misbehaving 
nodes that is triggered by network danger signals and antigen presenting cells. The approach 
in [109] is used in order to capture the real behaviour of a node and the experts provide the 
 Footprint of Uncertainty (FOU). A red region indicates misbehaviour of the network pattern, 
a yellow region indicates suspicious behaviour and a white region indicates normal 
behaviour. The binding process invokes the helper T-cells to measure the actual changes of 
the network parameter and find the region (Red, Yellow, and White) to which the Interval 
type 2 fuzzy parameter is closer. Therefore, to conclude if a node is good or bad I2FM is built 
for the whole network based on all M network parameters. The proposed approach is a work 
in progress. 
In [110] an immune system approach has been proposed for securing MANET. The Immune 
Agent consists of three profiles: gene profile, non-self-profile and Detector profile. The gene 
profile consists of the frequently occurring events for connection establishment. The Detector 
profile is similar to T-cells in the human body that detect the non-self. The non-self profile 
contains events that harm the system. The Immune Agent captures and stores the information 
pertaining to the protocol during the Training phase (Secure) as well as in the insecure phase. 
The Immune agent will be equipped with Detectors that are randomly generated. The NSA 
ensures that the generated Detectors do not match self. The Detectors that come out of the 
negative selection stage are cloned whenever they attain a score detecting non-self. 
The Combined Immune Theories Algorithm (CITA) [111] utilizes the basic principles of 
well-known immune theories including DCA, CS, and NSA. This algorithm is compared with 
the Secure Ad hoc on Demand Distance Vector algorithm (SAODV) [114] and improved 
performance is demonstrated. DCA is used to obtain context information. DCs are associated 
with a subset of neighbouring nodes called elements, which are responsible for DC 
maturation. Element subsets are monitored using adjacent Immature Detectors (ID), adjacent 
 Mature Detectors (MTD) and Memory Detectors (MMD). The network is first configured 
with trusted nodes during the learning phase. Each node will have a set of detectors. CITA 
utilizes several parameters that are initialized during the learning phase, including the number 
of detectors available and the definition of alarm signals.  
2.10 Interaction between pain, nervous system, and immune system 
Pain can be conceptualized as the alarm system for the body. When there is a threat of harm, 
the brain interprets that threat and signals the alarm. This alarm stimulates an avalanche of 
responses like a stress-response. One portion of the stress-response sets the activation mode of 
the nervous system into flight or fight. In its most basic configuration, the nervous system 
prepares the body to move away from or to fight a threat. The duration and magnitude of the 
stress have a great influence on whether or not the immune system will be affected by this 
avalanche, either suppressed or enhanced. Only once the alarm has been tripped does the 
connection between the nervous system and immune system [112] come into play. 
This link between the nervous system and the immune system is strong. The “fight or escape” 
system is focused on one over-riding instinct: to survive. When tailed by a lion or burned by a 
stove, the reactions and responses are short-term and immediate. To divert energy to muscles 
for running or moving, the body can shut down more long-term, high-energy processes like 
digestion and immunity functions. This kinship is more complex than a simple shut down 
operation because during the initial stress-response the nervous system fine tunes and 
enhances functions of immunity. Only as the stressor continues, the nervous system triggers 
the shutdown of immunity and begins to dismantle it. 
 In MANET, which is analogous to HIS, pain can be modeled using factors like trust and 
energy. These are two crucial factors that are required for the proper functioning of any 
routing protocol, which benefits the network as a whole. The energy of a node participating in 
the routing protocol is critical. Only if a client has sufficient energy can it duly forward/deliver 
packets. A packet cannot be simply forwarded to a node just because a client has sufficient 
energy. This is where the trust factor becomes important. A node should be deemed 
trustworthy in order to receive packets from the source/intermediate node. This scenario has 
been conceptualized in MANET through the research presented in the following chapters. 
In some events, pain may enhance immunity or feed into an over-active immune system. The 
interaction between pain, the nervous system and immune system is complex. 
2.11 Summary 
Techniques based on Immunity are becoming more popular and emerging as a new branch of 
Artificial Intelligence. The NSA is being continuously applied and modified to solve 
problems. This review highlighted that NSAs are utilized for new detector generation 
schemes and a broad discussion is required between the biologists, scientists and engineers to 
learn fresh ways of applying AIS. This chapter gives a critique of the various AIS approaches 
applied to MANET and discusses how research is tackling the difficult issues surrounding 
MANET security. Most of the approaches identified are either work in progress or have not 
been validated demonstrating there is scope for further study.  
The literature review provided in Chapter 2 has established the background principles, 
algorithms and direction being taken to further develop AIS as an efficient approach to 
 MANET security. This review discusses the representative state-of-the-art AIS schemes. 
The literature review has also provided a discussion along the relevant routing and MANET 
protocols based on their relevance to the research project. A brief introduction of different 
AIS principles, their classification and a concise discussion of the algorithms with common 
active periods has been shown.  
The chapter has also included a discussion on the different AIS techniques and its 
applications in MANET as well as other fields. 
 
 Chapter 3 ANALYSIS OF MANET NODE STATE 
 3.1 Overview 
This chapter provides research carried out to answer Research Question 1 on the design, 
modelling and analysis of the proposed AIS framework in MANET. Here MANET is 
analysed in terms of quadrants and the nodes are dispersed amongst the quadrants. In Section 
3.2, the motivation for the node analysis is detailed. Section 3.3 presents and discusses 
approaches that have utilized the transmission hop count. Section 3.4, takes advantage of the 
idea of a Markov model and transforms the hop count metric into the probability of 
communication or probability of node nearness. The relation between the hop count and the 
probability of communication is illustrated. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter, highlighting 
the importance of the hop count metric. 
3.2 Analysis of MANET nodes 
Consider a MANET consisting of several quadrants as seen in Figure  3-1, where the nodes 
are dispersed within the quadrants. There can be numerous points N spread along the x axis 
where N is a real number. A point C on the number line from –x to x is considered. Assuming 
there is a node at point C, and the node moves along the x axis and when the node is at point 
C the position of the node can be represented as CX. A node can also move along the positive 
plane of the x axis and can be at positions such as CX+1, CX+2, etc. The node can also move 
along the negative plane of x axis and can be at positions such as C-X, C-X-1, C-X-2, etc. At each 
hop the node can move along the positive or negative plane (+x/-x) of the respective axis it is 
present in. This movement of the node follows a Markov chain model known as the drunkard 
model. Similarly, the node can move along +y/-y. 
The movement along +x/-x can also be considered as moving along 
  NodeLeft(L)/NodeRight(R) (‎3-1) 
Similarly, the movement of the node along +y/-y can be considered as moving along 
 NodeUp(U)/NodeDown(D) (‎3-2) 
 
Figure ‎3-1 Node positions 
If the node takes one hop (+1/-1) at a time to reach its immediate neighbour, there is a 
probability of 0.5 when moving along +x/-x and +y/-y axes respectively. 
3.2.1 Node Movement Probability 
The node can either move by +1 hops or by -1 hops. By analysing (3-1) and (3-2) we can find 
the probability that the node moves by +1/-1 hop as a square matrix of non-negative values. 
Combining (3-1) and (3-2)provides ( 3-3) a doubly stochastic matrix which identifies with the 
probability of node movement (PNMOVE). 
 
PNMOVE = 
      
      
 
(‎3-3) 
Based on PNMOVE the different states, or the state transition due to node hops, can be 
identified which gives the state diagram shown in Figure ‎3-2 for the node in ‘L’ state and ‘R’ 
state. 
As shown in Figure ‎3-2 the L state is followed by the R state and similarly the U state is 
 followed by the D state. From this we get a transition matrix which is doubly stochastic. 
This change of node state can be identified as a Markov chain whereby the node undergoes 
transitions from one state to another. Considering a node hopping along CX+1, CX+2, CX+3, etc. 
such that the future state is only dependent on the present state and independent of the past or 
previous states, then P(Cn+1  =c|C1 =c1,C2=c2.........Cn=cn)= P(Cn+1  =c|Cn=cn) if both 
conditional probabilities are well defined i.e. if P(C1 =c1,C2=c2,...,Cn=cn) >0. 
 
Figure ‎3-2 State diagram for L and R states 
3.2.2 Node State Classification 
 
Figure ‎3-3 Node states 
Consider nodes Na, Nb, Nc and Nd to be at states a, b, c, and d. In Figure  3-3 state b is 
 accessible from state a, ab, if    
  > 0 for every n≥0. This implies there is a possibility of 
reaching state b from state a in n hops. If state b is not accessible from state a then 
 P
n
ab = 0 ∀ n≥0 (‎3-4) 
Let us consider P (ever visit b|C0=a) i.e. the probability of going from state ‘a’ to ‘b’ in ‘n’ 
hops then 
    
                (‎3-5) 
The n hop transition probabilities satisfy the Chapman- Kolmogorov equation for any k such 
that 0 ≤k ≤n then  
    
    ∑   
   
   
   
     
 (‎3-6) 
Where S is the state space of the Markov chain and r is any intermediary state in between 
state a and state b. If a is accessible from b and b is accessible from a, we say that a and b 
communicate, which is an equivalence relation. The equivalence relations that can be 
obtained are 
 a↔b (‎3-7) 
 a ↔ b implies b↔a (‎3-8) 
 a↔ b and b ↔ c together implies a ↔c (‎3-9) 
 a ↔ b; c ↔ d implies a ↔d (‎3-10) 
Let’s look at (‎3-7) in more detail; Assume a ↔ b and b ↔ c this means there exists n ≥ 0 so 
that 
    
  > 0 (‎3-11) 
And m ≥ 0 so that    
  >0. It is now possible to get from state a to state c in m+n hops by 
going from state a to state b in n hops and from b to c in m hops 
     
    ≥   
    
    (‎3-12) 
      =     and then    
     =∑    
 
    
     
    
  (‎3-13) 
This accessibility relation divides states into classes and this shows that within each class all 
states communicate with each other. Let D(t) be the distance in meters between a 
neighbouring node and the node that last transmitted a RREQ/RREP message. The 
positive/negative value indicates the interval –F(t) ≤D(t)≤F(t). L(t) is the maximum distance 
the node can cover at time t. F(t) is the number of hops the node can make during L(t). Hop-
Count is a measure of distance in the network and is given by 
 
  
 
 
 
(‎3-14) 
Based on the hop count, the probability density function can be calculated as follows, 
consider X and X0 to be node positions and consider the node to be at an initial position X0  
  
√     
⁄   
       
      
 
(‎3-15) 
(‎3-15) shows that the probability of finding the node at x(t) is Gaussian and as the motion of a 
node is random, the node can be considered as a Brownian particle. 
            
  
   
             
   
 
(‎3-16) 
The nodes keep changing their states and the probabilities associated with state changes are 
called Transition probabilities. The probability of going from state i to state j in a single step 
is a single step transition. For a single step transition 
     =              (‎3-17) 
Consider N to be the total number of network nodes 
    ∑              where 0 <n ≤N (‎3-18) 
K is the node nearness factor. The probability of a node being able to reach its next hop 
neighbour can be represented as the Probability of node nearness or Probability of 
communication (Pcom). (‎3-16) can be rewritten as 
       =  
     
     
 (‎3-19) 
As the probability ranges from 0 to 1 ,the ideal value for K after simulation and analysis, it 
was identified that the value of node nearness factor K=2, and when K=2 performance 
improved. 
 
Figure ‎3-4 Hop-count versus probability of communication 
3.2.3 Hop-Count versus Probability of Communication/Node Nearness 
The results of a simulation using MATLAB and NS-3 are shown in Figure 3-4 and when the 
probability of node nearness increases the distance the node travels is reduced thus 
minimizing the number of hops taken to reach its neighbouring node. As the hop-count 
increases the Probability of Communication/Node Nearness (Pcom) decreases which in turn 
indicates the hops taken by the node increases. 
 3.2.4 Delivery Time versus Delivery Cost 
An increasing number of hops from source to destination increases node battery consumption 
due to an increased likelihood of retransmissions and the result is an increase in the delivery 
cost [115,116]. For different values of Pcom, from Figure ‎3-5, it is shown that if the time to 
deliver is high the associated delivery cost is also high. For an increasing value of Pcom there 
is a decrease in delivery time as the node can communicate with the neighbouring node 
faster. 
3.2.5 Routing Overhead versus Node Velocity 
As shown in Figure ‎3-6 for different values of Pcom as velocity is increased the routing 
overhead increases. As the value of Probability of node nearness increases the routing 
overhead reduces as there is a lower chance for a message delivery failure. As the node 
moves towards its neighbour node for a higher value of Pcom, route discovery costs are 
minimized. 
 
Figure ‎3-5 Delivery Time versus Delivery Cost 
  
Figure ‎3-6 Routing overhead versus Node Velocity 
3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, the node communication process is analysed based on their states and hop-
count. The analysis is based on the Markov random walk model and the importance of hop 
count for efficient communication is analysed to understand the hop count dependency in 
terms of the probability to reliably communicate to a neighbour node and other associated 
impacts. An analysis of the results is presented along with a discussion of reliability and 
scalability.  
In this chapter, we have highlighted the importance of hop-count thereby leading to the 
Probability of node nearness and observed from the analysis that Pcom for a node plays a 
major role in network efficiency. In the following chapters, the hop-count metric has been 
included in the development of improved security techniques thereby making MANET more 
robust and secure. 
 
 Chapter 4 AIS ENHANCED SECURITY 
  
 4.1 Overview 
In this chapter, a new approach using AIS is presented which mimics the strategy of the HIS 
and Trust models to distinguish between a genuine node and selfish or compromised nodes. 
The research presented responds to Research Question 2 and the proposed framework utilizes 
the DCA principles. This algorithm utilizes the concept of Probability of Communication 
described in Chapter 3, for the development of an AISBA and is organized into the following 
five sections. Section 4.2 details existing MANET attacks. Section 4.3 describes the AIS 
based detection scheme. Section 4.4 and 4.5 analyses the detection system followed by the 
conclusion and areas that require future study in Section 4.6. 
4.2 Artificial Immune System Based Algorithm 
4.2.1 Inspiration 
The immune system distinguishes between non–self harmful antigens and non–self harmless 
antigens using specific mechanisms. The adaptive immune system and not the innate system 
could be the natural system and able to spot danger signs because it is hard-wired through 
evolution. In humans, however, due to genetic mutations that take place over time the 
immune system may be put into a deficit state that could result in catastrophic failure or 
contribute to an evolutionary update that incorporates the genetic mutations, with both 
positive and negative outcomes. 
In the adaptive immune system, white blood cells mediate the protection forces that might 
identify as an army of specialized able forces that have been trained to identify enemies and 
hence mount a defense. The protection forces work with the innate system to cleanse out the 
 damaged debris and rely on the natural system for alarms in the case of imminent danger as 
well as re-training if necessary. 
The damage signals are generated from the affected tissue, for example, a splinter results in 
the destruction of many cells due to skin penetration. A splinter may be accompanied by 
bacteria. The splinter is comparatively a non-self-harmless pathogen, while the bacteria are a 
non-self substantially harmful pathogen. The signal that spontaneously notified the able 
specialized forces comes from the dying cells. Cell death leads to the release of proteins that 
are not supposed to be on the outside surface of a living cell. The released proteins in turn 
alert the innate and adaptive systems about the necessity for a clean-up and immune response. 
The nature of how the living cells died is investigated and the able specialized forces are 
trained to carry out rectification activities. Therefore, the adaptive system will start to learn 
about the non-self proteins it finds near the damage and in turn, will train more specialized 
able forces near the abuse. The bacteria that followed the splinter can grow and lead to more 
damage; they may also have some innate proteins which in turn help to hunt them down. 
More signals will be generated raising the alarm level so that specialized able cells will hunt 
more belligerently for threatening pathogens.  
In some cases, the bacteria are vanquished rapidly, and all that remains is the splinter. Unlike 
bacteria, the non-self splinter is not going to cause more damage; the damage has already 
been done, and no more proteins will be released by damaged cells as they die. Minor 
irritations may occur, but the remaining splinter may not be a bother causing more cell 
damage causing the alarm to be raised again. The non-self and non-harmful splinter will still 
be confronted by the specialized able cells and they, in turn, begin to learn that the proteins 
 associated with the splinter aren't all that harmful. Thereby the specialized cells start to 
become allergic to the splinter proteins. This is how the HIS learns the difference between 
harmful non-self pathogens and non-harmful ones. The reason behind the cell death is the key 
to understanding if training the able specialized forces is required. 
During normal cell death or apoptosis, the proteins are not released, but are bundled and 
deactivated to avoid raising the alarm while being swept by the garbage collection teams of 
the human body. 
4.3 AISBA Trust Model 
Unlike some of the prior work carried out into AIS, where the learning phase is carried out 
once, there is a need in a dynamic topology like MANET to utilize an approach that permits 
each phase to be carried out in an iterative and repetitive process. The proposed algorithm 
follows a reactive approach as having a learning phase makes the algorithm have a large 
computational overhead. As the MANET topology is dynamic, thereby it is not efficient to 
learn things beforehand. If a node behaviour is not known before then that node is malicious 
during that time interval as seen in Section 2.7. The blacklisted node could have a route error. 
In such scenarios, designing a security algorithm based on the learning phase is inefficient. 
Therefore, the security algorithm proposed in this paper is a reactive one which accurately 
verifies genuine cases of route error and identifies a malicious node. 
  
Figure ‎4-1 Proposed AISBA Model 
In the proposed AISBA each node, as seen in Figure. 4-1, is modelled as a DC because DCs 
are the first line of defence as well as HIS antigen presenting cells. The initiator Node A 
sends a Route Request to the nodes in the network. The nodes that already have a path to the 
destination will send back a Route Reply. Upon receipt of the Route Reply, the source node 
sends its packet to the responder node. During this phase the source node expects the 
responder node to acknowledge (ACK) packet receipt. In the case of a Route Error causing 
the ACK to not be received, a Danger Signal alarm is raised upon which the initiator node is 
notified. This leads to a scenario where the genuineness of the Route Error should be verified, 
which will be explained in the upcoming sections. DCs in this model act as inquisitors, 
considering the events around them. They identify the presence of an invader and then 
present evidence of the invader to T-cells, which in turn activate the appropriate immune 
cells to attack the intruder. 
In a similar fashion the DC nodes, when they do not receive a response from the 
 neighbouring node, inform the source node and the source node sends the high priority 
PAMP signal to validate the presence or absence of danger. In our trust model based on AIS, 
four trust components are considered: 
 Safe Signal 1 (SS1) - This is generated upon receipt of Route Reply 
 Safe Signal 2 (SS2) - This is generated upon receipt of an ACK 
 Danger Signal (DS) - Generated in case of route discrepancies i.e. Route Error 
(RERR) 
 PAMP - This signal helps validate the selfish behaviour of a node. PAMP activates 
the immune response, thereby protecting the host from infections in HIS. In a 
similar way PAMP, being a high priority signal, overwrites the node buffer, and 
the attacker node will acknowledge receipt of PAMP.  
The trust value     
  (t) is evaluated by Node i towards Node j at time t, TC is the trust 
component.     
  (t) is represented as a real number in the range of [0, 1] as seen in Figure 4-2 
where 1 indicates genuine/unselfish or normalcy of nodes, [0.5-0.8] indicates route error 
discrepancies and [< 0.5] indicates selfishness. 
     
             
           
            
         
     (‎4-1) 
Where  ,         are the weights related to the trust components, with 
  +  +  +  =1. Instead of assigning individual weights to each of the trust elements a 
priority signal, PAMP, is used and a signal, SAFE, to indicate the nodes are behaving 
correctly. The weight of the PAMP priority signal is shown by     . The weight of the safe 
 signal is shown by     . (‎4-1) can be rewritten as: 
                    
        
                 
         
     (‎4-2) 
The values of the weights are chosen to maximize the performance of the algorithm based on 
Trust models which are evaluated in later sections. 
 
Figure ‎4-2 Trust Condition Number line model 
4.3.1 Trust Condition Evaluation 
The calculation of trust at each node is an indicator of the confidence in the node reliability 
[23]. The trust associated with a node should not be affected by network traffic, congestion 
and delay. The timing information of each node interaction should not be strictly emphasized. 
The use of a sliding window transmission approach reduces the effect of conditions arising 
out of a network that affect the trust calculation. In most real-time communication scenarios, 
utilizing sliding window mechanisms do not cause any delay in real-time packet delivery. We 
use a timing window t to evaluate the number of successful and unsuccessful messages 
between nodes. 
Let us consider Node i to evaluate Node j based on its behaviour; thereby making Node i the 
settlor and Node j the trustee. 
     
          
            
      (‎4-3) 
To calculate the trust threshold based on Trust conditions (     between two nodes i and j: 
       
       
                    
             (‎4-4) 
The trust relationship between nodes l, i and j as shown in Figure 4-3 is given by (l, j) = (l, i): 
(i, j) 
 
Figure ‎4-3 Trust Model 
Let the Trust Purpose be defined as “the node should be genuine.” Let the trust model, as 
seen in Figure 4-3, include node i in the network. The trust between node l and node i will be 
direct therefore it’s a functional level of trust whereas the trust between node l and node j will 
be indirect therefore it’s a referral level [24] of trust. 
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             
(‎4-5) 
(‎4-5) can be rewritten as 
       
          
       
       
   (‎4-6) 
To compute     
  ,we take into account the number of interactions between nodes i and j over 
the maximum possible number of interactions that could occur with any neighbour node 
during the interval [0,t]. We consider the following interaction types with regards to a 
 genuine /unselfish node, given that node i is the initiating node: 
 Sending Request 
 Receiving Reply 
 Selection of node based on highest value of     
 Acknowledgment 
 PAMP signal (high priority signal) 
The source node sends a request packet to the other nodes in the network, the nodes which 
are closer to the destination node will reply. On receiving a response, the source node selects 
the nodes with the highest value of     . Once the packet has been forwarded to the node 
with the highest value of       the node, in turn, waits for an acknowledgment from the 
corresponding node. In the instance of a selfish node, it will not transmit a reply. At this 
juncture, the high priority PAMP signal plays a critical role. The node that did not receive a 
response from its neighbour node informs the source node, which in turn leads to "Activate 
DC" mode being switched on.  
The initiator node then sends a PAMP signal (PAMPsend) and each node is required to 
acknowledge receipt of PAMPsend by sending back a PAMP receive signal (PAMPrecv). The 
selfish node that did not formerly acknowledge receipt of the packet will be forced to respond 
with a PAMPrecv as the PAMP signal is a high priority message. The gist of the PAMP signal 
strength on Packet loss ratio, in the presence of selfish nodes can be viewed in Figure. 4-4. 
Let the average number of messages from Node i, with a selfish, discrepant (uncertain) and 
normal node be x, y & z respectively. 
 If Node i requests a neighbour to forward a packet then the messages between Node i and 
selfish Node j include reply, selection, acknowledgment, and PAMP signal (total of four) as 
denoted by x. The anticipated number of messages between Node i and a selfish node can be 
none as there is a probability that the packets will be dropped or forwarded which in turn 
leads to two (reply, acknowledgment) follow-up messages as denoted by y. In the case of an 
ordinary node as denoted by z, there can be two classes of communication, including where 
Node j can be an intermediate node forwarding packets or Node j can be an unselfish node 
that replies to a route request from Node i. 
 x =        4  
y = 0 +       2 
z =       2 +       3=   +    
(‎4-7) 
 
Figure ‎4-4 Effect of PAMP strength on packet loss ratio 
 
Table ‎4-1 Trust Component Value Assignments 
   
       Values 
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       ⁄     ⁄  
  
Consequently, compute    
   (t) as seen in Table 4-1, by assigning a status value of   ⁄  to 
selfish states in Node j,   ⁄  for a discrepant node and   ⁄  for a normal node. Once Node a 
obtains    
   for TC = Safe Signal1, Safe Signal2, Danger Signal, PAMP then        is 
calculated based on (‎4-2). 
      
   (t) This measures the number of times a trustee node generated a route reply. 
Here a settlor node evaluates the unselfish and honest behaviour of the trustee node. 
This trust factor is calculated based on the number of interactions between the settlor 
and trustee node. 
    
   (t) This trust element is evaluated when the trustee node sends back an 
acknowledgment of receipt of a packet. 
    
  (t) In this case, the analysis is done by snooping on the packet transmission 
activity of the trustee node. 
    
    (t) This is analysed by observing if the susceptible node has acknowledged the 
PAMP signal. 
 4.3.2 Trust Threshold based on Interactions 
The Trust conditions are necessary to calculate the node reliability confidence. Traffic issues, 
such as congestion and delay, should not be taken into account when the trust is to be 
calculated. In other words, the trust evaluation should not rely exclusively on the network 
traffic conditions. The sliding window mechanism is applied as it sees the relative 
transmission time and downplays the consequence of degraded network traffic. The sliding 
window approach is employed to assess the number of successful and unsuccessful messages 
between the nodes and the timing windows (t for message transmission are recorded. After a 
time unit has passed the window slides by one increment and discards the contents of the 
previous time unit with no further action unless the ACK for the message transmitted in that 
time increment has not been received. Based on the analysis of the network scenario the 
window time duration can be varied. Let us consider an example, as depicted in Figure. 4-5, 
where the time for the window varies. 
The timing window length can be a variable and is determined based on the network 
scenarios. After a time unit has passed the window slides by one increment and discards the 
contents of the previous time unit with no further action unless the ACK for the message 
transmitted in that time increment has not been received. Based on the analysis of the 
network scenario the window time duration can be varied. Let us consider an example, as 
depicted in Figure. 4-5, where the time for the window varies. In the below given example, 
the length of the sliding window is three. 
During the first-time unit t1, the number of efficient and inefficient interactions is 4 and 3 
 respectively, and during the entire t1, the total number of efficient and inefficient 
interactions are 12 (sum of 4, 2 and 6) and 16 (sum 3, 5 and 8) respectively. Once the 
transition from the first-time unit is completed the new time interval t2 is actioned. In this 
case, t1 values (4, 3) are discarded and algorithm will be considering the next three values 
(2, 5), (6, 8), and (7, 1). 
Ef
f 
4 2 6 7 2 4 
Iff 3 5 8 1 8 3 
 t1=Eff(12),Iff(16
)   
     
  t2=Eff(15),Iff(14
) 
    
   t3=Eff(15),Iff(17
)   
   
    t4=Eff(13),Iff(12
)   
  
Figure ‎4-5 AISBA Sliding Window Implementation 
With the information gathered from the sliding window mechanism the time-based Trust 
threshold value of Node j at Node i (       that lies between 0 and 100 is defined as  
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(‎4-8) 
Effi,j is the total number of effective interactions of Node i with Node j during t. Iffi,j is the 
total number of ineffective interactions of Node i with Node j during t. Equation (‎4-8) is 
designed in such a way that the Trust threshold would approach 1 very slowly with the 
increase in effective interactions; therefore, it would take a longer time for Node i to increase 
 its trust value for another Node j. 
Figure. 4-6 shows the variation of Trust threshold value against effective and ineffective 
interactions. When the number of effective interactions is nil, then the Trust threshold value 
will be zero. 
 
Figure ‎4-6 Effect of interactions on Trust Value 
Based on the calculations of the Trust threshold values as seen in Figure. 4-6, a node 
classifies the behavioural state (Bst) of a node as shown in (4-9) with a denoting the median 
of all the Trust threshold values contributed to by unselfish nodes, and b indicates the median 
of all the Trust threshold values contributed to by the selfish nodes. 
     (     )
 {
                                                          
                                                                   
                                                                                     
} 
(‎4-9) 
  
Figure ‎4-7 Node Behavioral Sectors 
The median value provides a typical outcome if a set of values includes an outlier, which is 
an extreme value that differs largely from other values. The median is not significantly 
affected by extremely large or small values, so it is used to provide a typical Trust threshold 
value in a MANET that consists of selfish and unselfish nodes. 
In a scenario where there are more altruistic nodes and a low number of selfish nodes the 
mean value could be high as it would include the Trust threshold value of the unselfish nodes. 
Both a and b are calculated as shown in (‎4-10) and (‎4-11). 
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M denotes the set of unselfish nodes; P is the set of selfish nodes and n is the total number of 
nodes containing selfish, unselfish and unsure nodes. The values of a and b are designed to be 
 robust and can change over time, as shown in Figure. 4-7, hence the boundaries for 
selfishness or unselfishness can be dynamic. In the event of M or P becoming 0 then the 
values of           will be the same as the previous values      . For the nodes with values 
over 100, a will represent unselfish nodes, whereas for the nodes with values below 50, b will 
represent selfish nodes. The Trust threshold value calculation will continue in this manner 
after every unit of time. 
4.4 Simulation and Results 
The simulations were done using Network Simulator-3 version 3.23. The challenge was to 
implement AISBA within the simulation environment. In the simulations, the nodes were 
modelled as DCs and selfish nodes were introduced to provide an understanding of the 
algorithm's effectiveness. As observed in Figure. 4-8, using the packet delivery ratio metric, 
the algorithm performance was evaluated and AISBA provided a packet delivery ratio of 
86.25%, while SAODV (Secure AODV) was found to average 36.45%. The performance 
improvement found using AISBA, with this scenario when compared to SAODV, highlights 
the potential for AIS algorithms to be effectively utilized in MANET. The packet delivery 
ratio benefited from the detection and retained knowledge of malicious nodes. 
Table ‎4-2 Simulated Parameters 
Simulator Ns-3.23 
Mobility Model Random waypoint 
Simulation Time 950s 
Number of nodes 150 
Traffic Type UDP 
Network Area 1500m*1500m 
No.of malicious nodes 10-50 
Mobility 20 m/s 
Transmission Range 50m 
  
Figure ‎4-8 Malicious Node Effect on Packet Delivery 
Figure. 4-9 shows the AISBA detection rate against the number of malicious nodes in the 
network. An average detection rate of 93.41% was achieved while for SAODV the detection 
rate achieved was 85.34%. This comparison demonstrates that as the number of malicious 
nodes increases, the DC nodes can identify and validate a valid route error as well as a 
purposeful packet drop caused by the selfish nodes with the avail of the PAMP signal. 
 
Figure ‎4-9 Malicious Node Detection Rate 
 Using the Packet delivery ratio metric as shown in Figure. 4-10 we can evaluate the 
performance of the proposed security algorithm. AISBA shows higher packet delivery ratio 
of 86.25%, while SAODV exhibits an average of 36.45%. The contribution of this paper is 
that the use of bio-inspired algorithms gives better performance compared to SAODV. The 
packet delivery ratio and detection rate are better even in the presence of malicious nodes. 
Figure. 4-11 shows the Detection rate of AISBA against the number of malicious nodes. An 
average of 93.41% of true detection is achieved while Secure AODV reaches 85.34%. 
AISBA was evaluated against CITA-AODV. CITA-AODV utilizes the concept of learning 
stage and learns misbehaviour during this stage, AISBA does not utilize a learning stage as 
nodes in MANET have a dynamic topology therefore the behaviour of the mobile nodes is 
not constant. This comparison shows that though the number of malicious nodes increases, 
the DC nodes can identify and validate a valid route error as well as identify malicious nodes. 
 
Figure ‎4-10 Packet Delivery Ratio corresponding to Malicious nodes 
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Figure ‎4-11 True Detection corresponding to Malicious Nodes 
4.5 Statistical Analysis 
Consider that the trust value towards Node k is a random variable X following the normal 
distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom. This random variable is related to the sample mean, 
population mean and the standard deviation as follows:  
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(‎4-12) 
Where     
  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅     is sample mean,     
      population mean and     
      the standard deviation of 
Node j as observed by Node i. The probability that Node j is identified as a selfish node at 
time t is 
      (t) =P (    
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The analysis of the false positive probability is done by calculating      (t) under the scenario 
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 that node j is an altruistic/unselfish node whereby the false negative probability is analysed 
by calculating (1-     (t)) when node j is selfish or compromised. 
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During calculation of false positive probability the     
  = 0 and     
     = 0, There is neither 
danger nor PAMP signals involved as the nodes are genuine. Therefore, (‎4-14) is rewritten as  
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Conversely, during calculation of false negative probability (1-     (t)) the safe signals are 
absent, i.e.     
    = 0 and     
    = 0. Therefore, the false negative probability is given by: 
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Figure ‎4-12 Effect of Weight of PAMP and Trust Threshold on max (fpp,fpn) 
While developing this AIS based detection algorithm, the significance of keeping a balance 
was kept in mind. We observe that for an absolute value of        the false positive 
probability and the false negative probability is minimized. The optimal value for the Trust 
threshold is 0.5 and the value for Weight of PAMP (wPAMP) is 0.6 as seen in Figure 4-12, so 
that the false positive and false negative probabilities fall below 5%. 
4.6 Summary 
The algorithm presented in this chapter aims to provide a bio inspired approach to security. 
This bio centric approach to MANET security makes it an interesting and challenging subject 
for further research. 
 
 Chapter 5 ROUTING ATTACK - PACKET 
STORAGE TIME 
 
  
 5.1 Overview 
In this chapter, a novel MANET routing attack based on a Packet Storage Time (PST) is 
presented in response to Research Question 3. An attacking node modifies its storage time 
and thereby does not forward packets to the intended recipient nodes until some point after 
the delivery would have normally occurred. In the HIS, cells can discern between a range of 
matters, including foreign body attacks as well as cellular senescence. This chapter 
demonstrates a technique that uses the AIS, mimicking the strategy of the HIS, to identify the 
origin of a PST routing attack. 
5.2 Proposed attack-packet storage time 
Consider a MANET topology as shown in Figure 5-1, where the ad hoc networks challenge 
to establish a route between the existing nodes is presented. In Figure 5-1, MN1 is the source 
node and MN7 is the destination node. The intermediate nodes are MN2-MN6. In this 
scenario, consider the following available routes: 
 MN1-MN2-MN6-MN7 
 MN1-MN5-MN7 
 MN1-MN4-MN3-MN7 
When a route is needed, the source node should take into account the battery power or energy 
of the participating nodes that provide a route reply. 
  
Figure ‎5-1 MANET scenario 
In this scenario, a problem was identified where MN5 is an attacker/selfish node which do not 
want to expend energy to forward packets. This node is particularly interested in giving a 
RREP as it wants to maintain an updated routing table. 
The PST attack is a novel concept introduced for the first time in MANET where each mobile 
node is incorporated with a buffer/queue. In this type of attack, the attacker modifies its own 
buffer/queue time to congest the network. When the packets are maintained for a longer time 
than intended by each node, the packets become stale and the circulation of stale packets in 
the network goes to battery power wastage by the actual nodes. 
  
Figure ‎5-2 Proposed AIS algorithm 
5.3 AIS Algorithm 
A model based on the Danger Theory principle wherein each node is modelled as a DC is 
proposed. The presence or absence of danger is detected by the DC nodes, thereby identifying 
danger by indicating the presence of a malicious node. The DC nodes monitor the activity 
occurring in a MANET to report any malicious node. The PAMP signal is utilized here to 
signify the presence of a malicious node in the network. Based on these concepts a 
mathematical model is built. The nearby nodes have to expend less energy to communicate. 
The battery life/energy of each DC node plays an important role while establishing routes. 
During route establishment, the energy of each node needs to be considered. Consider x to be 
an energy dependent variable. The energy associated with the source destination and 
intermediate nodes is assigned a weight which is dependent on the percentage of battery 
power that would be used during a route request and route reply communication. Based on 
the above concept, the below given equation is formulated. 
  f(x) =αns  + βnd +2 n  (‎5-1) 
Where: α+β+γ=1 and α, β, γ ϵ [0, 1] and n  is the average of the energy among intermediate 
nodes,   is the source node energy,    is the destination node energy, α is the source node 
weight factor, β is the destination node weight factor, and γ is the intermediate nodes weight 
factor. Consider the Effective Energy (EE) of node k 
  k = F (nk,hk)=EEnode(k) =  *   (‎5-2) 
where hk is the number of hops from node k to node s, and F (nk,hk) ≈ EEnode(k) should satisfy 
the postulates: 
 If node k is far away from source node s, node k should have to take larger number of 
hops and more energy would be utilised which results in larger function value. 
 If node k is closer to node s, node k should have to take lesser number of hops and 
lesser energy would be utilised which results in a smaller function value. 
The effective mean energy of all the intermediate nodes is as follows 
  = 
 
   
∑    
 
         (‎5-3) 
Combining (‎5-2) and (‎5-3) gives the Node Energy Momentous function 
 f(x)=αns +βnd +
 
   
 ∑   
 
            (‎5-4) 
From (‎5-2) we get the Compatibility function 
 Ĉ=1/F(nk,hk) (‎5-5) 
As Compatibility Ĉ increases the cost to establish the route between source and destination 
decreases, which also implies that the node k has energy available for routing. In a MANET, 
 the source node initiates a route discovery whenever it has to send a packet. The proposed 
AISBA model consists of the following stages as shown in Figure 5-2: 
Normal. Consider the proposed AIS model as shown in Figure 5-2. Initially the source 
initiates a route discovery in order to send a packet to a destination node and computes 
compatibility of the node from which it receives a RREP. The source node does not receive 
an acknowledgement (ACK) from the node that provided the RREP. 
Attacker Detection. The source sends a high priority packet PAMP message to the attacker 
node and the attacker node is forced to acknowledge receipt of the PAMP (PAMP is a high 
priority signal) which indicates the presence of an attacker but this is not yet confirmed. 
Attacker Confirmation. The source computes the node Effective Energy (EEnode) of the 
attacker node and compares the value with its own energy. If the EEnode happens to be greater 
than EEsource the presence of the attacker is confirmed. 
The algorithm flowchart and pseudo code is described as shown in Figure 5-3. and Table 5-1. 
The source node broadcasts a RREQ and computes node compatibility for the nodes from 
which a RREP is received. The source node begins to send the packet and if an ACK is not 
received a high priority PAMP is sent. If the node is an attacker and it does respond with an 
ACK; this indicates the presence of the attacker node. The next step taken by the source is to 
compute the EE of the attacker, and a high EE value is used to confirm the presence of the 
attacker. This is also symbolically represented in the flowchart as shown in Figure 5-3. 
 Source 
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Source 
sends Packet
Intermediate 
node RREP
Check ACK 
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Send PAMP
Intermediate 
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Figure ‎5-3 Proposed AIS Algorithm flowchart 
5.4 Simulation and Results 
The ns-3.23 simulator was used to detect and confirm the presence of a PST attacker using 
the AODV protocol. Extensive simulations were carried out using ns-3.23 to verify the 
mathematical formulation presented. The simulation parameters used are shown in Table 5-2. 
 As can be seen in Figure 5-4 as the hop count increases in the network, the EE consumption 
by the mobile node is higher. As compatibility increases the cost to establish the route 
between the source and destination will decrease as can be seen in Figure 5-5. The route cost 
is a metric which is the ratio of transmitted control packets to the transmitted data packets. 
An increase in compatibility decreases the cost. 
Table ‎5-1 Algorithm Pseudo Code 
 
The average end-to-end delay increases as shown in Figure 5-6 and during the PST the 
attacker delays the packet delivery by modifying the packet storage time or queue time 
whereas in an AIS based AISBA model the presence of an attacker is detected and confirmed 
thereby the packet will be forwarded via a routing path that does not contain the PST 
1. Source Node broadcasts RREQ 
(a) Nodesrc broadcasts RREQ 
(b) Nodeintermed sends RREP 
2. Compute Compatiblity(Nodesrc,Nodeintermed,Packet P) 
(a) Nodesrc computes compatibility of Nodeintermed; 
(b) Nodesrcsends packet 
(c) Nodesrc does not receive  Ack;  
3. SendPAMP(Nodesrc,Nodeintermed,PAMPpacket PAMPp) 
(a) Nodesrc sends PAMP, 
(b) Nodeintermed acknowledges PAMP 
(c) The presence of attacker detected 
4. Compute Effective energy of intermediate node 
(a) EEnode(intermed) is computed by Source , 
(b) if EEnode(intermed) >= Nodesrc, the presence of attacker is confirmed. 
(c) Isolate the attacker node  
 
 attacker. Hence the average end-to-end delay will be slightly higher for AISBA. 
 
 
 
Table ‎5-2 Simulated Parameters 
Simulator Ns-3.23 
Mobility Model Random waypoint 
Simulation Time 500s 
Number of nodes 10-50 
Traffic Type UDP 
Network Area 600m*600m 
Mobility 6 m/s 
Pause Time 5s 
Transmission Range 50m 
As can be seen in Figure 5-7, a PST attack causes packet loss to increase as the number of 
nodes increase whereas with the AIS based algorithm the packet loss is lower due to the 
proposed security improvement. 
 
 Figure ‎5-4 Effective Energy v/s Hop Count 
 
Figure ‎5-5 Compatibility v/s Cost 
 
Figure ‎5-6 E2E v/s Number of nodes 
  
Figure ‎5-7 PST Attack-Packer loss v/s Number of nodes 
5.5 Summary 
The novel routing attack presented in this chapter modified the packet storage time in a node 
buffer to prolong packet delivery and route stale packets in the network. The AIS algorithm 
developed used three stages to detect and confirm the presence of a PST attacker. 
 
 Chapter 6 SELFISH NODE REHABILITATION 
 
  
 6.1 Overview 
This chapter provides a description of the Grudger Artificial Immune System framework 
(GrAIS) in response to Research Question 4. Selfish nodes limit the effectiveness of MANET 
and it is reasonable in certain situations to adopt an approach that isolates selfish nodes as 
they’re identified or to encourage selfish nodes to switch their behaviour before isolation is 
imposed. MANET is a communications network that can be utilized for disaster management, 
military and rescue operations. In each of these scenarios, for MANET to be effective there is 
a need to limit the number of selfish nodes. 
MANET effectiveness is increased when the nodes within the network are active participants, 
thereby reducing the amount of traffic that is resent due to nodes failing to relay traffic as 
requested. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 6.2 describes the proposed GrAIS. In 
Section 6.3, simulation results for scenarios with different mission critical workloads are 
presented. Lastly, Section 6.4 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Modeling of Grudger Artificial Immune System Algorithm 
The motivation for the GrAIS framework stems from the observation that it is not beneficial 
to the operation of a MANET to ignore or isolate selfish nodes. Initially all nodes in the 
network have the same classification and over time some nodes tend to become selfish. One 
of the reasons for nodes to become selfish is due to the relay load that the node may have 
experienced. Traffic workload has a direct effect on energy consumption and as energy 
reduces nodes can become selfish for various reasons, including observation of the number 
 and state of neighbouring nodes. The good nodes tend to overlook selfish nodes and continue 
to render service to the selfish nodes irrespective of any service in return. The proposal is that 
for high traffic volumes the routing task should be carried out by all nodes, including selfish 
nodes. In Section 2.4 a model is presented that provided the motivation for the formulation of 
the GrAIS. 
The routing model proposed in this paper categorizes good nodes into a sucker group, cheat 
nodes into selfish and DC nodes into a grudger group. In the proposed GrAIS model as seen 
in Figure. 6-1, each node is modelled as a Grudger Dendritic Cell (gDC). This DC node is 
analogous to the HIS DCs. In HIS, DCs are the first line of defence. The initiator gDC node 
sends a Route Request to the nodes in the network. The nodes that already have a path to the 
destination will send back a Route Reply. Upon receipt of the Route Reply, the source gDC 
node calculates the Pcom of those nodes from which a Route Reply was obtained. The packet 
is sent to the node that responded with the highest Pcom value. 
During this phase, the source node expects nodes to ACK packet receipt. In the case of a 
selfish node that does not send an ACK, a high priority PAMP signal is raised by the gDC 
node and the initiator node is also notified. The flow chart of the GrAis model can be seen in 
Figure 6-2.The selfish node is forced to acknowledge receipt of high priority PAMP signal as 
this high priority packet overwrites the selfish node’s buffer and there upon the packet signal 
will be transmitted as high priority by the previous gDC node.  
In a similar fashion the gDC nodes, when they do not receive a response from the 
intermediate selfish node, inform the sender node and raises the high priority PAMP signal to 
 validate the presence or absence of a selfish node. In our AIS based trust model, three trust 
signals are proposed: 
 Safe Signal 1 (SS1) - This is generated upon receipt of Route Reply 
 Safe Signal 2 (SS2) - This is generated upon receipt of an ACK 
 PAMP - This signal helps validate selfish node behaviour. PAMP activates the immune 
response, thereby protecting the host from infections in HIS. In a similar way PAMP, 
being a high priority signal, overwrites the node buffer, and the selfish node will 
acknowledge receipt of the PAMP. 
The trust value     
  (t) is evaluated by Node i towards Node j at time t, TP is the trust 
purpose.     
  (t) is represented as a real number in the range [0, 1], where 1 indicates unselfish 
nodes, [0.5-0.8] indicates route error discrepancies and [< 0.5] indicates a selfish behaviour. 
     
             
           
          
     (‎6-1) 
Where w1, w2, w3 are the weights related to the trust components, with w1+w2+w3=1. Instead 
of assigning individual weights to each of the trust elements a priority signal, PAMP, is used 
and a signal, SAFE, to indicate the nodes are behaving correctly. The weight of the PAMP 
priority signal is shown by wPAMP. The weight of the safe signal is shown by wSAFE. Equation 
(‎6-1) can be rewritten as: 
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Figure ‎6-1 GrAIS model 
The interaction types between nodes are shown along with the incorporation of the immune response trust 
model 
A sliding window transmission approach is used to decrease the effect of conditions arising 
out of a network that could affect the trust calculation. A timing window t is used to 
determine the number of successful and unsuccessful packets sent between nodes. 
Let us consider a scenario where Node a evaluates Node b based on its behaviour; thereby 
making Node a trustor and Node b the trustee. Node c sits beyond Node b. The trust 
relationship between nodes a, b and c is given by (a, b) = (a, b): (b, c). 
Let the Trust Purpose be defined as “the node should be good.” The trust between Node a and 
Node b will be direct therefore it’s a functional level of trust whereas the trust between Node 
a and Node c will be indirect as well as an exponential decay factor of trust is also considered 
therefore it’s a referral level [24] of trust. 
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Figure ‎6-2 GrAIS model event flow 
To compute     
  , consider the number of interactions between nodes a, b and c over the 
maximum possible number of interactions that could occur with any neighbor node during 
the interval [0, t]. The hop count measure calculated by Pcom and the Effective Energy of each 
node (EEnode) is detrimental during the interaction between nodes in the GrAIS model. In this 
approach, the following categories of interaction with regards to an unselfish node, given that 
Node a is the initiating node is considered: 
 Sending Request 
 Receiving Reply 
 Selection of node based on highest value of Pcom 
 Send Packet 
  If no ACK, send PAMP 
 If PAMP received, classify node as selfish node. 
 gDC node will resend packet to selfish node 
Pcom is an important factor while evaluating the trust purpose (    
     ) between any two 
nodes as the packet will be sent to the node that responds with a route reply and highest Pcom 
value. In this approach     
      between any two neighbouring nodes is computed by taking 
into account the number of communications between nodes a and b over the maximum 
possible number of interactions that could occur with any neighbour node during the interval 
[0,t ]. The trust purpose for Safe Signal 1 is computed by taking the ratio of the total number 
of route replies (NRREP) received with the total number of route requests sent (NRREQ). The trust 
purpose for Safe Signal 2 is computed by taking the ratio of the total number of 
acknowledgement packets (NACK) received by the sender with the route reply packets sent by 
the destination/intermediate (NRREP) node. The trust purpose for the PAMP signal is computed 
by taking the ratio of the total number of PAMP sent for every route reply received by the 
sender and no acknowledgement sent by the destination/neighbour node. 
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The intermediate node informs the source node of a neighbouring node that appears to be 
selfish. The source node sends a PAMP signal to overwrite the selfish node buffer and this 
selfish node is added to a blacklist to prevent it being used in future communications if it 
does not respond to the PAMP signal. The high priority PAMP signal plays a vital role in this 
process. The "Activate DC" mode that is switched on due to a selfish node being identified 
sets in motion the response process. The effect of the PAMP signal in the presence of selfish 
nodes and its impact on packet loss ratio can be seen in Chapter 4. As the PAMP works to 
deal with the selfish nodes, the packet loss ratio is reduced. 
The source node sends a PAMP signal, PAMPsend and each node should acknowledge receipt 
by sending back a PAMP receive signal, PAMPrecv. The selfish nodes that do not formerly 
acknowledge receipt of the packet will be forced to respond with a PAMP receive signal, 
PAMPrecv, as the PAMP signal is a high priority message and it overwrites the node buffer. 
       
   (t): Measures the number of times any intermediate (trustee) node generated a 
route reply. Here a settlor node evaluates the unselfish and honest behavior of the 
trustee node. This trust component is computed based on the number of interactions 
between the trustor and trustee node. 
     
   (t): The trust element is evaluated when the trustee node sends back an 
acknowledgment of receipt of a packet. 
      
    (t): Analysed by observing if the intermediate node received no 
acknowledgement to the data packet but it did send a route reply earlier and then the PAMP 
signal is sent to validate selfish node behaviour. 
The GrAIS utilizes the concept of a Price of Anarchy [9] for load calculation. Consider that 
there are N nodes in the network. In the GrAIS model, nodes that perform a routing task 
employ a trust purpose     
   between any two nodes a, b. The EEnode of b and Trust value of 
Node b as observed by Node a is taken into consideration. Therefore, the Workload (WL) in a 
routing task undertaken by any Node b is  
     
 
              
     
 (‎6-7) 
The workload is dependent on the energy of a node or inversely proportional to node energy 
and trust. (‎6-7) shows that as workload increases the nodes expend more energy to carry out 
networking tasks. As the node energy consumption increases the trust value could reduce. 
6.3 Simulation results and analysis 
The simulations were carried out using NS-3 and MATLAB. Energy-aware workload [13] 
distribution is the most efficient approach to reduce energy consumption and stimulate 
cooperation of selfish nodes. In the traditional MANET applications, the workloads are very 
simple and wireless communication is usually the most energy intensive process. However, 
as the MANET applications become more complex, it becomes necessary to efficiently 
distribute the workloads by considering both the trust, hop count and communication energy 
consumption. In this research, workload in terms of the trust metric and energy consumption 
during packet transmission was considered. The workload in terms of packet transmission 
 was considered to reveal the tradeoff between sucker (good) nodes and selfish (cheat) nodes.  
Table 6-1 Simulated Parameters 
Simulator Ns-3.23 
Mobility Model Random waypoint 
Simulation Time 1000s 
Number of selfish nodes 10-50 
Number of nodes 150 
Traffic Type UDP 
Network Area 300m*1500m 
Packet size 130 bytes 
Mobility 20 m/s 
Transmission Range 50m 
 
In the simulations, there are three workload scenarios explored with the packet delivery 
workload increasing from Workload1 to Workload3. 
In Figure 6-3 and Figure 6-4, it can be observed that initially good nodes maintain trust while 
the selfish nodes choose to conserve their energy. As the workload is initially light and all 
nodes have more energy, the unselfish characteristic amongst participating nodes becomes a 
crucial factor when determining trust. The prominent drop in trust amongst the good nodes 
was observed at t = 300 min when the good nodes had depleted their energy to a point where 
they began to look for alternative pathways that would conserve the energy of known good 
nodes.  
The GrAis model performs better as time progresses due to selfish nodes being forced to co-
operate. The selfish node maintains trust for a longer t as it would have conserved energy to 
this point. 
  
Figure ‎6-3 Trust values for Workload1 
In Figure 6-4, the trend is similar to Figure 6-3, except that the time during which good nodes 
start to show a dip in trust occurs earlier than when it occurred in the GrAIS model. This is 
due to the workload increase from Workload1 to Workload2 where the energy consumption 
increases and good nodes diminish their energy store at a corresponding rate whilst cheat 
nodes act to retain energy.  
The GrAIS model facilitates traffic flows using selfish nodes and as a result the GrAIS model 
can function more effectively as time progresses when compared to a model that relies upon 
good nodes to transfer traffic flows.  
In Figure 6-5, a new trend is seen with the cheat nodes acting to conserve energy earlier due 
to the higher workload and this result in a lack of cooperation from the point where trust dips. 
The GrAIS model approaches the good node model by forcing the selfish nodes to cooperate 
with the help of the high priority PAMP signal. 
  
Figure ‎6-4 Trust values for Workload2 
 
Figure ‎6-5 Trust values for Workload3 
6.4 Summary 
The GrAIS model utilizes the principles of AIS and probability to create a model 
incorporating good and selfish nodes to combat selfishness in MANET. The results obtained 
from the simulations have shown that the GrAIS model outcomes are an improvement over 
models that ignore or isolate selfish nodes as time progresses in spite of increasing workload. 
 A balance between energy utilization, due to good nodes transferring traffic, and energy 
conservation, due to selfish nodes refusing to transfer traffic, has been achieved by forcing 
selfish nodes to participate at an appropriate point in the MANET life cycle. A MANET that 
combines selfishness and unselfishness can be shown to be beneficial when resources, 
particularly energy, become limited. As future work, a more complex model could be 
developed exclusively for higher workloads by considering the stability of the GrAIS model 
over a longer time interval. 
 
 Chapter 7 AIS PAIN MODELLING 
 
  
 7.1 Overview 
This chapter provides an investigation of AIS pain modelling in response to Research 
Question 5. The most prominent characteristic of most systems is self-preservation, which is 
the instinct with which an animal can fight against pain. Most pain is a discomfort but can 
reach a level that reflects the degree of injury or reflective concern about an event. This 
discomfort in a MANET can be modelled with the help of key parameters like trust, energy 
and workload. A MANET node behaves automatically like a sensory node in terms of 
behavioural patterns like communication and information gathering with other network 
nodes. 
7.2 Modeling Trust for Pain Abstraction   
To model the Trust Metric the trust amongst nodes is considered, with the nodes modelled as 
DCs. When the DC nodes do not receive a response from a neighbouring node they inform 
the source node and the source node sends the high priority PAMP signal to validate the 
presence or absence of pain. In the AIS based trust model, four signals for trust purposes are 
considered: 
 Secure Signal 1 (SC1) - This signal is to confirm the receipt of Route Reply. 
 Secure Signal 2 (SC2) - This signal is to confirm acknowledgement of data packet. 
 Identifier Signal (IS) - This signal is initiated by the intermediate DC node when its 
immediate neighbour node is the cause of pain in the network. This signal has priority 
lesser than PAMP as it is the predecessor of PAMP. The signal is produced in the event 
of route error. 
  PAMP - This signal helps confirm the presence of selfish nodes. PAMP is a high 
priority signal, overwrites the node buffer, and the selfish node (the node that caused 
pain in the network) will acknowledge receipt of PAMP. This signal is initiated by the 
source DC node. 
The trust value      
  (t) is evaluated by Node i towards Node j at time t, TP is the trust 
purpose.     
  (t) is represented as a real number in range of [0, 1] where 1 indicates good 
nodes, [0.5-0.8] indicates route error/selfishness and [< 0.5] indicates pain and inflammation. 
     
             
             
               
            
        (‎7-1) 
Where  ,         are the weights related to the trust components, with  +  +  +  =1. 
Instead of assigning individual weights to each of the trust elements a priority signal, PAMP, 
is used and a signal, SECURE, to indicate the nodes are behaving correctly. The weight of 
the PAMP priority signal is shown by     . IS is used to identify route error. The weight of 
the IS is given by    .The weight of the secure signals are shown by     and     . 
Equation (‎7-1) can be rewritten as: 
 
    
                 
                   
                 
       
           
        
(‎7-2) 
The values for the weights are chosen to maximize the performance of the Trust model. The 
PAMP signal is assigned the highest weight                       Where       
                 
The calculation of trust at each node is an indicator of the confidence in node reliability. The 
trust associated with a node should not be affected by network traffic, congestion and delay. 
 Let us consider Node x to evaluate Node y based on its past and present behaviour; thereby 
making Node x the trustor and Node y the trustee. 
     
          
            
      (‎7-3) 
Let the Trust Purpose be defined as the node should be “unselfish.” To compute     
      take 
into account the number of communications between nodes x and y over the maximum 
possible number of interactions that could occur with any neighbour node during the interval 
[0, t]. The trust value for Secure Signal1 is the ratio of the total number of route replies (NRP) 
received for every total number of route requests sent (NRQ). The trust value for Secure Signal 
2 is the ratio of the total number of acknowledgement packets        received for every 
route reply received (    .The trust value for the IS is the ratio of the total number of ISs 
sent for every route reply received and no acknowledgement sent. The trust value for the 
PAMP signal is the total number of PAMP sent for every IS sent. 
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The IS is used to identify route error or selfish nodes. When the IS is sent, if there is a 
genuine case of route error there will not be acknowledgement of the IS and this will be 
 identified as a possible cause of route error. The intermediate node will inform the source 
node, which in turn sends a high priority PAMP and this signal overwrites the selfish node 
buffer and for future communication scenarios this selfish node could be blacklisted. 
In the case of a selfish node, it will not send a response. It is, at this juncture, the high priority 
PAMP signal that plays a vital role. The node that did not receive a response from its 
neighbour node informs the source node, which in turn leads to "Activate DC" mode being 
switched on.  
The initiator node then sends a PAMP signal, PAMPsend and each node is required to 
acknowledge receipt by sending back a PAMP receive signal, PAMPrecv. The selfish node 
that did not formerly acknowledge receipt of the packet will be forced to respond with a 
PAMPrecv, as the PAMP signal is a high priority message and it overwrites the node buffer. 
Once Node x obtains     
   for TP=Secure Signal1, Secure Signal2, Danger Signal, PAMP 
then         is calculated based on (‎7-2). 
       
   (t): This measures the number of times any intermediate (trustee) node 
generated a route reply. Here a settlor node evaluates the unselfish and honest 
behavior of the trustee node. This trust component is computed based on the number 
of interactions between the trustor and trustee node. 
     
   (t): This trust element is evaluated when the trustee node sends back an 
acknowledgment of receipt of a packet. 
      
  (t): This signal is sent by the intermediate DC node. In this case, the analysis is 
done by snooping on the packet transmission activity of the trustee node.  
     
    (t): This is analysed by observing if the node was in pain and then then the PAMP 
signal is sent to validate selfish behaviour in a node. 
7.3 Modeling the Pain Reduction Artificial Immune System 
Algorithm 
The basic principle involved in pain modelling is understanding pain as an output of the brain 
that is produced as a resultant of the body tissue in danger and the need to initiate an action. 
Pain is never straightforward although it appears to be so. In the Pain Reduction based AIS 
algorithm, the nodes are analogous to cells in the HIS, and lack of cooperation by any node 
inflicts pain to the network. There are selfish MANET nodes that appear reluctant to forward 
packets for other nodes as they do not want to drain their energy.  
In this research pain in the network is caused due to selfish nodes as seen in Figure 7-1. 
Energy consumption is a crucial factor in MANET. Four possible energy consumption states 
are identified: Sending state (RREQ), Receiving state (RREP), selfish and failed. The first 
two states are when the node is transmitting and receiving packets respectively, the selfish 
state has greater effect on energy consumption than the transmitting and receiving states as 
the node has elected to be selfish to preserve its energy. Nominally the energy cost of a 
packet is proportional to the packet size. The work presented in [23] identifies an energy 
consumption model that incorporates the cost of the receiving and sending traffic. The 
analysis in this approach gives a basis of comparison of the overhead associated with routing 
as well as data traffic. 
 The Energy Cost (Ecost) associated with each packet at a node is represented as the total of the 
incremental costs (c) proportional to the packet size (s) and cost (d) associated with channel 
acquisition. 
            
  
  
  (‎7-7) 
Where NS is the number of selfish nodes and NT is the number of network nodes. When 
inflammation occurs, chemicals from the body's white blood cells are released into the blood 
or affected tissues to protect the body from foreign substances. This release of chemicals 
increases the blood flow to the area of injury or infection, and may result in skin coloration 
and warmth. Some of the chemicals cause a fluid leak into the tissues, resulting in swelling. 
This protective process may stimulate nerves and cause pain. 
 
Figure ‎7-1 Pain and Inflammation Conceptualization in MANET 
In MANET during node interaction, the nodes are analogous to DCs in the HIS, when the 
nodes are stressed there should be a solution to overcome the pain and resulting 
inflammation. Inflammation (Infl) is initiated upon tissue injury and sets off a cascade of 
 biochemical reactions that prime the nervous system for pain sensing. Therefore, taking steps 
to ease inflammation is an effective means of interfering with the process of pain 
sensitization. Similarly, when there is a decrease in the trust metric an increase in 
inflammation occurs which indicates the network node is in pain. (‎7-8) shows the 
Inflammation-trust relation in AIS based MANET. 
           
 
         
 (‎7-8) 
Pain was modelled using two categories: Pba and Paa. Firstly, the nodes are placed in an 
environment with selfish nodes, when a node interacts with good nodes the Secure Signals 
1&2 are produced due to receipt of Route Reply and acknowledgment of the data packet. In 
the event of a good node communicating with a selfish node there will neither be receipt of 
Route Reply nor acknowledgment and during this time the good node is in pain as it affects 
the performance of the network as well. 
  
Figure ‎7-2 Proposed PrAIS algorithm flowchart 
To identify the presence of a selfish node, the PAMP signal is sent. If the node is selfish it is 
forced to acknowledge receipt of PAMP. On the other hand, if the node is not able to send a 
Route Reply or acknowledgment, DS is sent to identify the route error, since due to route 
error the node will not be able to send a reply nor acknowledgment and therefore the 
preceding nodes are informed of the route error. The flowchart of the proposed PrAIS can be 
seen in Figure. 7-2. The pain equations Pba and Paa can be modelled as 
          (         
              
   )          (‎7-9) 
Where Trust Purpose =SC1, SC2 in Pba 
          (          
              
  )          (‎7-10) 
 Where Trust Purpose =IS, PAMP in Paa. The Pain Reduction Equation (PRE) (‎7-11) forms the 
crux of the PrAIS algorithm as it gives the change in pain after sending the PAMP and DS 
signals so that the presence of selfish node or route error can be identified and validated. 
               (‎7-11) 
7.4 Simulation and Results 
The ns-3.23 simulator was used to detect and confirm the presence of a PST attacker using 
the AODV protocol. Extensive simulations were carried out using NS-3.23 to verify the 
mathematical formulation presented. Pause time is used to describe the interval between the 
mobility of nodes.By having a pause time of infiniteness implies that the node is stationary 
and by having a pause time of zero implies that the node is highly mobile.Therefore with the 
help of pause time it is possible to achieve a dynamicity of  either high/medium or fixed 
nodes.The simulation parameters used are shown in Table 7-1. Selfish nodes were also 
introduced in the simulation. 
As can be seen in Figure 7-3, as the trust reduces in the network, the Inflammation on the 
node increases. As delays increase, node mobility decreases which causes uncertainty for any 
two nodes to come in direct contact and create trust. Such a scenario that reduces mobility 
causes decreasing trust and increasing inflammation. The network is subjected to selfish 
nodes and in AODV, the packet delivery ratio will reduce as there is no antidote to curb 
selfishness, whereas in PrAIS the presence of IS and PAMP alleviates pain thereby achieving 
an improved packet delivery ratio, Figure.7-4. 
The average end-to-end delay is the average time between data packets sent out from the 
 source node and received at the destination node. The end-to-end delay decreases for PrAIS 
as shown in Figure 7-.5 as the selfish nodes are avoided due to PAMP signals whereas the 
routing path taken by AODV will have selfish nodes thereby increasing the packet delivery 
delay. 
 
Figure ‎7-3 Inflammation v/s Pause time 
As can be seen in Figure 7-6, the routing overhead is the ratio of route discovery packets to 
the data packets sent by source. The routing overhead for PrAIS is lower as it chooses a route 
avoiding selfish nodes resulting in less need to reconstruct routes during data transfer 
whereas in AODV the need to initiate route discovery is higher, as the effect of selfish nodes 
cannot be alleviated. 
Table ‎7-1 Simulated Parameters 
Simulator Ns-3.23 
Mobility Model Random waypoint 
Simulation Time 900s 
Number of nodes 10-50 
Traffic Type UDP 
Network Area 300m*1500m 
 Mobility 20 m/s 
Pause Time 0-500 s 
Transmission Range 50m 
 
Figure ‎7-4 Packet delivery ratio v/s Pause time 
 
Figure ‎7-5 E2E v/s Pause time 
  
Figure ‎7-6 Routing overhead v/s Pause time 
7.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the research introduced a new approach to dealing with MANET pain, which 
is a HIS concept applied to MANET using AIS techniques. The factors used to identify pain 
in MANET were Energy and Trust. MANET pain was alleviated with use of the novel PrAIS 
algorithm.  
 
 Chapter 8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
  
 The research successfully answered the research questions and the results presented in this 
thesis make a significant contribution to the body of knowledge in the application of AIS to 
improve MANET security and performance. A new and novel algorithm has been presented 
that improves MANET security whilst a variant improves performance by reducing the effect 
of selfish nodes. 
A review of the literature and a thematic classification of various AIS algorithms are 
provided in Chapter 2. A classification is proposed according to the challenges that AIS 
based MANET schemes might attempt to solve, thus providing a more efficient 
understanding of the proposed solution. In addition, the security attacks in MANET have also 
been detailed thereby providing an understanding of the reason behind the investigation of a 
new routing attack in MANET. 
In the current state of the art the nodes are in a protected state or human intervention is 
required when facing security threats. These situations are impractical in a MANET which is 
known for dynamic topology and node mobility. Therefore, a new and innovative approach is 
necessary which can overcome the challenges of the existing MANET design and rectify the 
drawbacks of the current state of the art. Integration of an AIS scheme in MANET packet 
transmission to create AIS based routing (Translate AIS signals to MANET signals) has the 
potential to be a valuable framework. 
A model of an AIS based security algorithm was developed where each node is modelled as a 
DC that initiates immune responses. Each DC node monitors the routing process and 
generates signals indicating the presence or absence of danger. 
 AISBA was designed with AIS signals to provide a secure routing algorithm to detect selfish 
nodes. This was inspired from the HIS as the DCs in the Human body provide a robust 
defence. To guarantee reliability and minimizing end-to-end latency, Trust metrics have been 
modelled and utilized to provide secure routing for MANET nodes. Extensive simulations 
demonstrate that AISBA yields a significant improvement in detection rate and packet 
delivery ratio. 
A novel routing attack, PST, was conceptualised and modelled in a MANET. In PST, the 
attacker modifies the storage time of the packet so that it does not reach the intended 
destination nodes. Utilizing AIS signals the source of the PST attack was successfully 
identified. The potential for PST to be detrimental to MANET is considerable and the 
solution to this attack has been presented with an analysis that provides evidence that the 
operation of MANETs is susceptible to malicious attack without an improved security 
regime. 
The GrAIS was developed in response to the loss of performance found when selfish nodes 
fail to participate in MANET opertion. A variant of the AISBA, GrAIS, takes advantage of 
the idea of a Dawkins model of birds and transforms the issue of selfish nodes non-
cooperation by stimulating them to cooperate by utilizing the concept of increasing workload. 
Simulation results show that GrAIS yields significant improvements in the efficiency of 
packet delivery. 
The concept of pain was introduced and modelled for a MANET. The PrAIS is a new and 
innovative approach to identifying and dealing with MANET pain, which is analogous to 
 what is found in the HIS. PrAIS applies a Pain before action (Pba) and Pain after action (Paa) 
based Pain Reduction approach, which uses the AIS signals, and trust among the nodes. 
Extensive simulations have demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed 
approach. 
There are considerable opportunities for future work in the area of applying HIS concepts to 
AIS applied solutions to evolving issues with MANET. In MANET pain could, for example, 
be broadened to incorporate other parameters apart from trust and energy. The AISBA 
framework led to the formation of GrAIS and PrAIS algorithm. Similarly, the AISBA 
framerwork could be broadened to pave the way for other AIS algorithms that focus on 
improving MANET security. 
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 Appendix 1 aisba.cc 
#include "ns3/aisba-module.h" 
#include "ns3/core-module.h" 
#include "ns3/network-module.h" 
#include "ns3/internet-module.h" 
#include "ns3/mobility-module.h" 
#include "ns3/point-to-point-module.h" 
#include "ns3/wifi-module.h"  
#include "ns3/v4ping-helper.h" 
#include <iostream> 
#include <cmath> 
// Lincy 
#include "ns3/aisba-rtable.h" 
 
using namespace ns3; 
using namespace ns3::aisba; 
 
*/ 
class AisbaExample  
{ 
public: 
  AisbaExample (); 
  /// Configure script parameters, \return true on successful configuration 
  bool Configure (int argc, char **argv); 
  /// Run simulation 
  void Run (); 
  /// Report results 
  void Report (std::ostream & os); 
  /// Lincy 
  //void activateDC(); 
private: 
 
  // parameters 
  /// Number of nodes 
  uint32_t size; 
  /// Distance between nodes, meters 
  double step; 
  /// Simulation time, seconds 
  double totalTime; 
  /// Write per-device PCAP traces if true 
  bool pcap; 
  /// Print routes if true 
  bool printRoutes; 
 
  // network 
  NodeContainer nodes; 
  NetDeviceContainer devices; 
  Ipv4InterfaceContainer interfaces; 
  
private: 
  void CreateNodes (); 
  void CreateDevices (); 
  void InstallInternetStack (); 
  void InstallApplications (); 
}; 
 
int main (int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
  AisbaExample test; 
  if (!test.Configure (argc, argv)) 
    NS_FATAL_ERROR ("Configuration failed. Aborted."); 
 
  test.Run (); 
  test.Report (std::cout); 
  return 0; 
} 
 
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
AisbaExample::AisbaExample () : 
  size (200), 
  step (70), 
  totalTime (10), 
  pcap (true), 
  printRoutes (true) 
{ 
} 
 
bool 
AisbaExample::Configure (int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
  //  
  // LogComponentEnable("AisbaRoutingProtocol", LOG_LEVEL_ALL); 
 
  SeedManager::SetSeed (12345); 
  CommandLine cmd; 
 
  cmd.AddValue ("pcap", "Write PCAP traces.", pcap); 
  cmd.AddValue ("printRoutes", "Print routing table dumps.", printRoutes); 
  cmd.AddValue ("size", "Number of nodes.", size); 
  cmd.AddValue ("time", "Simulation time, s.", totalTime); 
  cmd.AddValue ("step", "Grid step, m", step); 
 
  cmd.Parse (argc, argv); 
  return true; 
} 
 
void 
AisbaExample::Run () 
 { 
//  Config::SetDefault ("ns3::WifiRemoteStationManager::RtsCtsThreshold", UintegerValue (1)); // enable 
rts cts all the time. 
  CreateNodes (); 
  CreateDevices (); 
  InstallInternetStack (); 
  InstallApplications (); 
 
  std::cout << "Starting simulation for " << totalTime << " s ...\n"; 
 
  Simulator::Stop (Seconds (totalTime)); 
  Simulator::Run (); 
  Simulator::Destroy (); 
} 
 
void 
AisbaExample::Report (std::ostream &) 
{  
} 
 
void 
AisbaExample::CreateNodes () 
{ 
  std::cout << "Creating " << (unsigned)size << " nodes " << step << " m apart.\n"; 
  nodes.Create (size); 
  // Name nodes 
  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < size; ++i) 
    { 
      std::ostringstream os; 
      os << "node-" << i; 
      Names::Add (os.str (), nodes.Get (i)); 
    } 
  // Create static grid 
  MobilityHelper mobility; 
  mobility.SetPositionAllocator ("ns3::GridPositionAllocator", 
                                 "MinX", DoubleValue (0.0), 
                                 "MinY", DoubleValue (0.0), 
                                 "DeltaX", DoubleValue (step), 
                                 "DeltaY", DoubleValue (0), 
                                 "GridWidth", UintegerValue (size), 
                                 "LayoutType", StringValue ("RowFirst")); 
  mobility.SetMobilityModel ("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel"); 
  mobility.Install (nodes); 
} 
 
void 
AisbaExample::CreateDevices () 
{ 
  NqosWifiMacHelper wifiMac = NqosWifiMacHelper::Default (); 
  wifiMac.SetType ("ns3::AdhocWifiMac"); 
   YansWifiPhyHelper wifiPhy = YansWifiPhyHelper::Default (); 
  YansWifiChannelHelper wifiChannel = YansWifiChannelHelper::Default (); 
  wifiPhy.SetChannel (wifiChannel.Create ()); 
  WifiHelper wifi = WifiHelper::Default (); 
  wifi.SetRemoteStationManager ("ns3::ConstantRateWifiManager", "DataMode", StringValue 
("OfdmRate6Mbps"), "RtsCtsThreshold", UintegerValue (0)); 
  devices = wifi.Install (wifiPhy, wifiMac, nodes);  
 
  if (pcap) 
    { 
      wifiPhy.EnablePcapAll (std::string ("aisba")); 
    } 
} 
 
void 
AisbaExample::InstallInternetStack () 
{ 
  AisbaHelper aisba; 
  // you can configure AODV attributes here using aisba.Set(name, value) 
  InternetStackHelper stack; 
  stack.SetRoutingHelper (aisba); // has effect on the next Install () 
  stack.Install (nodes); 
  Ipv4AddressHelper address; 
  address.SetBase ("10.0.0.0", "255.0.0.0"); 
  interfaces = address.Assign (devices); 
 
  if (printRoutes) 
    { 
      Ptr<OutputStreamWrapper> routingStream = Create<OutputStreamWrapper> ("aisba.routes", 
std::ios::out); 
      aisba.PrintRoutingTableAllAt (Seconds (8), routingStream); 
    } 
} 
 
void 
AisbaExample::InstallApplications () 
{ 
  V4PingHelper ping (interfaces.GetAddress (size - 1)); 
  //V4PingHelper ping2(interfaces.GetAddress (size - 2)); 
  ping.SetAttribute ("Verbose", BooleanValue (true)); 
  //ping2.SetAttribute ("Verbose", BooleanValue (true)); 
  ApplicationContainer p = ping.Install (nodes.Get (0)); 
 // ApplicationContainer p2 = ping2.Install (nodes.Get (0)); 
  p.Start (Seconds (0)); 
  p.Stop (Seconds (totalTime) - Seconds (0.001)); 
  //p2.Start (Seconds (2)); 
 // p2.Stop (Seconds (totalTime) - Seconds (0.001)); 
 
  // move node away 
  Ptr<Node> node = nodes.Get (size/2); 
   Ptr<MobilityModel> mob = node->GetObject<MobilityModel> (); 
  Simulator::Schedule (Seconds (totalTime/3), &MobilityModel::SetPosition, mob, Vector (1e5, 1e5, 
1e5)); 
} 
 
// Method added by Lincy 
 
/*void AisbaExample::activateDC(){ 
  RoutingTableEntry _oRoutingTableEntry; 
  if(_oRoutingTableEntry.GetFlag() ==INVALID)  
  { 
   std::cout<<"PAMP-DC .\n"; 
  } 
  if(_oRoutingTableEntry.GetFlag() ==VALID) 
  { 
   std::cout << "DC - UP .\n"; 
  } 
  if(_oRoutingTableEntry.GetFlag() ==IN_SEARCH) 
  { 
   std::cout << "PAMP - IN_SEARCH .\n"; 
  } 
}*/ 
 
 Appendix 2 aisba-routing-protocol.cc 
 
#define NS_LOG_APPEND_CONTEXT                                   \ 
  if (m_ipv4) { std::clog << "[node " << m_ipv4->GetObject<Node> ()->GetId () << "] "; }  
 
#include "aisba-routing-protocol.h" 
#include "ns3/log.h" 
#include "ns3/boolean.h" 
#include "ns3/random-variable-stream.h" 
#include "ns3/inet-socket-address.h" 
#include "ns3/trace-source-accessor.h" 
#include "ns3/udp-socket-factory.h" 
#include "ns3/wifi-net-device.h" 
#include "ns3/adhoc-wifi-mac.h" 
#include "ns3/string.h" 
#include "ns3/pointer.h" 
#include <algorithm> 
#include <limits> 
#include "aisba-rqueue.h"//lincy 
 
namespace ns3 
{ 
 
NS_LOG_COMPONENT_DEFINE ("AisbaRoutingProtocol"); 
 
namespace aisba 
{ 
NS_OBJECT_ENSURE_REGISTERED (RoutingProtocol); 
 
/// UDP Port for AISBA control traffic 
const uint32_t RoutingProtocol::AISBA_PORT = 654; 
 
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/// Tag used by AISBA implementation 
 
class DeferredRouteOutputTag : public Tag 
{ 
 
public: 
  DeferredRouteOutputTag (int32_t o = -1) : Tag (), m_oif (o) {} 
 
  static TypeId GetTypeId () 
  { 
    static TypeId tid = TypeId ("ns3::aisba::DeferredRouteOutputTag").SetParent<Tag> () 
      .SetParent<Tag> () 
      .SetGroupName("Aisba") 
      .AddConstructor<DeferredRouteOutputTag> () 
    ; 
     return tid; 
  } 
 
  TypeId  GetInstanceTypeId () const  
  { 
    return GetTypeId (); 
  } 
 
  int32_t GetInterface() const 
  { 
    return m_oif; 
  } 
 
  void SetInterface(int32_t oif) 
  { 
    m_oif = oif; 
  } 
 
  uint32_t GetSerializedSize () const 
  { 
    return sizeof(int32_t); 
  } 
 
  void  Serialize (TagBuffer i) const 
  { 
    i.WriteU32 (m_oif); 
  } 
 
  void  Deserialize (TagBuffer i) 
  { 
    m_oif = i.ReadU32 (); 
  } 
 
  void  Print (std::ostream &os) const 
  { 
    os << "DeferredRouteOutputTag: output interface = " << m_oif; 
  } 
 
private: 
  /// Positive if output device is fixed in RouteOutput 
  int32_t m_oif; 
}; 
 
NS_OBJECT_ENSURE_REGISTERED (DeferredRouteOutputTag); 
 
 
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
RoutingProtocol::RoutingProtocol () : 
  RreqRetries (2), 
  RreqRateLimit (10), 
  RerrRateLimit (10), 
  ActiveRouteTimeout (Seconds (3)), 
  NetDiameter (35), 
   NodeTraversalTime (MilliSeconds (40)), 
  NetTraversalTime (Time ((2 * NetDiameter) * NodeTraversalTime)), 
  PathDiscoveryTime ( Time (2 * NetTraversalTime)), 
  MyRouteTimeout (Time (2 * std::max (PathDiscoveryTime, ActiveRouteTimeout))), 
  HelloInterval (Seconds (1)), 
  AllowedHelloLoss (2), 
  DeletePeriod (Time (5 * std::max (ActiveRouteTimeout, HelloInterval))), 
  NextHopWait (NodeTraversalTime + MilliSeconds (10)), 
  BlackListTimeout (Time (RreqRetries * NetTraversalTime)), 
  MaxQueueLen (64), 
  MaxQueueTime (Seconds (30)), 
  DestinationOnly (false), 
  GratuitousReply (true), 
  EnableHello (false), 
  m_routingTable (DeletePeriod), 
  m_queue (MaxQueueLen, MaxQueueTime), 
  m_requestId (0), 
  m_seqNo (0), 
  m_rreqIdCache (PathDiscoveryTime), 
  m_dpd (PathDiscoveryTime), 
  m_nb (HelloInterval), 
  m_rreqCount (0), 
  m_rerrCount (0), 
  m_htimer (Timer::CANCEL_ON_DESTROY), 
  m_rreqRateLimitTimer (Timer::CANCEL_ON_DESTROY), 
  m_rerrRateLimitTimer (Timer::CANCEL_ON_DESTROY), 
  m_lastBcastTime (Seconds (0)) 
{ 
  m_nb.SetCallback (MakeCallback (&RoutingProtocol::SendRerrWhenBreaksLinkToNextHop, taisba)); 
} 
 
TypeId 
RoutingProtocol::GetTypeId (void) 
{ 
  static TypeId tid = TypeId ("ns3::aisba::RoutingProtocol") 
    .SetParent<Ipv4RoutingProtocol> () 
    .SetGroupName("Aisba") 
    .AddConstructor<RoutingProtocol> () 
    .AddAttribute ("HelloInterval", "HELLO messages emission interval.", 
                   TimeValue (Seconds (1)), 
                   MakeTimeAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::HelloInterval), 
                   MakeTimeChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("RreqRetries", "Maximum number of retransmissions of RREQ to discover a route", 
                   UintegerValue (2), 
                   MakeUintegerAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::RreqRetries), 
                   MakeUintegerChecker<uint32_t> ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("RreqRateLimit", "Maximum number of RREQ per second.", 
                   UintegerValue (10), 
                   MakeUintegerAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::RreqRateLimit), 
                   MakeUintegerChecker<uint32_t> ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("RerrRateLimit", "Maximum number of RERR per second.", 
                   UintegerValue (10), 
                   MakeUintegerAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::RerrRateLimit), 
                    MakeUintegerChecker<uint32_t> ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("NodeTraversalTime", "Conservative estimate of the average one hop traversal time for 
packets and should include " 
                   "queuing delays, interrupt processing times and transfer times.", 
                   TimeValue (MilliSeconds (40)), 
                   MakeTimeAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::NodeTraversalTime), 
                   MakeTimeChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("NextHopWait", "Period of our waiting for the neighbour's RREP_ACK = 10 ms + 
NodeTraversalTime", 
                   TimeValue (MilliSeconds (50)), 
                   MakeTimeAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::NextHopWait), 
                   MakeTimeChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("ActiveRouteTimeout", "Period of time during which the route is considered to be valid", 
                   TimeValue (Seconds (3)), 
                   MakeTimeAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::ActiveRouteTimeout), 
                   MakeTimeChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("MyRouteTimeout", "Value of lifetime field in RREP generating by taisba node = 2 * 
max(ActiveRouteTimeout, PathDiscoveryTime)", 
                   TimeValue (Seconds (11.2)), 
                   MakeTimeAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::MyRouteTimeout), 
                   MakeTimeChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("BlackListTimeout", "Time for which the node is put into the blacklist = RreqRetries * 
NetTraversalTime", 
                   TimeValue (Seconds (5.6)), 
                   MakeTimeAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::BlackListTimeout), 
                   MakeTimeChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("DeletePeriod", "DeletePeriod is intended to provide an upper bound on the time for which an 
upstream node A " 
                   "can have a neighbor B as an active next hop for destination D, while B has invalidated the route to 
D." 
                   " = 5 * max (HelloInterval, ActiveRouteTimeout)", 
                   TimeValue (Seconds (15)), 
                   MakeTimeAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::DeletePeriod), 
                   MakeTimeChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("NetDiameter", "Net diameter measures the maximum possible number of hops between two 
nodes in the network", 
                   UintegerValue (35), 
                   MakeUintegerAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::NetDiameter), 
                   MakeUintegerChecker<uint32_t> ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("NetTraversalTime", "Estimate of the average net traversal time = 2 * NodeTraversalTime * 
NetDiameter", 
                   TimeValue (Seconds (2.8)), 
                   MakeTimeAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::NetTraversalTime), 
                   MakeTimeChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("PathDiscoveryTime", "Estimate of maximum time needed to find route in network = 2 * 
NetTraversalTime", 
                   TimeValue (Seconds (5.6)), 
                   MakeTimeAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::PathDiscoveryTime), 
                   MakeTimeChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("MaxQueueLen", "Maximum number of packets that we allow a routing protocol to buffer.", 
                   UintegerValue (64), 
                   MakeUintegerAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::SetMaxQueueLen, 
                                         &RoutingProtocol::GetMaxQueueLen), 
                    MakeUintegerChecker<uint32_t> ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("MaxQueueTime", "Maximum time packets can be queued (in seconds)", 
                   TimeValue (Seconds (30)), 
                   MakeTimeAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::SetMaxQueueTime, 
                                     &RoutingProtocol::GetMaxQueueTime), 
                   MakeTimeChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("AllowedHelloLoss", "Number of hello messages which may be loss for valid link.", 
                   UintegerValue (2), 
                   MakeUintegerAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::AllowedHelloLoss), 
                   MakeUintegerChecker<uint16_t> ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("GratuitousReply", "Indicates whether a gratuitous RREP should be unicast to the node 
originated route discovery.", 
                   BooleanValue (true), 
                   MakeBooleanAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::SetGratuitousReplyFlag, 
                                        &RoutingProtocol::GetGratuitousReplyFlag), 
                   MakeBooleanChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("DestinationOnly", "Indicates only the destination may respond to taisba RREQ.", 
                   BooleanValue (false), 
                   MakeBooleanAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::SetDesinationOnlyFlag, 
                                        &RoutingProtocol::GetDesinationOnlyFlag), 
                   MakeBooleanChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("EnableHello", "Indicates whether a hello messages enable.", 
                   BooleanValue (true), 
                   MakeBooleanAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::SetHelloEnable, 
                                        &RoutingProtocol::GetHelloEnable), 
                   MakeBooleanChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("EnableBroadcast", "Indicates whether a broadcast data packets forwarding enable.", 
                   BooleanValue (true), 
                   MakeBooleanAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::SetBroadcastEnable, 
                                        &RoutingProtocol::GetBroadcastEnable), 
                   MakeBooleanChecker ()) 
    .AddAttribute ("UniformRv", 
                   "Access to the underlying UniformRandomVariable", 
                   StringValue ("ns3::UniformRandomVariable"), 
                   MakePointerAccessor (&RoutingProtocol::m_uniformRandomVariable), 
                   MakePointerChecker<UniformRandomVariable> ()) 
  ; 
  return tid; 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SetMaxQueueLen (uint32_t len) 
{ 
  MaxQueueLen = len; 
  m_queue.SetMaxQueueLen (len); 
} 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SetMaxQueueTime (Time t) 
{ 
  MaxQueueTime = t; 
  m_queue.SetQueueTimeout (t); 
} 
 
 RoutingProtocol::~RoutingProtocol () 
{ 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::DoDispose () 
{ 
  m_ipv4 = 0; 
  for (std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::iterator iter = 
         m_socketAddresses.begin (); iter != m_socketAddresses.end (); iter++) 
    { 
      iter->first->Close (); 
    } 
  m_socketAddresses.clear (); 
  for (std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::iterator iter = 
         m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.begin (); iter != m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.end (); iter++) 
    { 
      iter->first->Close (); 
    } 
  m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.clear (); 
  Ipv4RoutingProtocol::DoDispose (); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::PrintRoutingTable (Ptr<OutputStreamWrapper> stream) const 
{ 
  *stream->GetStream () << "Node: " << m_ipv4->GetObject<Node> ()->GetId () << " Time: " << 
Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds () << "s "; 
  m_routingTable.Print (stream); 
} 
 
int64_t 
RoutingProtocol::AssignStreams (int64_t stream) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << stream); 
  m_uniformRandomVariable->SetStream (stream); 
  return 1; 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::Start () 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  if (EnableHello) 
    { 
      m_nb.ScheduleTimer (); 
    } 
  m_rreqRateLimitTimer.SetFunction (&RoutingProtocol::RreqRateLimitTimerExpire, 
                                    taisba); 
  m_rreqRateLimitTimer.Schedule (Seconds (1)); 
 
  m_rerrRateLimitTimer.SetFunction (&RoutingProtocol::RerrRateLimitTimerExpire, 
                                    taisba); 
   m_rerrRateLimitTimer.Schedule (Seconds (1)); 
 
} 
 
Ptr<Ipv4Route> 
RoutingProtocol::RouteOutput (Ptr<Packet> p, const Ipv4Header &header, 
                              Ptr<NetDevice> oif, Socket::SocketErrno &sockerr) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << header << (oif ? oif->GetIfIndex () : 0)); 
  if (!p) 
    { 
      NS_LOG_DEBUG("Packet is == 0"); 
      return LoopbackRoute (header, oif); // later 
    } 
  if (m_socketAddresses.empty ()) 
    { 
      sockerr = Socket::ERROR_NOROUTETOHOST; 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("No aisba interfaces"); 
      Ptr<Ipv4Route> route; 
      return route; 
    } 
  sockerr = Socket::ERROR_NOTERROR; 
  Ptr<Ipv4Route> route; 
  Ipv4Address dst = header.GetDestination (); 
  RoutingTableEntry rt; 
  if (m_routingTable.LookupValidRoute (dst, rt)) 
    { 
      route = rt.GetRoute (); 
      NS_ASSERT (route != 0); 
      NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Exist route to " << route->GetDestination () << " from interface " << route-
>GetSource ()); 
      if (oif != 0 && route->GetOutputDevice () != oif) 
        { 
          NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Output device doesn't match. Dropped."); 
          sockerr = Socket::ERROR_NOROUTETOHOST; 
          return Ptr<Ipv4Route> (); 
        } 
      UpdateRouteLifeTime (dst, ActiveRouteTimeout); 
      UpdateRouteLifeTime (route->GetGateway (), ActiveRouteTimeout); 
      return route; 
    } 
 
  // Valid route not found, in taisba case we return loopback.  
  // Actual route request will be deferred until packet will be fully formed,  
  // routed to loopback, received from loopback and passed to RouteInput (see below) 
  uint32_t iif = (oif ? m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForDevice (oif) : -1); 
  DeferredRouteOutputTag tag (iif); 
  NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Valid Route not found"); 
  if (!p->PeekPacketTag (tag)) 
    { 
      p->AddPacketTag (tag); 
    } 
  return LoopbackRoute (header, oif); 
 } 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::DeferredRouteOutput (Ptr<const Packet> p, const Ipv4Header & header,  
                                      UnicastForwardCallback ucb, ErrorCallback ecb) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << p << header); 
  NS_ASSERT (p != 0 && p != Ptr<Packet> ()); 
 
  QueueEntry newEntry (p, header, ucb, ecb); 
  bool result = m_queue.Enqueue (newEntry); 
  if (result) 
    { 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Add packet " << p->GetUid () << " to queue. Protocol " << (uint16_t) 
header.GetProtocol ()); 
      RoutingTableEntry rt; 
      bool result = m_routingTable.LookupRoute (header.GetDestination (), rt); 
      if(!result || ((rt.GetFlag () != IN_SEARCH) && result)) 
        { 
          NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Send new RREQ for outbound packet to " <<header.GetDestination ()); 
          SendRequest (header.GetDestination ()); 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
bool 
RoutingProtocol::RouteInput (Ptr<const Packet> p, const Ipv4Header &header, 
                             Ptr<const NetDevice> idev, UnicastForwardCallback ucb, 
                             MulticastForwardCallback mcb, LocalDeliverCallback lcb, ErrorCallback ecb) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << p->GetUid () << header.GetDestination () << idev->GetAddress ()); 
  if (m_socketAddresses.empty ()) 
    { 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("No aisba interfaces"); 
      return false; 
    } 
  NS_ASSERT (m_ipv4 != 0); 
  NS_ASSERT (p != 0); 
  // Check if input device supports IP 
  NS_ASSERT (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForDevice (idev) >= 0); 
  int32_t iif = m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForDevice (idev); 
 
  Ipv4Address dst = header.GetDestination (); 
  Ipv4Address origin = header.GetSource (); 
  
  // Deferred route request 
  if (idev == m_lo) 
    { 
      DeferredRouteOutputTag tag; 
      if (p->PeekPacketTag (tag)) 
        { 
          DeferredRouteOutput (p, header, ucb, ecb); 
          return true; 
         } 
    } 
 
  // Duplicate of own packet 
  if (IsMyOwnAddress (origin)) 
  //std::cout<<origin<<"duplicate"; 
    return true; 
 
  // AISBA is not a multicast routing protocol 
  if (dst.IsMulticast ()) 
    { 
      return false;  
    } 
 
  // Broadcast local delivery/forwarding 
  for (std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::const_iterator j = 
         m_socketAddresses.begin (); j != m_socketAddresses.end (); ++j) 
    { 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = j->second; 
      if (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (iface.GetLocal ()) == iif) 
        if (dst == iface.GetBroadcast () || dst.IsBroadcast ()) 
          { 
            if (m_dpd.IsDuplicate (p, header)) 
              { 
                NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Duplicated packet " << p->GetUid () << " from " << origin << ". Drop."); 
                return true; 
              } 
            UpdateRouteLifeTime (origin, ActiveRouteTimeout); 
            Ptr<Packet> packet = p->Copy (); 
            if (lcb.IsNull () == false) 
              { 
                NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Broadcast local delivery to " << iface.GetLocal ()); 
                lcb (p, header, iif); 
                // Fall through to additional processing 
              } 
            else 
              { 
                NS_LOG_ERROR ("Unable to deliver packet locally due to null callback " << p->GetUid () << " 
from " << origin); 
                ecb (p, header, Socket::ERROR_NOROUTETOHOST); 
              } 
            if (!EnableBroadcast) 
              { 
                return true; 
              } 
            if (header.GetTtl () > 1) 
              { 
                NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Forward broadcast. TTL " << (uint16_t) header.GetTtl ()); 
                RoutingTableEntry toBroadcast; 
                if (m_routingTable.LookupRoute (dst, toBroadcast)) 
                  { 
                    Ptr<Ipv4Route> route = toBroadcast.GetRoute (); 
                    ucb (route, packet, header); 
                   } 
                else 
                  { 
                    NS_LOG_DEBUG ("No route to forward broadcast. Drop packet " << p->GetUid ()); 
                  } 
              } 
            else 
              { 
                NS_LOG_DEBUG ("TTL exceeded. Drop packet " << p->GetUid ()); 
              } 
            return true; 
          } 
    } 
 
  // Unicast local delivery 
  if (m_ipv4->IsDestinationAddress (dst, iif)) 
    { 
      UpdateRouteLifeTime (origin, ActiveRouteTimeout); 
      RoutingTableEntry toOrigin; 
      if (m_routingTable.LookupValidRoute (origin, toOrigin)) 
        {   
          UpdateRouteLifeTime (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), ActiveRouteTimeout); 
          m_nb.Update (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), ActiveRouteTimeout); 
        } 
      if (lcb.IsNull () == false) 
        { 
          NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Unicast local delivery to " << dst); 
          lcb (p, header, iif); 
        } 
      else 
        { 
          NS_LOG_ERROR ("Unable to deliver packet locally due to null callback " << p->GetUid () << " from " 
<< origin); 
          ecb (p, header, Socket::ERROR_NOROUTETOHOST); 
        } 
      return true; 
    } 
 
  // Forwarding 
  return Forwarding (p, header, ucb, ecb); 
} 
 
bool 
RoutingProtocol::Forwarding (Ptr<const Packet> p, const Ipv4Header & header, 
                             UnicastForwardCallback ucb, ErrorCallback ecb) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  Ipv4Address dst = header.GetDestination (); 
  Ipv4Address origin = header.GetSource (); 
  m_routingTable.Purge (); 
  RoutingTableEntry toDst; 
  if (m_routingTable.LookupRoute (dst, toDst)) 
    { 
       if (toDst.GetFlag () == VALID) 
       
        { 
          Ptr<Ipv4Route> route = toDst.GetRoute (); 
          NS_LOG_LOGIC (route->GetSource ()<<" forwarding to " << dst << " from " << origin << " packet " << 
p->GetUid ()); 
    //  std::cout<< " all good";//lincy 
          /* 
           *  Each time a route is used to forward a data packet, its Active Route 
           *  Lifetime field of the source, destination and the next hop on the 
           *  path to the destination is updated to be no less than the current 
           *  time plus ActiveRouteTimeout. 
           */ 
          UpdateRouteLifeTime (origin, ActiveRouteTimeout); 
          UpdateRouteLifeTime (dst, ActiveRouteTimeout); 
          UpdateRouteLifeTime (route->GetGateway (), ActiveRouteTimeout); 
          /* 
           *  Since the route between each originator and destination pair is expected to be symmetric, the 
           *  Active Route Lifetime for the previous hop, along the reverse path back to the IP source, is also 
updated 
           *  to be no less than the current time plus ActiveRouteTimeout 
           */ 
          RoutingTableEntry toOrigin; 
          m_routingTable.LookupRoute (origin, toOrigin); 
          UpdateRouteLifeTime (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), ActiveRouteTimeout); 
 
          m_nb.Update (route->GetGateway (), ActiveRouteTimeout); 
          m_nb.Update (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), ActiveRouteTimeout); 
 
          ucb (route, p, header); 
          //sendPAMPSignal ( dst, route); 
   
          return true; 
        } 
      else 
        { 
          if (toDst.GetValidSeqNo ()) 
            { 
              SendRerrWhenNoRouteToForward (dst, toDst.GetSeqNo (), origin); 
              std::cout<<"RERRWHENNOROUTETO FORWARD"<<dst<<origin<<"\n";//lincy 
              //sendPAMPSignal(dst, origin);//lincy 
           
              
              NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Drop packet " << p->GetUid () << " because no route to forward it."); 
              return false; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
  NS_LOG_LOGIC ("route not found to "<< dst << ". Send RERR message."); 
   
  NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Drop packet " << p->GetUid () << " because no route to forward it."); 
  SendRerrWhenNoRouteToForward (dst, 0, origin); 
  return false; 
 } 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SetIpv4 (Ptr<Ipv4> ipv4) 
{ 
  NS_ASSERT (ipv4 != 0); 
  NS_ASSERT (m_ipv4 == 0); 
 
  m_ipv4 = ipv4; 
 
  // Create lo route. It is asserted that the only one interface up for now is loopback 
  NS_ASSERT (m_ipv4->GetNInterfaces () == 1 && m_ipv4->GetAddress (0, 0).GetLocal () == Ipv4Address 
("127.0.0.1")); 
  m_lo = m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (0); 
  NS_ASSERT (m_lo != 0); 
  // Remember lo route 
  RoutingTableEntry rt (/*device=*/ m_lo, /*dst=*/ Ipv4Address::GetLoopback (), /*know seqno=*/ true, 
/*seqno=*/ 0, 
                                    /*iface=*/ Ipv4InterfaceAddress (Ipv4Address::GetLoopback (), Ipv4Mask 
("255.0.0.0")), 
                                    /*hops=*/ 1, /*next hop=*/ Ipv4Address::GetLoopback (), 
                                    /*lifetime=*/ Simulator::GetMaximumSimulationTime ()); 
  m_routingTable.AddRoute (rt); 
 
  Simulator::ScheduleNow (&RoutingProtocol::Start, taisba); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::NotifyInterfaceUp (uint32_t i) 
{ 
  // Lincy Begins 
  Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
  Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(i,0); 
  std::cout << ifaceLocal.GetLocal () << ": NODES Printing interface Is up\n"; 
  // Lincy Ends 
   
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << m_ipv4->GetAddress (i, 0).GetLocal ()); 
  Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3 = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
  if (l3->GetNAddresses (i) > 1) 
    { 
      NS_LOG_WARN ("AISBA does not work with more then one address per each interface."); 
    } 
  Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = l3->GetAddress (i, 0); 
  if (iface.GetLocal () == Ipv4Address ("127.0.0.1")) 
    return; 
  
  // Create a socket to listen only on taisba interface 
  Ptr<Socket> socket = Socket::CreateSocket (GetObject<Node> (), 
                                             UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); 
  NS_ASSERT (socket != 0); 
  socket->SetRecvCallback (MakeCallback (&RoutingProtocol::RecvAisba, taisba)); 
  socket->Bind (InetSocketAddress (Ipv4Address::GetAny (), AISBA_PORT)); 
  socket->BindToNetDevice (l3->GetNetDevice (i)); 
   socket->SetAllowBroadcast (true); 
  socket->SetAttribute ("IpTtl", UintegerValue (1)); 
  m_socketAddresses.insert (std::make_pair (socket, iface)); 
 
  // create also a subnet broadcast socket 
  socket = Socket::CreateSocket (GetObject<Node> (), 
                                 UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); 
  NS_ASSERT (socket != 0); 
  socket->SetRecvCallback (MakeCallback (&RoutingProtocol::RecvAisba, taisba)); 
  socket->Bind (InetSocketAddress (iface.GetBroadcast (), AISBA_PORT)); 
  socket->BindToNetDevice (l3->GetNetDevice (i)); 
  socket->SetAllowBroadcast (true); 
  socket->SetAttribute ("IpTtl", UintegerValue (1)); 
  m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.insert (std::make_pair (socket, iface)); 
 
  // Add local broadcast record to the routing table 
  Ptr<NetDevice> dev = m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (iface.GetLocal ())); 
  RoutingTableEntry rt (/*device=*/ dev, /*dst=*/ iface.GetBroadcast (), /*know seqno=*/ true, /*seqno=*/ 0, 
/*iface=*/ iface, 
                                    /*hops=*/ 1, /*next hop=*/ iface.GetBroadcast (), /*lifetime=*/ 
Simulator::GetMaximumSimulationTime ()); 
  m_routingTable.AddRoute (rt); 
 
  if (l3->GetInterface (i)->GetArpCache ()) 
    { 
      m_nb.AddArpCache (l3->GetInterface (i)->GetArpCache ()); 
    } 
 
  // Allow neighbor manager use taisba interface for layer 2 feedback if possible 
  Ptr<WifiNetDevice> wifi = dev->GetObject<WifiNetDevice> (); 
  if (wifi == 0) 
    return; 
  Ptr<WifiMac> mac = wifi->GetMac (); 
  if (mac == 0) 
    return; 
 
  mac->TraceConnectWithoutContext ("TxErrHeader", m_nb.GetTxErrorCallback ()); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::NotifyInterfaceDown (uint32_t i) 
{ 
  //Lincy 
  std::cout << "Lincy Printing LInk Is Donw"; 
   
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << m_ipv4->GetAddress (i, 0).GetLocal ()); 
 
  // Disable layer 2 link state monitoring (if possible) 
  Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3 = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
  Ptr<NetDevice> dev = l3->GetNetDevice (i); 
  Ptr<WifiNetDevice> wifi = dev->GetObject<WifiNetDevice> (); 
  if (wifi != 0) 
    { 
       Ptr<WifiMac> mac = wifi->GetMac ()->GetObject<AdhocWifiMac> (); 
      if (mac != 0) 
        { 
          mac->TraceDisconnectWithoutContext ("TxErrHeader", 
                                              m_nb.GetTxErrorCallback ()); 
          m_nb.DelArpCache (l3->GetInterface (i)->GetArpCache ()); 
        } 
    } 
 
  // Close socket  
  Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (m_ipv4->GetAddress (i, 0)); 
  NS_ASSERT (socket); 
  socket->Close (); 
  m_socketAddresses.erase (socket); 
 
  // Close socket 
  socket = FindSubnetBroadcastSocketWithInterfaceAddress (m_ipv4->GetAddress (i, 0)); 
  NS_ASSERT (socket); 
  socket->Close (); 
  m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.erase (socket); 
 
  if (m_socketAddresses.empty ()) 
    { 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("No aisba interfaces"); 
      m_htimer.Cancel (); 
      m_nb.Clear (); 
      m_routingTable.Clear (); 
      return; 
    } 
  m_routingTable.DeleteAllRoutesFromInterface (m_ipv4->GetAddress (i, 0)); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::NotifyAddAddress (uint32_t i, Ipv4InterfaceAddress address) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << " interface " << i << " address " << address); 
  Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3 = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
  if (!l3->IsUp (i)) 
    return; 
  if (l3->GetNAddresses (i) == 1) 
    { 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = l3->GetAddress (i, 0); 
      Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (iface); 
      if (!socket) 
        { 
          if (iface.GetLocal () == Ipv4Address ("127.0.0.1")) 
            return; 
          // Create a socket to listen only on taisba interface 
          Ptr<Socket> socket = Socket::CreateSocket (GetObject<Node> (), 
                                                     UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); 
          NS_ASSERT (socket != 0); 
          socket->SetRecvCallback (MakeCallback (&RoutingProtocol::RecvAisba,taisba)); 
          socket->Bind (InetSocketAddress (iface.GetLocal (), AISBA_PORT)); 
           socket->BindToNetDevice (l3->GetNetDevice (i)); 
          socket->SetAllowBroadcast (true); 
          m_socketAddresses.insert (std::make_pair (socket, iface)); 
 
          // create also a subnet directed broadcast socket 
          socket = Socket::CreateSocket (GetObject<Node> (), 
                                                       UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); 
          NS_ASSERT (socket != 0); 
          socket->SetRecvCallback (MakeCallback (&RoutingProtocol::RecvAisba, taisba)); 
          socket->Bind (InetSocketAddress (iface.GetBroadcast (), AISBA_PORT)); 
          socket->BindToNetDevice (l3->GetNetDevice (i)); 
          socket->SetAllowBroadcast (true); 
          socket->SetAttribute ("IpTtl", UintegerValue (1)); 
          m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.insert (std::make_pair (socket, iface)); 
 
          // Add local broadcast record to the routing table 
          Ptr<NetDevice> dev = m_ipv4->GetNetDevice ( 
              m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (iface.GetLocal ())); 
          RoutingTableEntry rt (/*device=*/ dev, /*dst=*/ iface.GetBroadcast (), /*know seqno=*/ true, 
                                            /*seqno=*/ 0, /*iface=*/ iface, /*hops=*/ 1, 
                                            /*next hop=*/ iface.GetBroadcast (), /*lifetime=*/ 
Simulator::GetMaximumSimulationTime ()); 
          m_routingTable.AddRoute (rt); 
        } 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("AISBA does not work with more then one address per each interface. Ignore added 
address"); 
    } 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::NotifyRemoveAddress (uint32_t i, Ipv4InterfaceAddress address) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (address); 
  if (socket) 
    { 
      m_routingTable.DeleteAllRoutesFromInterface (address); 
      socket->Close (); 
      m_socketAddresses.erase (socket); 
 
      Ptr<Socket> unicastSocket = FindSubnetBroadcastSocketWithInterfaceAddress (address); 
      if (unicastSocket) 
        { 
          unicastSocket->Close (); 
          m_socketAddresses.erase (unicastSocket); 
        } 
 
      Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3 = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
      if (l3->GetNAddresses (i)) 
        { 
           Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = l3->GetAddress (i, 0); 
          // Create a socket to listen only on taisba interface 
          Ptr<Socket> socket = Socket::CreateSocket (GetObject<Node> (), 
                                                     UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); 
          NS_ASSERT (socket != 0); 
          socket->SetRecvCallback (MakeCallback (&RoutingProtocol::RecvAisba, taisba)); 
          // Bind to any IP address so that broadcasts can be received 
          socket->Bind (InetSocketAddress (iface.GetLocal (), AISBA_PORT)); 
          socket->BindToNetDevice (l3->GetNetDevice (i)); 
          socket->SetAllowBroadcast (true); 
          socket->SetAttribute ("IpTtl", UintegerValue (1)); 
          m_socketAddresses.insert (std::make_pair (socket, iface)); 
 
          // create also a unicast socket 
          socket = Socket::CreateSocket (GetObject<Node> (), 
                                                       UdpSocketFactory::GetTypeId ()); 
          NS_ASSERT (socket != 0); 
          socket->SetRecvCallback (MakeCallback (&RoutingProtocol::RecvAisba, taisba)); 
          socket->Bind (InetSocketAddress (iface.GetBroadcast (), AISBA_PORT)); 
          socket->BindToNetDevice (l3->GetNetDevice (i)); 
          socket->SetAllowBroadcast (true); 
          socket->SetAttribute ("IpTtl", UintegerValue (1)); 
          m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.insert (std::make_pair (socket, iface)); 
 
          // Add local broadcast record to the routing table 
          Ptr<NetDevice> dev = m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (iface.GetLocal ())); 
          RoutingTableEntry rt (/*device=*/ dev, /*dst=*/ iface.GetBroadcast (), /*know seqno=*/ true, /*seqno=*/ 
0, /*iface=*/ iface, 
                                            /*hops=*/ 1, /*next hop=*/ iface.GetBroadcast (), /*lifetime=*/ 
Simulator::GetMaximumSimulationTime ()); 
          m_routingTable.AddRoute (rt); 
        } 
      if (m_socketAddresses.empty ()) 
        { 
          NS_LOG_LOGIC ("No aisba interfaces"); 
          m_htimer.Cancel (); 
          m_nb.Clear (); 
          m_routingTable.Clear (); 
          return; 
        } 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Remove address not participating in AISBA operation"); 
    } 
} 
 
bool 
RoutingProtocol::IsMyOwnAddress (Ipv4Address src) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << src); 
  for (std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::const_iterator j = 
         m_socketAddresses.begin (); j != m_socketAddresses.end (); ++j) 
     { 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = j->second; 
      //std::cout << "From isMyOwnAddress Method: "<<iface.GetLocal(); 
      if (src == iface.GetLocal ()) 
        { 
          return true; 
        } 
    } 
  return false; 
} 
 
Ptr<Ipv4Route>  
RoutingProtocol::LoopbackRoute (const Ipv4Header & hdr, Ptr<NetDevice> oif) const 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << hdr); 
  NS_ASSERT (m_lo != 0); 
  Ptr<Ipv4Route> rt = Create<Ipv4Route> (); 
  rt->SetDestination (hdr.GetDestination ()); 
  // 
  // Source address selection here is tricky.  The loopback route is 
  // returned when AISBA does not have a route; taisba causes the packet 
  // to be looped back and handled (cached) in RouteInput() method 
  // while a route is found. However, connection-oriented protocols 
  // like TCP need to create an endpoint four-tuple (src, src port, 
  // dst, dst port) and create a pseudo-header for checksumming.  So, 
  // AISBA needs to guess correctly what the eventual source address 
  // will be. 
  // 
  // For single interface, single address nodes, taisba is not a problem. 
  // When there are possibly multiple outgoing interfaces, the policy 
  // implemented here is to pick the first available AISBA interface. 
  // If RouteOutput() caller specified an outgoing interface, that  
  // further constrains the selection of source address 
  // 
  std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::const_iterator j = m_socketAddresses.begin (); 
  if (oif) 
    { 
      // Iterate to find an address on the oif device 
      for (j = m_socketAddresses.begin (); j != m_socketAddresses.end (); ++j) 
        { 
          Ipv4Address addr = j->second.GetLocal (); 
          int32_t interface = m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (addr); 
          if (oif == m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (static_cast<uint32_t> (interface))) 
            { 
              rt->SetSource (addr); 
              break; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      rt->SetSource (j->second.GetLocal ()); 
    } 
   NS_ASSERT_MSG (rt->GetSource () != Ipv4Address (), "Valid AISBA source address not found"); 
  rt->SetGateway (Ipv4Address ("127.0.0.1")); 
  rt->SetOutputDevice (m_lo); 
  return rt; 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SendRequest (Ipv4Address dst) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION ( taisba << dst); 
  // A node SHOULD NOT originate more than RREQ_RATELIMIT RREQ messages per second. 
  if (m_rreqCount == RreqRateLimit) 
    { 
      Simulator::Schedule (m_rreqRateLimitTimer.GetDelayLeft () + MicroSeconds (100), 
                           &RoutingProtocol::SendRequest, taisba, dst); 
                            
      return; 
    } 
  else 
    m_rreqCount++; 
   // std::cout<< m_rreqCount;//lincy 
  // Create RREQ header 
  RreqHeader rreqHeader; 
  rreqHeader.SetDst (dst); 
 
  RoutingTableEntry rt; 
  if (m_routingTable.LookupRoute (dst, rt)) 
    { 
      rreqHeader.SetHopCount (rt.GetHop ()); 
      if (rt.GetValidSeqNo ()) 
        rreqHeader.SetDstSeqno (rt.GetSeqNo ()); 
      else 
        rreqHeader.SetUnknownSeqno (true); 
      rt.SetFlag (IN_SEARCH); 
      m_routingTable.Update (rt); 
      // Lincy Starts 
      Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1,0); 
      std::cout << ifaceLocal.GetLocal() <<": insearch-update routing table entry. \n";//lincy 
      //Lincy Ends 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      rreqHeader.SetUnknownSeqno (true); 
      Ptr<NetDevice> dev = 0; 
      RoutingTableEntry newEntry (/*device=*/ dev, /*dst=*/ dst, /*validSeqNo=*/ false, /*seqno=*/ 0, 
                                              /*iface=*/ Ipv4InterfaceAddress (),/*hop=*/ 0, 
                                              /*nextHop=*/ Ipv4Address (), /*lifeTime=*/ Seconds (0)); 
      newEntry.SetFlag (IN_SEARCH); 
      m_routingTable.AddRoute (newEntry); 
      //Lincy Starts 
      Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1,0); 
       std::cout<< ifaceLocal.GetLocal() <<": add new entry to routing table.\n";//lincy 
      //Lincy Ends 
    } 
 
  if (GratuitousReply) 
    rreqHeader.SetGratiousRrep (true); 
  if (DestinationOnly) 
    rreqHeader.SetDestinationOnly (true); 
 
  m_seqNo++; 
  rreqHeader.SetOriginSeqno (m_seqNo); 
  m_requestId++; 
  rreqHeader.SetId (m_requestId); 
  rreqHeader.SetHopCount (0); 
 
  // Send RREQ as subnet directed broadcast from each interface used by aisba 
  for (std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::const_iterator j = 
         m_socketAddresses.begin (); j != m_socketAddresses.end (); ++j) 
    { 
      Ptr<Socket> socket = j->first; 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = j->second; 
 
      rreqHeader.SetOrigin (iface.GetLocal ()); 
      m_rreqIdCache.IsDuplicate (iface.GetLocal (), m_requestId); 
 
      Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
      packet->AddHeader (rreqHeader); 
      TypeHeader tHeader (AISBATYPE_RREQ); 
      packet->AddHeader (tHeader); 
      // Send to all-hosts broadcast if on /32 addr, subnet-directed otherwise 
      Ipv4Address destination; 
      if (iface.GetMask () == Ipv4Mask::GetOnes ()) 
        { 
          destination = Ipv4Address ("255.255.255.255"); 
        } 
      else 
        {  
          destination = iface.GetBroadcast (); 
        } 
      NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Send RREQ with id " << rreqHeader.GetId () << " to socket"); 
      m_lastBcastTime = Simulator::Now (); 
      Simulator::Schedule (Time (MilliSeconds (m_uniformRandomVariable->GetInteger (0, 10))), 
&RoutingProtocol::SendTo, taisba, socket, packet, destination);  
    } 
 //  ackPAMPSignal (rreqHeader,toOrigin); 
  ScheduleRreqRetry (dst); 
  std::cout<<dst<<"destination";//lincy 
}//send rreq ends here//lincy 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SendTo (Ptr<Socket> socket, Ptr<Packet> packet, Ipv4Address destination) 
{ 
    socket->SendTo (packet, 0, InetSocketAddress (destination, AISBA_PORT)); 
  
} 
void 
RoutingProtocol::ScheduleRreqRetry (Ipv4Address dst) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << dst); 
  std::cout<<dst<<"i found you destination"; 
  if (m_addressReqTimer.find (dst) == m_addressReqTimer.end ()) 
    { 
      Timer timer (Timer::CANCEL_ON_DESTROY); 
      m_addressReqTimer[dst] = timer; 
    } 
  m_addressReqTimer[dst].SetFunction (&RoutingProtocol::RouteRequestTimerExpire, taisba); 
  m_addressReqTimer[dst].Remove (); 
  m_addressReqTimer[dst].SetArguments (dst); 
  RoutingTableEntry rt; 
  m_routingTable.LookupRoute (dst, rt); 
  rt.IncrementRreqCnt (); 
  m_routingTable.Update (rt); 
  m_addressReqTimer[dst].Schedule (Time (rt.GetRreqCnt () * NetTraversalTime)); 
  NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Scheduled RREQ retry in " << Time (rt.GetRreqCnt () * NetTraversalTime).GetSeconds 
() << " seconds"); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::RecvAisba (Ptr<Socket> socket) 
{  //RerrHeader rerrHeader;//LINCY 
  
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << socket); 
  Address sourceAddress; 
  Ptr<Packet> packet = socket->RecvFrom (sourceAddress); 
  InetSocketAddress inetSourceAddr = InetSocketAddress::ConvertFrom (sourceAddress); 
  Ipv4Address sender = inetSourceAddr.GetIpv4 (); 
  Ipv4Address receiver; 
 
  if (m_socketAddresses.find (socket) != m_socketAddresses.end ()) 
    { 
      receiver = m_socketAddresses[socket].GetLocal (); 
    } 
  else if(m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.find (socket) != m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.end ()) 
    { 
      receiver = m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses[socket].GetLocal (); 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      NS_ASSERT_MSG (false, "Received a packet from an unknown socket"); 
    } 
  NS_LOG_DEBUG ("AISBA node " << taisba << " received a AISBA packet from " << sender << " to " << 
receiver); 
 
  UpdateRouteToNeighbor (sender, receiver); 
  TypeHeader tHeader (AISBATYPE_RREQ); 
  packet->RemoveHeader (tHeader); 
   if (!tHeader.IsValid ()) 
    {   
      NS_LOG_DEBUG ("AISBA message " << packet->GetUid () << " with unknown type received: " << 
tHeader.Get () << ". Drop"); 
      return; // drop 
    } 
  switch (tHeader.Get ()) 
    { 
    case AISBATYPE_RREQ: 
      { 
        RecvRequest (packet, receiver, sender); 
         std::cout<<"RREQPACKET :"<<packet<<" receiver :"<<receiver <<" sender :"<<sender<<"\n"; 
        //std::cout<<"RREQ.\n"; //LINCY 
      //  std::cout<< m_rreqCount; 
        break; 
      } 
    case AISBATYPE_RREP: 
      { 
        RecvReply (packet, receiver, sender); 
        std::cout<<"RREPPACKET :"<<packet<<" receiver :"<<receiver <<" sender :"<<sender<<"\n"; 
         
    
             
 
        break; 
      } 
    case AISBATYPE_RERR: 
      {       
        RecvError (packet, sender); 
       std::cout<<sender<<":SENDER OF RERR \n";//lincy 
       // RerrHeader rerrHeader; 
  
  ////p->RemoveHeader (rerrHeader); 
 //// PampsendHeader pampsendHeader; 
   
 ////Lincy Starts 
   
   //Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
   //Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1, 0); 
  
 ///**lINCY  ADDED code to send PAMP when source has received RERR,ALSO ADDED 
GETORIGIN,SET ORIGIN TO PACKET.CC AND H FOR TAISBA 
PURPOSE**************************************************************/ 
  
       //std::cout <<  " RERR Packet Received TO node - " << ifaceLocal.GetLocal() << "\n";//lincy 
     
             //rerrHeader.SetOrigin (ifaceLocal.GetLocal ()); 
              //Ipv4Address origin=rerrHeader.GetOrigin (); 
        
 
            //if (IsMyOwnAddress (rerrHeader.GetOrigin())){ 
    //std::cout<<" Calling Activate DC for " <<origin; 
     //ActivateDC();//Lincy 
              //}   
       //Ipv4Address dst = rerrHeader.GetDst(); 
       //RoutingTableEntry toDst; 
       //Ptr<Ipv4Route> route = toDst.GetRoute (); 
          //sendPAMPSignal ( dst, route); 
         ////ENDS LINCY  
    
        break; 
      } 
    case AISBATYPE_RREP_ACK: 
      { 
        RecvReplyAck (sender); 
        std::cout<<"RECVREPLYACK";//LINCY 
        
        break; 
      } 
         case  AISBATYPE_PAMPSEND: ///ADD LINCY 
    {      
  std::cout << "PAMP_SEND"; 
  break; 
 } 
  case  AISBATYPE_PAMPRECV: ///ADD LINCY 
    { 
  std::cout << "PAMP_RECV"; 
  break; 
 } 
    } 
} 
 
bool 
RoutingProtocol::UpdateRouteLifeTime (Ipv4Address addr, Time lifetime) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << addr << lifetime); 
  RoutingTableEntry rt; 
  if (m_routingTable.LookupRoute (addr, rt)) 
    { 
      if (rt.GetFlag () == VALID) 
        { 
          NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Updating VALID route"); 
          rt.SetRreqCnt (0); 
          rt.SetLifeTime (std::max (lifetime, rt.GetLifeTime ())); 
          m_routingTable.Update (rt); 
          return true; 
        } 
    } 
  return false; 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::UpdateRouteToNeighbor (Ipv4Address sender, Ipv4Address receiver) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << "sender " << sender << " receiver " << receiver); 
  RoutingTableEntry toNeighbor; 
   if (!m_routingTable.LookupRoute (sender, toNeighbor)) 
    { 
      Ptr<NetDevice> dev = m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver)); 
      RoutingTableEntry newEntry (/*device=*/ dev, /*dst=*/ sender, /*know seqno=*/ false, /*seqno=*/ 0, 
                                              /*iface=*/ m_ipv4->GetAddress (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver), 0), 
                                              /*hops=*/ 1, /*next hop=*/ sender, /*lifetime=*/ ActiveRouteTimeout); 
      m_routingTable.AddRoute (newEntry); 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      Ptr<NetDevice> dev = m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver)); 
      if (toNeighbor.GetValidSeqNo () && (toNeighbor.GetHop () == 1) && (toNeighbor.GetOutputDevice () == 
dev)) 
        { 
          toNeighbor.SetLifeTime (std::max (ActiveRouteTimeout, toNeighbor.GetLifeTime ())); 
        } 
      else 
        { 
          RoutingTableEntry newEntry (/*device=*/ dev, /*dst=*/ sender, /*know seqno=*/ false, /*seqno=*/ 0, 
                                                  /*iface=*/ m_ipv4->GetAddress (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver), 
0), 
                                                  /*hops=*/ 1, /*next hop=*/ sender, /*lifetime=*/ std::max (ActiveRouteTimeout, 
toNeighbor.GetLifeTime ())); 
          m_routingTable.Update (newEntry); 
        } 
    } 
 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::RecvRequest (Ptr<Packet> p, Ipv4Address receiver, Ipv4Address src) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  RreqHeader rreqHeader; 
  p->RemoveHeader (rreqHeader); 
 
  // A node ignores all RREQs received from any node in its blacklist 
  RoutingTableEntry toPrev; 
  if (m_routingTable.LookupRoute (src, toPrev)) 
    { 
      if (toPrev.IsUnidirectional ()) 
        { 
          NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Ignoring RREQ from node in blacklist"); 
          return; 
        } 
    } 
 
  uint32_t id = rreqHeader.GetId (); 
  Ipv4Address origin = rreqHeader.GetOrigin (); 
std::cout<<origin<<" :ORIGIN\n";//lincy 
  /* 
   *  Node checks to determine whether it has received a RREQ with the same Originator IP Address and RREQ 
ID. 
    *  If such a RREQ has been received, the node silently discards the newly received RREQ. 
   */ 
  if (m_rreqIdCache.IsDuplicate (origin, id)) 
    { 
      NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Ignoring RREQ due to duplicate"); 
      return; 
    } 
 
  // Increment RREQ hop count 
  uint8_t hop = rreqHeader.GetHopCount () + 1; 
  rreqHeader.SetHopCount (hop); 
 
  /* 
   *  When the reverse route is created or updated, the following actions on the route are also carried out: 
   *  1. the Originator Sequence Number from the RREQ is compared to the corresponding destination sequence 
number 
   *     in the route table entry and copied if greater than the existing value there 
   *  2. the valid sequence number field is set to true; 
   *  3. the next hop in the routing table becomes the node from which the  RREQ was received 
   *  4. the hop count is copied from the Hop Count in the RREQ message; 
   *  5. the Lifetime is set to be the maximum of (ExistingLifetime, MinimalLifetime), where 
   *     MinimalLifetime = current time + 2*NetTraversalTime - 2*HopCount*NodeTraversalTime 
   */ 
  RoutingTableEntry toOrigin; 
  if (!m_routingTable.LookupRoute (origin, toOrigin)) 
    { 
      Ptr<NetDevice> dev = m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver)); 
      RoutingTableEntry newEntry (/*device=*/ dev, /*dst=*/ origin, /*validSeno=*/ true, /*seqNo=*/ 
rreqHeader.GetOriginSeqno (), 
                                              /*iface=*/ m_ipv4->GetAddress (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver), 0), 
/*hops=*/ hop, 
                                              /*nextHop*/ src, /*timeLife=*/ Time ((2 * NetTraversalTime - 2 * hop * 
NodeTraversalTime))); 
      m_routingTable.AddRoute (newEntry); 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      if (toOrigin.GetValidSeqNo ()) 
        { 
          if (int32_t (rreqHeader.GetOriginSeqno ()) - int32_t (toOrigin.GetSeqNo ()) > 0) 
            toOrigin.SetSeqNo (rreqHeader.GetOriginSeqno ()); 
        } 
      else 
        toOrigin.SetSeqNo (rreqHeader.GetOriginSeqno ()); 
      toOrigin.SetValidSeqNo (true); 
      toOrigin.SetNextHop (src); 
      toOrigin.SetOutputDevice (m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver))); 
      toOrigin.SetInterface (m_ipv4->GetAddress (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver), 0)); 
      toOrigin.SetHop (hop); 
      toOrigin.SetLifeTime (std::max (Time (2 * NetTraversalTime - 2 * hop * NodeTraversalTime), 
                                      toOrigin.GetLifeTime ())); 
      m_routingTable.Update (toOrigin); 
      //m_nb.Update (src, Time (AllowedHelloLoss * HelloInterval)); 
     } 
 
 
  RoutingTableEntry toNeighbor; 
  if (!m_routingTable.LookupRoute (src, toNeighbor)) 
    { 
      NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Neighbor:" << src << " not found in routing table. Creating an entry");  
      Ptr<NetDevice> dev = m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver)); 
      RoutingTableEntry newEntry (dev, src, false, rreqHeader.GetOriginSeqno (), 
                                              m_ipv4->GetAddress (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver), 0), 
                                              1, src, ActiveRouteTimeout); 
      m_routingTable.AddRoute (newEntry); 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      toNeighbor.SetLifeTime (ActiveRouteTimeout); 
      toNeighbor.SetValidSeqNo (false); 
      toNeighbor.SetSeqNo (rreqHeader.GetOriginSeqno ());  
      toNeighbor.SetFlag (VALID);// IF INVALID THEN 0 PACKET RECEIVED IN PING STATISTICS 
LINCY 
      toNeighbor.SetOutputDevice (m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver))); 
      toNeighbor.SetInterface (m_ipv4->GetAddress (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver), 0)); 
      toNeighbor.SetHop (1); 
      toNeighbor.SetNextHop (src); 
      m_routingTable.Update (toNeighbor); 
    } 
  m_nb.Update (src, Time (AllowedHelloLoss * HelloInterval)); 
 
  NS_LOG_LOGIC (receiver << " receive RREQ with hop count " << 
static_cast<uint32_t>(rreqHeader.GetHopCount ())  
                         << " ID " << rreqHeader.GetId () 
                         << " to destination " << rreqHeader.GetDst ()); 
 
  //  A node generates a RREP if either: 
  //  (i)  it is itself the destination, 
  if (IsMyOwnAddress (rreqHeader.GetDst ())) 
    { 
      m_routingTable.LookupRoute (origin, toOrigin); 
       
     NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Send reply since I am the destination");//ORIGINAL 
      SendReply (rreqHeader, toOrigin);//ORIGINAL 
      //std::cout<<rreqHeader.GetOrigin()<<"HEADER"; 
       
      //TO CONFIRM DESTINATION GOT PAMP SIGNAL //LINCY 
      // ackPAMPSignal (rreqHeader,toOrigin); 
        
      
      return; 
    } 
    
   
  /* 
   *  
    * (ii) or it has an active route to the destination, the destination sequence number in the node's existing route 
table entry for the destination 
   *      is valid and greater than or equal to the Destination Sequence Number of the RREQ, and the "destination 
only" flag is NOT set. 
   */ 
  RoutingTableEntry toDst; 
  Ipv4Address dst = rreqHeader.GetDst (); 
  if (m_routingTable.LookupRoute (dst, toDst)) 
    { 
      /* 
       * Drop RREQ, Taisba node RREP wil make a loop. 
       */ 
      if (toDst.GetNextHop () == src) 
        { 
          NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Drop RREQ from " << src << ", dest next hop " << toDst.GetNextHop ()); 
          return; 
        } 
      /* 
       * The Destination Sequence number for the requested destination is set to the maximum of the 
corresponding value 
       * received in the RREQ message, and the destination sequence value currently maintained by the node for 
the requested destination. 
       * However, the forwarding node MUST NOT modify its maintained value for the destination sequence 
number, even if the value 
       * received in the incoming RREQ is larger than the value currently maintained by the forwarding node. 
       */ 
      if ((rreqHeader.GetUnknownSeqno () || (int32_t (toDst.GetSeqNo ()) - int32_t (rreqHeader.GetDstSeqno ()) 
>= 0)) 
          && toDst.GetValidSeqNo () ) 
        { 
          if (!rreqHeader.GetDestinationOnly () && toDst.GetFlag () == INVALID) 
            { 
              m_routingTable.LookupRoute (origin, toOrigin); 
              SendReplyByIntermediateNode (toDst, toOrigin, rreqHeader.GetGratiousRrep ()); 
              return; 
            } 
          rreqHeader.SetDstSeqno (toDst.GetSeqNo ()); 
          rreqHeader.SetUnknownSeqno (false); 
        } 
    } 
 
  for (std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::const_iterator j = 
         m_socketAddresses.begin (); j != m_socketAddresses.end (); ++j) 
    { 
      Ptr<Socket> socket = j->first; 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = j->second; 
      Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
      packet->AddHeader (rreqHeader); 
      TypeHeader tHeader (AISBATYPE_RREQ); 
      packet->AddHeader (tHeader); 
      // Send to all-hosts broadcast if on /32 addr, subnet-directed otherwise 
      Ipv4Address destination; 
      if (iface.GetMask () == Ipv4Mask::GetOnes ()) 
         { 
          destination = Ipv4Address ("255.255.255.255"); 
        } 
      else 
        {  
          destination = iface.GetBroadcast (); 
        } 
      m_lastBcastTime = Simulator::Now (); 
      Simulator::Schedule (Time (MilliSeconds (m_uniformRandomVariable->GetInteger (0, 10))), 
&RoutingProtocol::SendTo, taisba, socket, packet, destination);  
 
    } 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SendReply (RreqHeader const & rreqHeader, RoutingTableEntry const & toOrigin) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << toOrigin.GetDestination ()); 
   
  std::cout<<"i am source to which dest should send rrep" <<toOrigin.GetDestination() << "\n";//lincy 
 
  /* 
   * Destination node MUST increment its own sequence number by one if the sequence number in the RREQ 
packet is equal to that 
   * incremented value. Otherwise, the destination does not change its sequence number before generating the  
RREP message. 
   */ 
  if (!rreqHeader.GetUnknownSeqno () && (rreqHeader.GetDstSeqno () == m_seqNo + 1)) 
    m_seqNo++; 
  RrepHeader rrepHeader ( /*prefixSize=*/ 0, /*hops=*/ 0, /*dst=*/ rreqHeader.GetDst (), 
                                          /*dstSeqNo=*/ m_seqNo, /*origin=*/ toOrigin.GetDestination (), /*lifeTime=*/ 
MyRouteTimeout); 
  Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
  packet->AddHeader (rrepHeader); 
  TypeHeader tHeader (AISBATYPE_RREP); 
  packet->AddHeader (tHeader); 
  Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (toOrigin.GetInterface ()); 
  NS_ASSERT (socket); 
  socket->SendTo (packet, 0, InetSocketAddress (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), AISBA_PORT)); 
} 
 
//method added by lincy for PAMPSEND should i follow the send request or send reply ,i am following send 
reply because the path is already known inorder to send pamp 
 
//void 
//RoutingProtocol::PAMPSend (RreqHeader const & rreqHeader, RoutingTableEntry const & toOrigin) 
//{ 
  //NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << toOrigin.GetDestination ()); 
   
  //std::cout<<"i SHOULD SEND pamp to" <<rreqHeader.GetDst () << "\n";//lincy 
 
  ///* 
    //* Destination node MUST increment its own sequence number by one if the sequence number in the RREQ 
packet is equal to that 
   //* incremented value. Otherwise, the destination does not change its sequence number before generating the  
RREP message. 
   //*/ 
  //if (!rreqHeader.GetUnknownSeqno () && (rreqHeader.GetDstSeqno () == m_seqNo + 1)) 
    //m_seqNo++; 
    //PampsendHeader pampsendheader ( /*prefixSize=*/ 0, /*hops=*/ 0, /*dst=*/ rreqHeader.GetDst (), 
                                          ///*dstSeqNo=*/ m_seqNo, /*origin=*/ toOrigin.GetDestination (), /*lifeTime=*/ 
MyRouteTimeout); 
  //Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
  ////PampsendHeader pampsendheader; 
  //packet->AddHeader (pampsendheader); 
  //TypeHeader tHeader (AISBATYPE_PAMPSEND); 
  //packet->AddHeader (tHeader); 
  //Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (toOrigin.GetInterface ()); 
  //NS_ASSERT (socket); 
  //socket->SendTo (packet, 0, InetSocketAddress (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), AISBA_PORT)); 
//} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SendReplyByIntermediateNode (RoutingTableEntry & toDst, RoutingTableEntry & toOrigin, 
bool gratRep) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  RrepHeader rrepHeader (/*prefix size=*/ 0, /*hops=*/ toDst.GetHop (), /*dst=*/ toDst.GetDestination (), /*dst 
seqno=*/ toDst.GetSeqNo (), 
                                          /*origin=*/ toOrigin.GetDestination (), /*lifetime=*/ toDst.GetLifeTime ()); 
  /* If the node we received a RREQ for is a neighbor we are 
   * probably facing a unidirectional link... Better request a RREP-ack 
   */ 
  if (toDst.GetHop () == 1) 
    { 
      rrepHeader.SetAckRequired (true); 
      RoutingTableEntry toNextHop; 
      m_routingTable.LookupRoute (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), toNextHop); 
      toNextHop.m_ackTimer.SetFunction (&RoutingProtocol::AckTimerExpire, taisba); 
      toNextHop.m_ackTimer.SetArguments (toNextHop.GetDestination (), BlackListTimeout); 
      toNextHop.m_ackTimer.SetDelay (NextHopWait); 
    } 
  toDst.InsertPrecursor (toOrigin.GetNextHop ()); 
  toOrigin.InsertPrecursor (toDst.GetNextHop ()); 
  m_routingTable.Update (toDst); 
  m_routingTable.Update (toOrigin); 
    
 
  Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
  packet->AddHeader (rrepHeader); 
  TypeHeader tHeader (AISBATYPE_RREP); 
  packet->AddHeader (tHeader); 
  Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (toOrigin.GetInterface ()); 
  NS_ASSERT (socket); 
  socket->SendTo (packet, 0, InetSocketAddress (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), AISBA_PORT)); 
  
  // Generating gratuitous RREPs 
  if (gratRep) 
    { 
      RrepHeader gratRepHeader (/*prefix size=*/ 0, /*hops=*/ toOrigin.GetHop (), /*dst=*/ 
toOrigin.GetDestination (), 
                                                 /*dst seqno=*/ toOrigin.GetSeqNo (), /*origin=*/ toDst.GetDestination (), 
                                                 /*lifetime=*/ toOrigin.GetLifeTime ()); 
      Ptr<Packet> packetToDst = Create<Packet> (); 
      packetToDst->AddHeader (gratRepHeader); 
      TypeHeader type (AISBATYPE_RREP); 
      packetToDst->AddHeader (type); 
      Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (toDst.GetInterface ()); 
      NS_ASSERT (socket); 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Send gratuitous RREP " << packet->GetUid ()); 
      socket->SendTo (packetToDst, 0, InetSocketAddress (toDst.GetNextHop (), AISBA_PORT)); 
    } 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SendReplyAck (Ipv4Address neighbor) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << " to " << neighbor); 
  RrepAckHeader h; 
  TypeHeader typeHeader (AISBATYPE_RREP_ACK); 
  Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
  packet->AddHeader (h); 
  packet->AddHeader (typeHeader); 
  RoutingTableEntry toNeighbor; 
  m_routingTable.LookupRoute (neighbor, toNeighbor); 
  Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (toNeighbor.GetInterface ()); 
  NS_ASSERT (socket); 
  socket->SendTo (packet, 0, InetSocketAddress (neighbor, AISBA_PORT)); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::RecvReply (Ptr<Packet> p, Ipv4Address receiver, Ipv4Address sender) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << " src " << sender); 
  //std::cout<<receiver<<"RECEIVER"; 
  RrepHeader rrepHeader; 
  p->RemoveHeader (rrepHeader); 
  Ipv4Address dst = rrepHeader.GetDst (); 
 
  NS_LOG_LOGIC ("RREP destination " << dst << " RREP origin " << rrepHeader.GetOrigin ()); 
  
 
  uint8_t hop = rrepHeader.GetHopCount () + 1; 
  rrepHeader.SetHopCount (hop); 
 
  // If RREP is Hello message 
  if (dst == rrepHeader.GetOrigin ()) 
    { 
       ProcessHello (rrepHeader, receiver); 
      return; 
    } 
 
  /* 
   * If the route table entry to the destination is created or updated, then the following actions occur: 
   * -  the route is marked as active, 
   * -  the destination sequence number is marked as valid, 
   * -  the next hop in the route entry is assigned to be the node from which the RREP is received, 
   *    which is indicated by the source IP address field in the IP header, 
   * -  the hop count is set to the value of the hop count from RREP message + 1 
   * -  the expiry time is set to the current time plus the value of the Lifetime in the RREP message, 
   * -  and the destination sequence number is the Destination Sequence Number in the RREP message. 
   */ 
  Ptr<NetDevice> dev = m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver)); 
  RoutingTableEntry newEntry (/*device=*/ dev, /*dst=*/ dst, /*validSeqNo=*/ true, /*seqno=*/ 
rrepHeader.GetDstSeqno (), 
                                          /*iface=*/ m_ipv4->GetAddress (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver), 
0),/*hop=*/ hop, 
                                          /*nextHop=*/ sender, /*lifeTime=*/ rrepHeader.GetLifeTime ()); 
  RoutingTableEntry toDst; 
  if (m_routingTable.LookupRoute (dst, toDst)) 
    { 
      /* 
       * The existing entry is updated only in the following circumstances: 
       * (i) the sequence number in the routing table is marked as invalid in route table entry. 
       */ 
      if (!toDst.GetValidSeqNo ()) 
        { 
          m_routingTable.Update (newEntry); 
        } 
      // (ii)the Destination Sequence Number in the RREP is greater than the node's copy of the destination 
sequence number and the known value is valid, 
      else if ((int32_t (rrepHeader.GetDstSeqno ()) - int32_t (toDst.GetSeqNo ())) > 0) 
        { 
          m_routingTable.Update (newEntry); 
        } 
      else 
        { 
          // (iii) the sequence numbers are the same, but the route is marked as inactive. 
          if ((rrepHeader.GetDstSeqno () == toDst.GetSeqNo ()) && (toDst.GetFlag () != VALID)) 
            { 
              m_routingTable.Update (newEntry); 
            } 
          // (iv)  the sequence numbers are the same, and the New Hop Count is smaller than the hop count in route 
table entry. 
          else if ((rrepHeader.GetDstSeqno () == toDst.GetSeqNo ()) && (hop < toDst.GetHop ())) 
            { 
              m_routingTable.Update (newEntry); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
  else 
     { 
      // The forward route for taisba destination is created if it does not already exist. 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("add new route"); 
      m_routingTable.AddRoute (newEntry); 
    } 
  // Acknowledge receipt of the RREP by sending a RREP-ACK message back 
  if (rrepHeader.GetAckRequired ()) 
    { 
      SendReplyAck (sender); 
      rrepHeader.SetAckRequired (true);//originally false lincy changed to true 
    } 
  NS_LOG_LOGIC ("receiver " << receiver << " origin " << rrepHeader.GetOrigin ()); 
  if (IsMyOwnAddress (rrepHeader.GetOrigin ())) 
    { 
      if (toDst.GetFlag () == IN_SEARCH) 
        { 
          m_routingTable.Update (newEntry); 
          m_addressReqTimer[dst].Remove (); 
          m_addressReqTimer.erase (dst); 
        } 
      m_routingTable.LookupRoute (dst, toDst); 
    
      return; 
    } 
 
  RoutingTableEntry toOrigin; 
  if (!m_routingTable.LookupRoute (rrepHeader.GetOrigin (), toOrigin) || toOrigin.GetFlag () == IN_SEARCH) 
    { 
      return; // Impossible! drop. 
      
    } 
  toOrigin.SetLifeTime (std::max (ActiveRouteTimeout, toOrigin.GetLifeTime ())); 
  m_routingTable.Update (toOrigin); 
     
 
  // Update information about precursors 
  if (m_routingTable.LookupValidRoute (rrepHeader.GetDst (), toDst)) 
    { 
      toDst.InsertPrecursor (toOrigin.GetNextHop ()); 
      m_routingTable.Update (toDst); 
 
      RoutingTableEntry toNextHopToDst; 
      m_routingTable.LookupRoute (toDst.GetNextHop (), toNextHopToDst); 
      toNextHopToDst.InsertPrecursor (toOrigin.GetNextHop ()); 
      m_routingTable.Update (toNextHopToDst); 
 
      toOrigin.InsertPrecursor (toDst.GetNextHop ()); 
      m_routingTable.Update (toOrigin); 
       
 
      RoutingTableEntry toNextHopToOrigin; 
      m_routingTable.LookupRoute (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), toNextHopToOrigin); 
      toNextHopToOrigin.InsertPrecursor (toDst.GetNextHop ()); 
       m_routingTable.Update (toNextHopToOrigin); 
    } 
 
  Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
  packet->AddHeader (rrepHeader); 
  TypeHeader tHeader (AISBATYPE_RREP); 
  packet->AddHeader (tHeader); 
  Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (toOrigin.GetInterface ()); 
   
  NS_ASSERT (socket); 
  socket->SendTo (packet, 0, InetSocketAddress (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), AISBA_PORT)); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::RecvReplyAck (Ipv4Address neighbor) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  RoutingTableEntry rt; 
   
  if(m_routingTable.LookupRoute (neighbor, rt)) 
    { 
      rt.m_ackTimer.Cancel (); 
      rt.SetFlag (VALID); 
      m_routingTable.Update (rt); 
       
    } 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::ProcessHello (RrepHeader const & rrepHeader, Ipv4Address receiver ) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << "from " << rrepHeader.GetDst ()); 
  /* 
   *  Whenever a node receives a Hello message from a neighbor, the node 
   * SHOULD make sure that it has an active route to the neighbor, and 
   * create one if necessary. 
   */ 
  RoutingTableEntry toNeighbor; 
  if (!m_routingTable.LookupRoute (rrepHeader.GetDst (), toNeighbor)) 
    { 
      Ptr<NetDevice> dev = m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver)); 
      RoutingTableEntry newEntry (/*device=*/ dev, /*dst=*/ rrepHeader.GetDst (), /*validSeqNo=*/ true, 
/*seqno=*/ rrepHeader.GetDstSeqno (), 
                                              /*iface=*/ m_ipv4->GetAddress (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver), 0), 
                                              /*hop=*/ 1, /*nextHop=*/ rrepHeader.GetDst (), /*lifeTime=*/ 
rrepHeader.GetLifeTime ()); 
      m_routingTable.AddRoute (newEntry); 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      toNeighbor.SetLifeTime (std::max (Time (AllowedHelloLoss * HelloInterval), toNeighbor.GetLifeTime 
())); 
      toNeighbor.SetSeqNo (rrepHeader.GetDstSeqno ()); 
       toNeighbor.SetValidSeqNo (true); 
      toNeighbor.SetFlag (VALID); 
      toNeighbor.SetOutputDevice (m_ipv4->GetNetDevice (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver))); 
      toNeighbor.SetInterface (m_ipv4->GetAddress (m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForAddress (receiver), 0)); 
      toNeighbor.SetHop (1); 
      toNeighbor.SetNextHop (rrepHeader.GetDst ()); 
      m_routingTable.Update (toNeighbor); 
    } 
  if (EnableHello) 
    { 
      m_nb.Update (rrepHeader.GetDst (), Time (AllowedHelloLoss * HelloInterval)); 
    } 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::RecvError (Ptr<Packet> p, Ipv4Address src )//recv  route error from node with address src 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << " from " << src); 
 
  RerrHeader rerrHeader; 
  
  p->RemoveHeader (rerrHeader); 
 //// PampsendHeader pampsendHeader; 
   
 ////Lincy Starts 
   
   //Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
   //Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1, 0); 
  
 ///**lINCY  ADDED code to send PAMP when source has received RERR,ALSO ADDED 
GETORIGIN,SET ORIGIN TO PACKET.CC AND H FOR AISBA 
PURPOSE**************************************************************/ 
  
       //std::cout <<  " RERR Packet Received TO node - " << ifaceLocal.GetLocal() << "\n";//lincy 
     
             //rerrHeader.SetOrigin (ifaceLocal.GetLocal ()); 
              //Ipv4Address origin=rerrHeader.GetOrigin (); 
           //std::cout<<" Origin  = "<<rerrHeader.GetOrigin() << "  DEST = " <<rerrHeader.GetDst()<< "\n"; 
 
            //if (IsMyOwnAddress (rerrHeader.GetOrigin())){ 
    //std::cout<<" Calling Activate DC for " <<origin; 
     //ActivateDC();//Lincy 
             //}   
       //Ipv4Address dst = rerrHeader.GetDst(); 
       //RoutingTableEntry toDst; 
       //Ptr<Ipv4Route> route = toDst.GetRoute (); 
          //sendPAMPSignal ( dst, route); 
         ////ENDS LINCY  
   std::map<Ipv4Address, uint32_t> dstWithNextHopSrc; 
  std::map<Ipv4Address, uint32_t> unreachable; 
  m_routingTable.GetListOfDestinationWithNextHop (src, dstWithNextHopSrc); 
  std::pair<Ipv4Address, uint32_t> un; 
  while (rerrHeader.RemoveUnDestination (un)) 
     { 
      for (std::map<Ipv4Address, uint32_t>::const_iterator i = 
           dstWithNextHopSrc.begin (); i != dstWithNextHopSrc.end (); ++i) 
      { 
        if (i->first == un.first) 
          { 
            unreachable.insert (un); 
          } 
      } 
    } 
 
  std::vector<Ipv4Address> precursors; 
  for (std::map<Ipv4Address, uint32_t>::const_iterator i = unreachable.begin (); 
       i != unreachable.end ();) 
    { 
      if (!rerrHeader.AddUnDestination (i->first, i->second)) 
        { 
          TypeHeader typeHeader (AISBATYPE_RERR); 
          Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
          packet->AddHeader (rerrHeader); 
          packet->AddHeader (typeHeader); 
          SendRerrMessage (packet, precursors); 
          rerrHeader.Clear (); 
        } 
      else 
        { 
          RoutingTableEntry toDst; 
          m_routingTable.LookupRoute (i->first, toDst); 
          toDst.GetPrecursors (precursors); 
          ++i; 
        } 
    } 
  if (rerrHeader.GetDestCount () != 0) 
    { 
      TypeHeader typeHeader (AISBATYPE_RERR); 
      Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
      packet->AddHeader (rerrHeader); 
      packet->AddHeader (typeHeader); 
      SendRerrMessage (packet, precursors); 
                
 
    } 
  m_routingTable.InvalidateRoutesWithDst (unreachable); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::RouteRequestTimerExpire (Ipv4Address dst) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_LOGIC (taisba); 
  RoutingTableEntry toDst; 
  if (m_routingTable.LookupValidRoute (dst, toDst)) 
    { 
      SendPacketFromQueue (dst, toDst.GetRoute ()); 
       NS_LOG_LOGIC ("route to " << dst << " found"); 
      std::cout<< "route to" << dst<< "found";//lincy 
      return; 
    } 
  /* 
   *  If a route discovery has been attempted RreqRetries times at the maximum TTL without 
   *  receiving any RREP, all data packets destined for the corresponding destination SHOULD be 
   *  dropped from the buffer and a Destination Unreachable message SHOULD be delivered to the application. 
   */ 
  if (toDst.GetRreqCnt () == RreqRetries) 
    { 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("route discovery to " << dst << " has been attempted RreqRetries (" << RreqRetries << 
") times"); 
       std::cout << "route discovery to " << dst << " has been attempted RreqRetries (" << RreqRetries << ") 
times";//lincy 
      m_addressReqTimer.erase (dst); 
      m_routingTable.DeleteRoute (dst); 
      NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Route not found. Drop all packets with dst " << dst); 
      std::cout<< "Route not found,drop all packets with dst"<<dst;//lincy 
      m_queue.DropPacketWithDst (dst); 
      return; 
    } 
 
  if (toDst.GetFlag () == IN_SEARCH) 
    { 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Resend RREQ to " << dst << " ttl " << NetDiameter); 
      SendRequest (dst); 
       
      //LIncy Starts 
      Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1,0); 
      std::cout<< ifaceLocal.GetLocal() <<": resend rreq as in_Search to dst"<<dst;//lincy 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Route down. Stop search. Drop packet with destination " << dst); 
      m_addressReqTimer.erase (dst); 
      m_routingTable.DeleteRoute (dst); 
      m_queue.DropPacketWithDst (dst); 
    } 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::HelloTimerExpire () 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  Time offset = Time (Seconds (0)); 
  if (m_lastBcastTime > Time (Seconds (0))) 
    { 
      offset = Simulator::Now () - m_lastBcastTime; 
      NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Hello deferred due to last bcast at:" << m_lastBcastTime); 
    } 
  else 
     { 
      SendHello (); 
    } 
  m_htimer.Cancel (); 
  Time diff = HelloInterval - offset; 
  m_htimer.Schedule (std::max (Time (Seconds (0)), diff)); 
  m_lastBcastTime = Time (Seconds (0)); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::RreqRateLimitTimerExpire () 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  m_rreqCount = 0; 
  m_rreqRateLimitTimer.Schedule (Seconds (1)); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::RerrRateLimitTimerExpire () 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  m_rerrCount = 0; 
  m_rerrRateLimitTimer.Schedule (Seconds (1)); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::AckTimerExpire (Ipv4Address neighbor, Time blacklistTimeout) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  m_routingTable.MarkLinkAsUnidirectional (neighbor, blacklistTimeout); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SendHello () 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  /* Broadcast a RREP with TTL = 1 with the RREP message fields set as follows: 
   *   Destination IP Address         The node's IP address. 
   *   Destination Sequence Number    The node's latest sequence number. 
   *   Hop Count                      0 
   *   Lifetime                       AllowedHelloLoss * HelloInterval 
   */ 
  for (std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::const_iterator j = m_socketAddresses.begin (); j != 
m_socketAddresses.end (); ++j) 
    { 
      Ptr<Socket> socket = j->first; 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = j->second; 
      RrepHeader helloHeader (/*prefix size=*/ 0, /*hops=*/ 0, /*dst=*/ iface.GetLocal (), /*dst seqno=*/ 
m_seqNo, 
                                               /*origin=*/ iface.GetLocal (),/*lifetime=*/ Time (AllowedHelloLoss * 
HelloInterval)); 
      Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
      packet->AddHeader (helloHeader); 
       TypeHeader tHeader (AISBATYPE_RREP); 
      packet->AddHeader (tHeader); 
      // Send to all-hosts broadcast if on /32 addr, subnet-directed otherwise 
      Ipv4Address destination; 
      if (iface.GetMask () == Ipv4Mask::GetOnes ()) 
        { 
          destination = Ipv4Address ("255.255.255.255"); 
        } 
      else 
        {  
          destination = iface.GetBroadcast (); 
        } 
      Time jitter = Time (MilliSeconds (m_uniformRandomVariable->GetInteger (0, 10))); 
      Simulator::Schedule (jitter, &RoutingProtocol::SendTo, taisba , socket, packet, destination); 
    } 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SendPacketFromQueue (Ipv4Address dst, Ptr<Ipv4Route> route) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  QueueEntry queueEntry; 
  while (m_queue.Dequeue (dst, queueEntry)) 
    { 
      DeferredRouteOutputTag tag; 
      //Lincy Starts 
      //Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
      //Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1,0); 
      //std::cout<< ifaceLocal.GetLocal() <<": send packet from queue\n";//lincy 
      //Lincy Ends 
      Ptr<Packet> p = ConstCast<Packet> (queueEntry.GetPacket ()); 
      if (p->RemovePacketTag (tag) &&  
          tag.GetInterface() != -1 && 
          tag.GetInterface() != m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForDevice (route->GetOutputDevice ())) 
        { 
          NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Output device doesn't match. Dropped."); 
          return; 
        } 
      UnicastForwardCallback ucb = queueEntry.GetUnicastForwardCallback (); 
      Ipv4Header header = queueEntry.GetIpv4Header (); 
      header.SetSource (route->GetSource ()); 
      header.SetTtl (header.GetTtl () + 1); // compensate extra TTL decrement by fake loopback routing 
      ucb (route, p, header); 
    } 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SendRerrWhenBreaksLinkToNextHop (Ipv4Address nextHop) 
{  
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << nextHop); 
  //std::cout<<nextHop<<"NEXTHOP"; 
  RerrHeader rerrHeader; 
  std::vector<Ipv4Address> precursors; 
   std::map<Ipv4Address, uint32_t> unreachable; 
 
  RoutingTableEntry toNextHop; 
  if (!m_routingTable.LookupRoute (nextHop, toNextHop)) 
    return; 
  toNextHop.GetPrecursors (precursors); 
  rerrHeader.AddUnDestination (nextHop, toNextHop.GetSeqNo ()); 
  m_routingTable.GetListOfDestinationWithNextHop (nextHop, unreachable); 
  for (std::map<Ipv4Address, uint32_t>::const_iterator i = unreachable.begin (); i 
       != unreachable.end ();) 
    { 
      if (!rerrHeader.AddUnDestination (i->first, i->second)) 
        { 
          NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Send RERR message with maximum size."); 
          TypeHeader typeHeader (AISBATYPE_RERR); 
          Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
          packet->AddHeader (rerrHeader); 
          packet->AddHeader (typeHeader); 
          SendRerrMessage (packet, precursors); 
          rerrHeader.Clear (); 
        } 
      else 
        { 
          RoutingTableEntry toDst; 
          m_routingTable.LookupRoute (i->first, toDst); 
          toDst.GetPrecursors (precursors); 
          ++i; 
        } 
    } 
  if (rerrHeader.GetDestCount () != 0) 
    { 
      TypeHeader typeHeader (AISBATYPE_RERR); 
      Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
      packet->AddHeader (rerrHeader); 
      packet->AddHeader (typeHeader); 
      SendRerrMessage (packet, precursors); 
    } 
  unreachable.insert (std::make_pair (nextHop, toNextHop.GetSeqNo ())); 
  m_routingTable.InvalidateRoutesWithDst (unreachable); 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SendRerrWhenNoRouteToForward (Ipv4Address dst, 
                                               uint32_t dstSeqNo, Ipv4Address origin) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  // A node SHOULD NOT originate more than RERR_RATELIMIT RERR messages per second. 
  if (m_rerrCount == RerrRateLimit) 
    { 
      // Just make sure that the RerrRateLimit timer is running and will expire 
      NS_ASSERT (m_rerrRateLimitTimer.IsRunning ()); 
      // discard the packet and return 
       NS_LOG_LOGIC ("RerrRateLimit reached at " << Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds () << " with timer delay 
left "  
                                                << m_rerrRateLimitTimer.GetDelayLeft ().GetSeconds () 
                                                << "; suppressing RERR"); 
      return; 
    } 
  RerrHeader rerrHeader; 
  rerrHeader.AddUnDestination (dst, dstSeqNo); 
  RoutingTableEntry toOrigin; 
  Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
  packet->AddHeader (rerrHeader); 
  packet->AddHeader (TypeHeader (AISBATYPE_RERR)); 
  if (m_routingTable.LookupValidRoute (origin, toOrigin)) 
    { 
  //Lincy Starts 
  Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
       Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1,0); 
  //std::cout<< ifaceLocal.GetLocal() << ": " <<origin <<"hey i found you-origin 
\n";//lincy 
  //sendPAMPSignal(); 
  //Lincy Ends 
      Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress ( 
          toOrigin.GetInterface ()); 
      NS_ASSERT (socket); 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Unicast RERR to the source of the data transmission"); 
     std::cout<< ifaceLocal.GetLocal() << ": " << "Unicast RERR to "<<origin <<"\n";//lincy 
      std::cout<<origin<<"initiator of RREQ"<<"\n";//lincy 
       RerrHeader rerrHeader;//lincy 
  
  
 /**lINCY  ADDED code to send PAMP when source has received RERR,ALSO ADDED 
GETORIGIN,SET ORIGIN TO PACKET.CC AND H FOR TAISBA 
PURPOSE**************************************************************/ 
         // rerrHeader.SetOrigin (ifaceLocal.GetLocal ()); 
            //  Ipv4Address origin=rerrHeader.GetOrigin (); 
        
 
           // if (IsMyOwnAddress (origin)){ 
    std::cout<<" Calling Activate DC for " <<origin; 
     ActivateDC(origin);//Lincy 
           //  }   
          
          //SendRerrMessage (packet, precursors); 
       //Ipv4Address dst = rerrHeader.GetDst(); 
       RoutingTableEntry toOrigin; 
       Ptr<Ipv4Route> route = toOrigin.GetRoute (); 
          sendPAMPSignal ( origin, route); 
    
         //ENDS LINCY  
        //if (IsMyOwnAddress (origin)) //lincy 
        //{ //(m_routingTable.LookupValidRoute (origin, toOrigin)); 
   ////sendPAMPSignal(); 
   //std::cout<<"JKJKJKJKJJJKJKKJKJKJKJKJKJKJKJK"; 
    //return;} //lincy 
      socket->SendTo (packet, 0, InetSocketAddress (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), AISBA_PORT)); 
    } 
  else 
    { 
      for (std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::const_iterator i = 
             m_socketAddresses.begin (); i != m_socketAddresses.end (); ++i) 
        { 
          Ptr<Socket> socket = i->first; 
          Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = i->second; 
          NS_ASSERT (socket); 
          NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Broadcast RERR message from interface " << iface.GetLocal ()); 
          // Send to all-hosts broadcast if on /32 addr, subnet-directed otherwise 
          Ipv4Address destination; 
          if (iface.GetMask () == Ipv4Mask::GetOnes ()) 
            { 
              destination = Ipv4Address ("255.255.255.255"); 
            } 
          else 
            {  
              destination = iface.GetBroadcast (); 
            } 
          socket->SendTo (packet->Copy (), 0, InetSocketAddress (destination, AISBA_PORT)); 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::SendRerrMessage (Ptr<Packet> packet, std::vector<Ipv4Address> precursors) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  
 
  if (precursors.empty ()) 
    { 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("No precursors"); 
      return; 
    } 
  // A node SHOULD NOT originate more than RERR_RATELIMIT RERR messages per second. 
  if (m_rerrCount == RerrRateLimit) 
    { 
      // Just make sure that the RerrRateLimit timer is running and will expire 
      NS_ASSERT (m_rerrRateLimitTimer.IsRunning ()); 
      // discard the packet and return 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("RerrRateLimit reached at " << Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds () << " with timer delay 
left "  
                                                << m_rerrRateLimitTimer.GetDelayLeft ().GetSeconds () 
                                                << "; suppressing RERR"); 
                                                std::cout <<"RerrRateLimit reached at " << Simulator::Now ().GetSeconds () << " 
with timer delay left "  
                                                << m_rerrRateLimitTimer.GetDelayLeft ().GetSeconds () 
                                                << "; suppressing RERR";//lincy 
      return; 
     } 
  // If there is only one precursor, RERR SHOULD be unicast toward that precursor 
  if (precursors.size () == 1) 
    { 
      RoutingTableEntry toPrecursor; 
      if (m_routingTable.LookupValidRoute (precursors.front (), toPrecursor)) 
        { 
          Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (toPrecursor.GetInterface ()); 
          NS_ASSERT (socket); 
          NS_LOG_LOGIC ("one precursor => unicast RERR to " << toPrecursor.GetDestination () << " from " << 
toPrecursor.GetInterface ().GetLocal ()); 
          Simulator::Schedule (Time (MilliSeconds (m_uniformRandomVariable->GetInteger (0, 10))), 
&RoutingProtocol::SendTo, taisba, socket, packet, precursors.front ()); 
          m_rerrCount++; 
        } 
      return; 
    } 
 
  //  Should only transmit RERR on those interfaces which have precursor nodes for the broken route 
  std::vector<Ipv4InterfaceAddress> ifaces; 
  RoutingTableEntry toPrecursor; 
  for (std::vector<Ipv4Address>::const_iterator i = precursors.begin (); i != precursors.end (); ++i) 
    { 
      if (m_routingTable.LookupValidRoute (*i, toPrecursor) &&  
          std::find (ifaces.begin (), ifaces.end (), toPrecursor.GetInterface ()) == ifaces.end ()) 
        { 
          ifaces.push_back (toPrecursor.GetInterface ()); 
        } 
    } 
 
  for (std::vector<Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::const_iterator i = ifaces.begin (); i != ifaces.end (); ++i) 
    { 
      Ptr<Socket> socket = FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (*i); 
      NS_ASSERT (socket); 
      NS_LOG_LOGIC ("Broadcast RERR message from interface " << i->GetLocal ()); 
      // std::cout << "Broadcast RERR message from interface " << i->GetLocal () << std::endl; 
      // Send to all-hosts broadcast if on /32 addr, subnet-directed otherwise 
      Ptr<Packet> p = packet->Copy (); 
      Ipv4Address destination; 
      if (i->GetMask () == Ipv4Mask::GetOnes ()) 
        { 
          destination = Ipv4Address ("255.255.255.255"); 
        } 
      else 
        {  
          destination = i->GetBroadcast (); 
        } 
      Simulator::Schedule (Time (MilliSeconds (m_uniformRandomVariable->GetInteger (0, 10))), 
&RoutingProtocol::SendTo, taisba, socket, p, destination); 
    } 
} 
 
Ptr<Socket> 
 RoutingProtocol::FindSocketWithInterfaceAddress (Ipv4InterfaceAddress addr ) const 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << addr); 
  for (std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::const_iterator j = 
         m_socketAddresses.begin (); j != m_socketAddresses.end (); ++j) 
    { 
      Ptr<Socket> socket = j->first; 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = j->second; 
      if (iface == addr) 
        return socket; 
    } 
  Ptr<Socket> socket; 
  return socket; 
} 
 
Ptr<Socket> 
RoutingProtocol::FindSubnetBroadcastSocketWithInterfaceAddress (Ipv4InterfaceAddress addr ) const 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba << addr); 
  for (std::map<Ptr<Socket>, Ipv4InterfaceAddress>::const_iterator j = 
         m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.begin (); j != m_socketSubnetBroadcastAddresses.end (); ++j) 
    { 
      Ptr<Socket> socket = j->first; 
      Ipv4InterfaceAddress iface = j->second; 
      if (iface == addr) 
        return socket; 
    } 
  Ptr<Socket> socket; 
  return socket; 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::DoInitialize (void) 
{ 
  NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  uint32_t startTime; 
  if (EnableHello) 
    { 
      m_htimer.SetFunction (&RoutingProtocol::HelloTimerExpire, taisba); 
      startTime = m_uniformRandomVariable->GetInteger (0, 100); 
      NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Starting at time " << startTime << "ms"); 
      m_htimer.Schedule (MilliSeconds (startTime)); 
    } 
  Ipv4RoutingProtocol::DoInitialize (); 
} 
 
// Method added by Lincy 
 
//void RoutingProtocol::sendPAMPSignal(){ 
  //RoutingTableEntry _oRoutingTableEntry; 
  //Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
  //Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1,0); 
  //std::cout << ifaceLocal.GetLocal() << ": " << "Talking from sendPAMPSignal Method\n"; 
 //} 
//////////////////SENDPAMPSIGANL///LINCY 
//void 
//RoutingProtocol::sendPAMPSignal (Ipv4Address dst, Ipv4Address origin) 
//{ 
  //std::cout<<"ARE YOU REACHABLE"<<dst<<"\n";//LINCY 
//} 
void 
RoutingProtocol::sendPAMPSignal (Ipv4Address dst, Ptr<Ipv4Route> route) 
{ 
  //NS_LOG_FUNCTION (taisba); 
  //QueueEntry queueEntry; 
  //while (m_queue.Dequeue (dst, queueEntry)) 
    //{ 
      //DeferredRouteOutputTag tag; 
      //Lincy Starts 
     // Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
//Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1,0); 
     // std::cout<< ifaceLocal.GetLocal() <<": send PAMP\n";//lincy 
     RerrHeader rerrHeader; 
 //Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
 // Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1,0); 
//  rerrHeader.SetOrigin (ifaceLocal.GetLocal ()); 
rerrHeader.SetOrigin(dst); 
 Ipv4Address ac =rerrHeader.GetOrigin(); 
 std::cout<<"sendpamp" << ac; 
      //Lincy Ends 
       
    //  RerrHeader rerrHeader; 
      // rerrHeader.SetOrigin (ifaceLocal.GetLocal ()); 
            //  Ipv4Address origin=rerrHeader.GetOrigin (); 
            
            //if (IsMyOwnAddress (origin)){ 
     //ActivateDC();//Lincy 
             //}   
     //  Ipv4Address dst = rerrHeader.GetDst(); 
       //Ipv4Address origin = rerrheader.GetOrigin(); 
 // m_routingTable.Purge (); 
  //RoutingTableEntry toDst; 
  
        //  Ptr<Ipv4Route> routes = toDst.GetRoute (); 
           
        //  RoutingTableEntry toOrigin; 
        //  m_routingTable.LookupRoute (origin, toOrigin); 
        //  UpdateRouteLifeTime (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), ActiveRouteTimeout); 
 
         // m_nb.Update (route->GetGateway (), ActiveRouteTimeout); 
        //  m_nb.Update (toOrigin.GetNextHop (), ActiveRouteTimeout); 
 
    //PampsendHeader pampsendHeader; 
      //Ptr<Packet> packet = Create<Packet> (); 
//packet->AddHeader (rerrHeader);//pampsendHeader rerrHeader 
     // TypeHeader tHeader (AISBATYPE_RERR);//AISBATYPE_PAMPSEND 
     //  packet->AddHeader (tHeader); 
     // Ptr<Packet> p = ConstCast<Packet> (queueEntry.GetPacket ()); 
      //if (p->RemovePacketTag (tag) &&  
          //tag.GetInterface() != -1 && 
          //tag.GetInterface() != m_ipv4->GetInterfaceForDevice (route->GetOutputDevice ())) 
        //{ 
          //NS_LOG_DEBUG ("Output device doesn't match. Dropped."); 
          //return; 
        //} 
      //UnicastForwardCallback ucb = queueEntry.GetUnicastForwardCallback (); 
      //Ipv4Header header = queueEntry.GetIpv4Header (); 
      //header.SetSource (route->GetSource ()); 
      //header.SetTtl (header.GetTtl () + 1); // compensate extra TTL decrement by fake loopback routing 
      //ucb (route, p, header); 
    //} 
} 
 
void 
RoutingProtocol::ackPAMPSignal (RreqHeader const & rreqHeader, RoutingTableEntry const & toOrigin) 
{  
 std::cout<<"I AM REACHABLE"<<"\n";//LINCY 
 //bool ackPAMPSignalrecv;//doubt 
} 
//Method added bt Lincy 
void RoutingProtocol::ActivateDC(Ipv4Address origins){ 
  
 RerrHeader rerrHeader; 
 //Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
 // Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1,0); 
//  rerrHeader.SetOrigin (ifaceLocal.GetLocal ()); 
rerrHeader.SetOrigin(origins); 
 Ipv4Address dc =rerrHeader.GetOrigin(); 
 std::cout<<"ActivateDC" << dc; 
  //RoutingTableEntry _oRoutingTableEntry; 
 // Ptr<Ipv4L3Protocol> l3K = m_ipv4->GetObject<Ipv4L3Protocol> (); 
 //// Ipv4InterfaceAddress ifaceLocal = l3K->GetAddress(1,0); 
 // std::cout << ifaceLocal.GetLocal() << ": " << "Activate DC\n"; 
} 
 
} //namespace aisba 
} //namespace ns3 
 
 
  
 Appendix 3 Value of Node nearness facor(K) 
Hop count (F)                                
ln(F) 
K                                   ln(K) Pcom=ln(K)/ln(F) (for F=14) 
2                                                      
.693 
1                                   0 0 
4                                                       
1.3 
2                                  .693 0.26 
6                                                        
1.7 
3                                   1.09      0.41 
8                                                        
2.0 
4                                   1.38 0.53 
10                                                      
2.3 
5                                   1.60 0.61 
12                                                      
2.4 
6                                    1.79 0.68 
14                                                      
2.6 
9                                     2.19  0.84 
 
As can be observed ,when the value of K gets higher this gives a misleading information 
regarding Pcom (Probability of node nearness/communication).For example, if we consider a 
higher value of  hop count  ,it is  most likely that the node is far away and the probability of 
communication is very low.Thereby choosing higher value of K ,along with a higher hop 
count , shows that the probability of communication is high which is not correct therefore the 
ideal value of K is chosen to be 2.The same can be inferred from the table above when K is 
9and hop count is 14 the value of Pcom is 0.84 which is misleading.Therefore the value of K 
should be chosen in accordance with the Probability of node nearness/communication and 
signal the correct information  about the node nearness. 
 
